North Carolina § 50-16 - 9. Modification of order.

§ 50-16. 9. Modification of order.

An order of a court of this State for alimony or postseparation support, whether contested or entered by consent, may be modified or vacated at any time, upon motion in the cause and a showing of changed circumstances by either party or anyone interested. This section shall not apply to orders entered by consent before October 1, 1967. If a dependent spouse who is receiving postseparation support or alimony from a supporting spouse under a judgment or order of a court of this State remarries or engages in cohabitation, the postseparation support or alimony shall terminate. Postseparation support or alimony shall terminate upon the death of either the supporting or the dependent spouse. When an order for alimony has been entered by a court of another jurisdiction, a court of this State may, upon gaining jurisdiction over the person of both parties in a civil action instituted for that purpose, and upon a showing of changed circumstances, enter a new order for alimony which modifies or supersedes such order for alimony to the extent that it could have been so modified in the jurisdiction where granted. Any motion to modify or terminate alimony or postseparation support based on a resumption of marital relations between parties who remain married to each other shall be determined pursuant to G.S. 52-10.2 . As used in this subsection, cohabitation means the act of two adults dwelling together continuously and habitually in a private heterosexual relationship, even if this relationship is not solemnized by marriage, or a private homosexual relationship. Cohabitation is evidenced by the voluntary mutual assumption of those marital rights, duties, and obligations which are usually manifested by married people, and which include, but are not necessarily dependent on, sexual relations. Nothing in this section shall be construed to make lawful conduct which is made unlawful by other statutes. History (1871-2, c. 193, ss. 38, 39; 1883, c. 67; Code, ss. 1291, 1292; Rev., ss. 1566, 1567; 1919, c. 24; C.S., ss. 1666, 1667; 1921, c. 123; 1923, c. 52; 1951, c. 893, s. 3; 1953, c. 925; 1955, cc. 814, 1189; 1961, c. 80; 1967, c. 1152, s. 2; 1987, c. 664, s. 3; 1995, c. 319, s. 7.) Cross References. - As to distribution by court of marital property upon divorce, see G.S. 50-20 . Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1995, c. 319, which amended this section, in s. 12 provides that this act applies to civil actions filed on or after October 1, 1995, and shall not apply to pending litigation, or to future motions in the cause seeking to modify orders or judgments in effect on October 1, 1995. This section, prior to the amendment by Session Laws 1995, c. 319 read as follows: " Modification of order. "(a) An order of a court of this State for alimony or alimony pendente lite, whether contested or entered by consent, may be modified or vacated at any time, upon motion in the cause and a showing of changed circumstances by either party or anyone interested. This section shall not apply to orders entered by consent before October 1, 1967. "Any motion to modify or terminate alimony or alimony pendente lite based on a resumption of marital relations between parties who remain married to each other shall be determined pursuant to G.S. 52-10.2 . "(b) If a dependent spouse who is receiving alimony under a judgment or order of a court of this State shall remarry, said alimony shall terminate. "(c) When an order for alimony has been entered by a court of another jurisdiction, a court of this State may, upon gaining jurisdiction over the person of both parties in a civil action instituted for that purpose, and upon a showing of changed circumstances, enter a new order for alimony which modifies or supersedes such order for alimony to the extent that it could have been so modified in the jurisdiction where granted." Legal Periodicals. - For a survey of 1977 law on domestic relations, see 56 N.C.L. Rev. 1045 (1978). For note on reinstatement of alimony under a prior divorce decree after annulment of remarriage, see 14 Wake Forest L. Rev. 273 (1978). For survey of 1978 family law, see 57 N.C.L. Rev. 1084 (1979). For note on specific performance of separation agreements, see 58 N.C.L. Rev. 867 (1980). For survey of 1979 family law, see 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1471 (1980). For note on separability of support and property provisions in ambiguous separation agreements, see 16 Wake Forest L. Rev. 152 (1980). For article on the rights of individuals to control the distributional consequences of divorce by private contract and on the interests of the State in preserving its role as a third party to marriage and divorce, see 59 N.C.L. Rev. 819 (1981). For note on consent judgments in family law in light of Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381 , 298 S.E.2d 338 (1983), see 6 Campbell L. Rev. 125 (1984). For note, "Discarding the Dual Consent Judgment Approach in Family Law in Light of Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381 , 298 S.E.2d 338 (1983)," see 20 Wake Forest L. Rev. 297 (1984). For note, "Alimony Modification and Cohabitation in North Carolina," see 63 N.C.L. Rev. (1985). For survey, "Termination of Lump Sum Alimony upon the Remarriage of a Dependent Spouse: Potts v. Tutterow," see 73 N.C.L. Rev. 2432 (1995).