Tennessee § 27-9-111 - Hearing — Findings.

§ 27-9-111. Hearing — Findings.

At the expiration of ninety (90) days from the filing of the transcript, the cause shall stand for trial, and shall be heard and determined at the earliest practical date, as one having precedence over other litigation, except suits involving state, county or municipal revenue. The hearing shall be on the proof introduced before the board or commission contained in the transcript, and upon such other evidence as either party may desire to introduce. The judge shall reduce all findings of fact and conclusions of law to writing and make them parts of the record. In making such findings of fact, the judge shall weigh the evidence and determine the facts by the preponderance of the proof. If the final decision of a board or commission revokes, suspends, or denies a license or permit that is required prior to engaging in conduct protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and either the petitioner or the respondent requests an expedited hearing, the court shall immediately grant the writ of certiorari, and shall hear the matter and issue its decision within forty (40) days of the court granting the writ of certiorari. When an expedited hearing is requested, the board or commission shall forward the transcript described in § 27-9-109 within seven (7) days of the grant of the writ of certiorari. Code 1932, § 9014; Acts 1951, ch. 261, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 27-911; Acts 1987, ch. 28, §§ 1-3; 1998, ch. 794, § 1; 2002, ch. 615, § 1. Compiler's Notes. The portion of this section which requires that proof at a hearing be taken by deposition has been superseded by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 43.01 which provides that witnesses shall give testimony orally, under oath, in open court. Acts 2002, ch. 615, § 2 provided that the 2002 amendment to (e) shall not take effect until such time as the United States Supreme Court has denied the petition for a writ of certiorari filed by the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County in the case of Déj` Vu, Inc. v. Metropolitan Government, 274 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2001), or if the United States Supreme Court grants a writ of certiorari, the 2002 amendment shall not take effect until such time as the United States Supreme Court affirms the Sixth Circuit's opinion on the issue of “prompt judicial review.” If the United States Supreme Court reverses the Sixth Circuit's opinion on “prompt judicial review” the amendment shall never take effect. On May 13, 2002, the United States Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, et al. v. Déj` Vu of Nashville, Inc., et al., 122 S. Ct. 1952 , 152 L. Ed. 2 d 855. Cross-References. Evidence to be taken orally and in open court, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 43.01. Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 5 Tenn. Juris., Carriers, § 58; 5 Tenn. Juris., Certiorari, § 60; 16 Tenn. Juris., Intoxicating Liquors, § 22. Law Reviews. Report on Administrative Law to the Tennessee Law Revision Commission, 20 Vand. L. Rev. 777. Review of Administrative Decisions by Writ of Certiorari in Tennessee (Ben H. Cantrell), 4 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 19. Tennessee Appellate Procedure and the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (William J. Harbison), 6 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 291. The Scope of Judicial Review of Administrative Acts in Tennessee (William H. Ewing, Jr.), 2 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 144. The Tennessee Law of Real Estate Broker Licensing (Lewis L. Laska), 4 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 457.