Tennessee § 39-11-301 - Requirement of culpable mental state.

§ 39-11-301. Requirement of culpable mental state.

A person commits an offense who acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence, as the definition of the offense requires, with respect to each element of the offense. When the law provides that criminal negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, that element is also established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly or recklessly. When recklessness suffices to establish an element, that element is also established if a person acts intentionally or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, that element is also established if a person acts intentionally. A culpable mental state is required within this title unless the definition of an offense plainly dispenses with a mental element. If the definition of an offense within this title does not plainly dispense with a mental element, intent, knowledge or recklessness suffices to establish the culpable mental state. Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1030, §§ 6, 7. Sentencing Commission Comments. Subsection (a) reduces the number of mental elements to four. Section 39-11-302 defines each of the four. The former confusing distinction between general and specific intent has been abandoned. The four mental elements are in a hierarchy. While each of the four elements is unique, subdivision (a)(2) provides that lesser levels of culpability are included in greater levels. For example, a person who acts “intentionally” also acts knowingly, recklessly and with criminal negligence. Subsection (b) creates a presumption that at least one of the four mental states is required for offenses within the criminal code. See Duncan v. State, 26 Tenn. 148 (1846). An intent to punish without the requirement of a culpable mental state must be clear from the language of the statute creating the offense. Pappas v. State, 135 Tenn. 499, 188, S.W. 52 (1916). Under subsection (c), offenses within this title which are silent regarding whether a culpable mental state is required will be presumed to require at least recklessness. The better reasoned cases from other jurisdictions have reached this result in interpreting common law authorities. See, e.g., People v. Angelo, 246 N.Y. 451, 159 N.E. 394 (1927). Compiler's Notes. The sentencing commission terminated June 30, 1995. Sentencing Commission Comments have been retained, but do not reflect 1995 or subsequent legislation. Cross-References. Definitions of mental states, §§ 39-11-106 , 39-11-302 . Law Reviews. Criminal Attempt — Murder Two: The Law in Tennessee After State v. Kimbrough (Barbara Kritchevsky), 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 3 (1997). Rethinking Presumed Knowledge of the Law in the Regulatory Age, 82 Tenn. L. Rev. 137 (2014). The Language of Mens Rea, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1327 (2014). Invisible Bars: Adapting the Crime of False Imprisonment to Better Address Coercive Control and Domestic Violence in Tennessee, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 681 (2018).