Tennessee § 17-2-202 - Duty to interchange.

§ 17-2-202. Duty to interchange.

Each state trial court judge has an affirmative duty to interchange if: A judge has died or is unable to hold court; Two (2) or more judges have agreed to a mutually convenient interchange; or [Deleted by 2012 amendment.] The chief justice of the supreme court has assigned by order a judge to another court pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 11. A failure to comply with an interchange order of the supreme court is a judicial offense under § 17-5-301(j)(1)(B). The chief justice shall report such failure to comply immediately to the presiding judge of the board of judicial conduct. The clerk of the supreme court shall maintain such reports for public inspection. Acts 1859-1860, ch. 105, § 3; Shan., § 5713; mod. Code 1932, § 9899; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 17-208; Acts 1997, ch. 430, § 1; 2012, ch. 789, § 5; 2012, ch. 819, § 4. Compiler's Notes. Acts 2012, ch. 819, § 5 provided that, in order to carry out its functions, duties, and responsibilities maintained under the provisions of the act, which amended subsection (b), the court of the judiciary shall retain and have the authority to exercise any and all of its powers and duties existing under title 17 prior to enactment of the act, including, but not limited to, the power to subpoena, the power to take evidence, and the power to examine. Upon the termination of the court of the judiciary, the board of judicial conduct is expressly granted the same powers and duties as set forth above for the court of the judiciary in order to carry out its responsibilities established this chapter. The board of judicial conduct also is expressly authorized to continue any preliminary investigations, full investigations, and/or trials scheduled or in progress by the court of the judiciary at the time of termination of the court of the judiciary. This authorization includes the right to use any evidence obtained or taken by the court of the judiciary without the need to obtain again or retake any such evidence, including, but not limited to, prior issued subpoenas. Acts 2012, ch. 819, § 6 provided that: (a) All rules of the court of the judiciary in effect on July 1, 2012, shall remain in full force and effect as rules of the board of judicial conduct until modified or repealed by the board of judicial conduct. The initial rules adopted by the board of judicial conduct shall serve as the temporary rules of the board. The temporary rules shall remain in effect until such time as approved or not approved by the general assembly, with the board's chairperson presenting the rules, during the first session of the One Hundred Eighth General Assembly using the same procedure set out in § 16-3-404 for rules of court. If approved, the rules shall become the permanent rules of the board. All subsequent modifications or additions to such rules shall be approved by the general assembly in accordance with the procedures set forth in § 16-3-404 . Amendments. The 2012 amendment by ch. 789 deleted (a)(3) which read: “The judge is incompetent under § 17-2-101 ;”. The 2012 amendment by ch. 819 substituted “board of judicial conduct” for “court of the judiciary” in (b). Effective Dates. Acts 2012, ch. 789, § 7. April 23, 2012. Acts 2012, ch. 819, § 8. July 1, 2012; provided, that, for the purposes of appointing the members of the board of judicial conduct created by the act, the act shall take effect April 25, 2012. Cross-References. Change of venue in chancery, § 21-1-501 . Rule Reference. This section is referred to in Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 11, § VII. Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 624. Law Reviews. The Tennessee Court System — Chancery Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 281. The Tennessee Court System — Circuit Court (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 241. Attorney General Opinions. A private act proposing to authorize a general sessions judge to interchange with a chancellor in a particular county should articulate the reasons why such authority is necessary or convenient to the operation of the judicial system in the affected county, as such an act would violate the constitution absent a rational basis for suspending the general law with regard to interchange in the particular county, OAG 02-074 (6/12/02). Cited: State v. Brown, 53 S.W.3d 264, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 962 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000); State Dep't of Children's Servs. v. A.M.H., 198 S.W.3d 757, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006); Ready Mix, USA, LLC v. Jefferson County, 380 S.W.3d 52, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 621 (Tenn. Aug. 30, 2012).