Tennessee § 47-2-725 - Statute of limitations in contracts for sale.

§ 47-2-725. Statute of limitations in contracts for sale.

An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four (4) years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one (1) year but may not extend it. A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered. When an action is commenced within the time limited by subsection (1), but the judgment or decree is rendered against the plaintiff upon any ground not concluding his right of action, or when the judgment or decree is rendered in favor of plaintiff, and is arrested or reversed on appeal, the plaintiff or his representatives or privies as the case may be, may, from time to time, commence a new action within one (1) year after the judgment, reversal or arrest. This section does not alter the law or tolling of the statute of limitations nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued before midnight (12:00 midnight) June 30, 1964. A counterclaim or third-party complaint is not barred by the statute of limitations provided by this section if it was not barred at the time the claims asserted in the complaint were interposed. If a nonsuit is taken as to the original civil action, any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint arising from such action shall not be terminated but may proceed as an original civil action. However, if a counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint is filed as a civil action as permitted by this subsection and such action does not proceed to an adjudication on the merits of such claim, the defendant shall have the right to file a counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint within the time allowed for the filing of a responsive pleading only if the original action is reinstituted pursuant to § 28-1-105. Any counterclaim, cross-claim or third party complaint arising from an action or suit originally commenced in general sessions court and subsequently recommenced as an original action or as a counterclaim, cross-claim or third party complaint pursuant to this section in circuit or chancery court according to the provisions of § 28-1-105, shall not be subject to the monetary jurisdictional limit originally imposed in general sessions court. Acts 1963, ch. 81, § 1 (2-725); 1978, ch. 758, § 2; 1984, ch. 520, §§ 3, 5; 1985, ch. 344, § 3. Variation from Uniform Code. Subsection (3) substituted for provision which read: “Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsection (1) is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action for the same breach such other action may be commenced after the expiration of the time limited and within six months after the termination of the first action unless the termination resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute.” Cross-References. Limitation of actions, counterclaims, cross-claims and third party complaints, § 28-1-114 . Monetary jurisdiction of general sessions court, § 16-15-501 . Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 6 Tenn. Juris., Commercial Law, § 33; 7 Tenn. Juris., Contracts, § 81; 18 Tenn. Juris., Limitations of Actions, § 17. Law Reviews. Please Pass the Biscuits and Gravamen (Donald F. Paine), 29 No. 6 Tenn. B.J. 20 (1993). Statutes of Limitations — Personal Injury, Property Damage and Breach of Warranty, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 803. The Predominant Factor Test Under the Uniform Commercial Code (R. Alan Pritchard), 37 No. 7 Tenn. B.J. 23 (2001). Cited: Leyen v. Dunn, 62 Tenn. App. 239, 461 S.W.2d 41, 1970 Tenn. App. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970); Cumberland Corp. v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 383 F. Supp. 595, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11437 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Benco Plastics, Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 387 F. Supp. 772, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7543 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); Mid-South Milling Co. v. Loret Farms, Inc., 521 S.W.2d 586, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. 1975); Branch v. Warren, 527 S.W.2d 89, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 637 (Tenn. 1975); Vance v. Schulder, 547 S.W.2d 927, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 573 (Tenn. 1977); Webber v. Union Carbide Corp., 653 S.W.2d 409, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 575 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983); Soldano v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 696 S.W.2d 887, 1985 Tenn. LEXIS 548 (Tenn. 1985); Massey v. Hardcastle, 753 S.W.2d 127, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 189 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988); Electric Power Bd. v. Monsanto Co., 879 F.2d 1368, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 10141 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1989); Young v. Toys R Us, 987 F. Supp. 1035, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20428 (E.D. Tenn. 1997); P&G Cellulose Co. v. Viskoza-Loznica, 33 F. Supp. 2d 644, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19981 (W.D. Tenn. 1998); Damron v. Media Gen., Inc., 3 S.W.3d 510, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 326 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Langford v. Gatlinburg Real Estate & Rental, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47714 (E.D. Tenn. June 29, 2007); Big Creek Landscaping v. Hudson Constr. Co., — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2007); Baptist Mem. Hosp. v. Argo Constr. Corp., 308 S.W.3d 337, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 502 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29, 2009).