Tennessee § 29-28-102 - Chapter definitions.

§ 29-28-102. Chapter definitions.

As used in this chapter unless the context otherwise requires: “Anticipated life.” The anticipated life of a product shall be determined by the expiration date placed on the product by the manufacturer when required by law but shall not commence until the date the product was first purchased for use or consumption; “Defective condition” means a condition of a product that renders it unsafe for normal or anticipatable handling and consumption; “Employer” means any person exercising legal supervisory control or guidance of users or consumers of products; “Manufacturer” means the designer, fabricator, producer, compounder, processor or assembler of any product or its component parts; “Product” means any tangible object or goods produced; “Product liability action” for purposes of this chapter includes all actions brought for or on account of personal injury, death or property damage caused by or resulting from the manufacture, construction, design, formula, preparation, assembly, testing, service, warning, instruction, marketing, packaging or labeling of any product. “Product liability action” includes, but is not limited to, all actions based upon the following theories: strict liability in tort; negligence; breach of warranty, express or implied; breach of or failure to discharge a duty to warn or instruct, whether negligent, or innocent; misrepresentation, concealment, or nondisclosure, whether negligent, or innocent; or under any other substantive legal theory in tort or contract whatsoever; “Seller” includes a retailer, wholesaler, or distributor, and means any individual or entity engaged in the business of selling a product, whether such sale is for resale, or for use or consumption. “Seller” also includes a lessor or bailor engaged in the business of leasing or bailment of a product; and “Unreasonably dangerous” means that a product is dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics, or that the product because of its dangerous condition would not be put on the market by a reasonably prudent manufacturer or seller, assuming that the manufacturer or seller knew of its dangerous condition. Acts 1978, ch. 703, § 2; T.C.A., § 23-3702; modified. Cross-References. Privity, § 29-34-104 . Law Reviews. Assumption of Risk in Tennessee Subsequent to the Adoption of Comparative Fault: Perez v. McConkey (Mark W. Milam), 60 Tenn. L. Rev. 1007 (1993). Comments on the Report of the Governor's Commission on Tort and Liability Insurance Reform (Jerry J. Phillips), 53 Tenn. L. Rev. 679 (1986). A Purposeful Approach to Products Liability Warnings and Non-English-Speaking Consumers, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1107 (1994). Skimming the Trout From the Milk: Using Circumstantial Evidence to Prove Product Defects Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 3, Tennessee and Beyond, 68 Tenn. L. Rev. 647 (2001). The Restatement (Third) of Products Liability: Is it a Reasonable Alternative Design to Tennessee's Products Liability Statute? (Robert S. Stevens), 39 U. Mem. L. Rev. 463 (2009). The Tennessee Products Liability Act, 9 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 105. The Tennessee Products Liability Act of 1978 (Irvin L. Tankersley), 14-4 Tenn. B.J. 11. Torts — First National Bank v. Brooks Farms: A Seller's Potential Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Innocent Misrepresentations, 23 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 441 (1993). Cited: Commercial Truck & Trailer Sales, Inc. v. McCampbell, 580 S.W.2d 765, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 427 (Tenn. 1979); Wilson v. Dake Corp., 497 F. Supp. 1339, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14130 (E.D. Tenn. 1980); Grindstaff v. Singer Co., 518 F. Supp. 44, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13526 (E.D. Tenn. 1981); Pemberton v. American Distilled Spirits Co., 664 S.W.2d 690, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 917, 42 A.L.R.4th 245 (Tenn. 1984); County of Johnson by Board of Education v. United States Gypsum Co., 580 F. Supp. 284, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20642 (E.D. Tenn. 1984); Milligan v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 622 F. Supp. 56, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16397 (W.D. Tenn. 1985); Rollins v. Cherokee Warehouses, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 136, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26762 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); Electric Power Bd. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 716 F. Supp. 1069, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17127 (E.D. Tenn. 1988); Whitehead v. Dycho Co., 775 S.W.2d 593, 1989 Tenn. LEXIS 391 (Tenn. 1989); Miller v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 811 F. Supp. 1286, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21333 (D. Tenn. 1992); Spence v. Miles Lab., 37 F.3d 1185, 1994 FED App. 352P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 29071 (6th Cir. 1994); Smith v. Guadino, 911 F. Supp. 296, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 322 (E.D. Tenn. 1996); Rutherford v. Polar Tank Trailer, 978 S.W.2d 102, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); Olin Corp. v. Lambda Elecs., 39 F. Supp. 2d 912, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20765 (E.D. Tenn. 1998); Greene v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 882, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17917 (W.D. Tenn. 1999); United States v. Kamen, 178 F.3d 1297, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19200 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1999); Damron v. Media Gen., Inc., 3 S.W.3d 510, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 326 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); McConkey v. McGhan Med. Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d 958, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19895 (E.D. Tenn. 2000); Coffey v. Dowley Mfg., 187 F. Supp. 2d 958, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6898 (M.D. Tenn. 2002); Flax v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 272 S.W.3d 521, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 505 (Tenn. July 24, 2008); Alexander v. Antonio Zamperla, S.P.A., — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 549 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2010); Ramirez v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 414 S.W.3d 707, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 231 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2013).