Wisconsin § 893.23 - When action stayed.

§ 893.23. When action stayed.

When the commencement of an action is stayed by injunction or statutory prohibition the time of the continuance of the injunction or prohibition is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. 893.23 History History: 1979 c. 323 . 893.23 Note Judicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.36 renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. [Bill 326-A] 893.23 Annotation The interplay between this section and s. 893.80 creates a statute of limitations equal to three years and 120 days when filing a claim under s. 893.80. Colby v. Columbia County, 202 Wis. 2d 342 , 550 N.W.2d 124 (1996), 93-3348 . subch. III of ch. 893 SUBCHAPTER III ACTIONS CONCERNING REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY Subch. III of ch. 893 Note Judicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This subchapter assembles sections affecting real or personal property in a single location in ch. 893. It revises some present provisions; rearranges others; adds a 7-year limitation statute under certain circumstances and a codification of case-law relating to obtaining prescriptive rights by adverse user; and deletes several present sections considered unnecessary. Subch. III of ch. 893 Note Notes following the sections of the subchapter explain the rearrangements, changes, and additions. However, specific discussion of those sections eliminated follows: Subch. III of ch. 893 Note (1) Previous ss. 893.02 and 893.03 were judged duplicative of the principal operative sections and possibly confusing. Nelson v. Jacobs, 99 Wis. 547, 75 N.W. 406 (1898), appears to rely in part on these sections for the proposition that one who has adversely possessed for 20 years has marketable title which can be forced on a vendee who objects, even though not established of record. This is undesirable and contrary to current understanding; see Baldwin v. Anderson, 40 Wis. 2d 33 , 161 N.W.2d 553 (1968). In addition, Zellmer v. Martin, 157 Wis. 341, 147 N.W. 371 (1914) suggests that these sections may mean that 20 years of continuous disseisin of a true owner may bar that owner even if the claiming adverse possessor has not possessed in one of the ways required by previous s. 893.09. This may be confusing, since the language of previous s. 893.09 precluded other forms of possession under the 20-year statute. Other than as here noted, ss. 893.02 and 893.03 have been rarely cited and are not significant. In view of the presumption of possession by the true owner provided by previous s. 893.05, which this subchapter retains, previous ss. 893.02 and 893.03 contributed no needed substance to the subchapter. Subch. III of ch. 893 Note (2) Previous s. 893.075 was enacted as a companion to s. 700.30, which was held unconstitutional in Chicago & N.W. Transportation Co. v. Pedersen, 80 Wis. 2d 566 , 259 N.W.2d 316 (1977). No new s. 700.30 has been enacted. Therefore, s. 893.075 is surplusage and repealed. Subch. III of ch. 893 Note (3) The ancient doctrine of “descent cast” is no longer of practical importance, especially since the passage of the new probate code in 1971. Therefore, the need for a response to that doctrine in previous s. 893.13 has disappeared, and the section has been repealed. Subch. III of ch. 893 Note (4) Previous s. 893.18 (7) limited the time within which title to real estate could be attacked based on a defect in the jurisdiction of a court of record which entered a judgment affecting the title. That section is repealed as its application is preempted by s. 706.09 (1) (g). [Bill 326-A]