Tennessee § 39-11-302 - Definitions of culpable mental state.

§ 39-11-302. Definitions of culpable mental state.

“Intentional” refers to a person who acts intentionally with respect to the nature of the conduct or to a result of the conduct when it is the person's conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. “Knowing” refers to a person who acts knowingly with respect to the conduct or to circumstances surrounding the conduct when the person is aware of the nature of the conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of the person's conduct when the person is aware that the conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. “Reckless” refers to a person who acts recklessly with respect to circumstances surrounding the conduct or the result of the conduct when the person is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the accused person's standpoint. “Criminal negligence” refers to a person who acts with criminal negligence with respect to the circumstances surrounding that person's conduct or the result of that conduct when the person ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the accused person's standpoint. Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1. Sentencing Commission Comments. Intentional conduct or an intentional result occurs when the defendant wants to do the act or achieve the criminal objective. A defendant acts knowingly, on the other hand, when he or she is aware of the conduct or is practically certain that the conduct will cause the result, irrespective of his or her desire that the conduct or result will occur. Subsection (c), defining “reckless” conduct, provides liability for conscious risk creation where there is no desire that the risk occur or no awareness that it is practically certain to occur. Subsection (d) is in line with case law of Tennessee on the degree of negligence required for criminal culpability. The proposition that criminal liability be based on a higher degree of negligence than that required for civil liability is well settled. Claybrook v. State, 164 Tenn. 440, 51 S.W.2d 499 (1932); Miller v. State, 164 Tenn. 388, 50 S.W.2d 388, 50 S.W.2d 225 (1932); Copeland v. State, 154 Tenn. 7, 285 S.W. 565 (1926). Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation. Cross-References. Culpable mental states, §§ 39-11-106 , 39-11-301 . Definitions of mental states, § 39-11-106 . Requirement of culpable mental states, § 39-11-101 . Law Reviews. Criminal Attempt — Murder Two: The Law in Tennessee After State v. Kimbrough (Barbara Kritchevsky), 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 3 (1997). Instructing the Jury in Murder Cases, 38 No. 7 Tenn. B.J. 30 (2002). State v. Carson: A Misguided Attempt to Retain the Natural and Probable Consequence Doctrine of Accomplice Liability Under the Current Tennessee Code, 29 U. Mem. L. Rev. 273 (1998). Tennessee Attempts to Tighten the Purse Strings on Punitive Damages: Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co. (P. Steven Hacker), 60 Tenn. L. Rev. 983 (1993). The Language of Mens Rea, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1327 (2014). Invisible Bars: Adapting the Crime of False Imprisonment to Better Address Coercive Control and Domestic Violence in Tennessee, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 681 (2018).