Tennessee § 39-13-203 - Intellectually disabled defendants — Death sentence prohibited.

§ 39-13-203. Intellectually disabled defendants — Death sentence prohibited.

As used in this section, “intellectual disability” means: Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning as evidenced by a functional intelligence quotient (I.Q.) of seventy (70) or below; Deficits in adaptive behavior; and The intellectual disability must have been manifested during the developmental period, or by eighteen (18) years of age. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, no defendant with intellectual disability at the time of committing first degree murder shall be sentenced to death. The burden of production and persuasion to demonstrate intellectual disability by a preponderance of the evidence is upon the defendant. The determination of whether the defendant had intellectual disability at the time of the offense of first degree murder shall be made by the court. If the court determines that the defendant was a person with intellectual disability at the time of the offense, and if the trier of fact finds the defendant guilty of first degree murder, and if the district attorney general has filed notice of intention to ask for the sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole as provided in § 39-13-208(b), the jury shall fix the punishment in a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole or imprisonment for life. Section 39-13-207 shall govern the sentencing proceeding. If the issue of intellectual disability is raised at trial and the court determines that the defendant is not a person with intellectual disability, the defendant shall be entitled to offer evidence to the trier of fact of diminished intellectual capacity as a mitigating circumstance pursuant to § 39-13-204(j)(8). The determination by the trier of fact that the defendant does not have intellectual disability shall not be appealable by interlocutory appeal, but may be a basis of appeal by either the state or defendant following the sentencing stage of the trial. Acts 1990, ch. 1038, §§ 1, 2; 1993, ch. 473, § 10; 2010, ch. 734, §§ 1-3. Compiler's Notes. Acts 1993, ch. 473, § 16 provided that the amendment by that act shall apply to all offenses committed on or after July 1, 1993. For the Preamble to the act regarding changing the term “mental retardation” to “intellectual disability”, please refer to Acts 2010, ch. 734. Acts 2010, ch. 734, § 1 provided that the Tennessee code commission is directed to change all references to “mental retardation”, wherever such references appear in titles 33, 39 and 41, to “intellectual disability”, as supplements are issued and volumes are replaced. Acts 2010, ch. 734, § 7 provided that for purposes of each provision amended by the act, a reference to intellectual disability shall be considered to refer to mental retardation, as defined by that provision on the day before the date of enactment of the act. Acts 2010, ch. 734, § 8 provided that nothing in the act shall be construed to alter or otherwise affect the eligibility for services or the rights or responsibilities of individuals covered by the provision on the day before the date of enactment of the act. Cross-References. Burden of proof, title 39, ch. 11, part 2. Criminal Sentencing Reform Act, title 40, ch. 35. Mental health and intellectual and developmental disabilities, title 33. Textbooks. Tennessee Law of Evidence (2nd ed., Cohen, Paine and Sheppeard), §§ 101.1, 802.2. Law Reviews. A More Intelligent and Just Atkins: Adjusting for the Flynn Effect in Capital Determinations of Mental Retardation or Intellectual Disability (Geraldine W. Young), 65 Vand. L. Rev. 615 (2012). Capital Punishment, Cultural Competency, and Litigating Intellectual Disability (Jeffrey Usman), 42 U. Mem. L. Rev. 855 (2012). Criminal Procedure — Capital Punishment — Motions to Reopen Petitions for Post-Conviction Relief, 81 Tenn. L. Rev. 389 (2014). Tennessee's Death Penalty: An Overview of the Procedural Safeguards, 31 U. Mem. L. Rev. 779 (2001). Treated Differently in Life but Not in Death: The Execution of the Intellectually Disabled After Atkins v. Virginia (Penny J. White), 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 685 (2009).