Tennessee § 39-11-503 - Intoxication.

§ 39-11-503. Intoxication.

Except as provided in subsection (c), intoxication itself is not a defense to prosecution for an offense. However, intoxication, whether voluntary or involuntary, is admissible in evidence, if it is relevant to negate a culpable mental state. If recklessness establishes an element of an offense and the person is unaware of a risk because of voluntary intoxication, the person's unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution for that offense. Intoxication itself does not constitute a mental disease or defect within the meaning of § 39-11-501. However, involuntary intoxication is a defense to prosecution, if, as a result of the involuntary intoxication, the person lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of the person's conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of the law allegedly violated. The following definitions apply in this part, unless the context clearly requires otherwise: “Intoxication” means disturbance of mental or physical capacity resulting from the introduction of any substance into the body; “Involuntary intoxication” means intoxication that is not voluntary; and “Voluntary intoxication” means intoxication caused by a substance that the person knowingly introduced into the person's body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication was known or ought to have been known. Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1. Sentencing Commission Comments. Under prior Tennessee law, intoxication was not a defense unless it was so extreme as to negate a finding of the specific intent which was an essential element of the offense charged. See State v. Adkins, 653 S.W.2d 708 (Tenn. 1983). Subsection (a) retains this rule, permitting intoxication to be considered whenever the intoxication prevents the defendant from forming the required mental state. Subsection (b) makes it clear that voluntary intoxication can never negate awareness of a risk where recklessness is sufficient to establish a culpable mental state of an offense. Involuntary intoxication may suffice to negate any essential element of a defense including recklessness. The commission recognizes that a defendant who is not responsible for his or her intoxicated condition and either cannot control his or her own conduct or is unable to appreciate its wrongfulness because of the intoxicated condition should be excused from criminal responsibility. Subsection (c) also preserves the rule that intoxication does not in and of itself constitute a mental disease or defect, sufficient to constitute insanity, unless the intoxication is found to be involuntary. The definition of intoxication is sufficiently broad to include all substances which alter mental or physical capacity, including alcohol, marijuana, glue sniffing, and heroin. Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation. Law Reviews. Law On the Rocks: The Intoxication Defenses are Being Eighty-Sixed, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 607 (2002).