North Carolina § 14-27 - 21. First-degree forcible rape.

§ 14-27. 21. First-degree forcible rape.

A person is guilty of first-degree forcible rape if the person engages in vaginal intercourse with another person by force and against the will of the other person, and does any of the following: Uses, threatens to use, or displays a dangerous or deadly weapon or an article which the other person reasonably believes to be a dangerous or deadly weapon. Inflicts serious personal injury upon the victim or another person. The person commits the offense aided and abetted by one or more other persons. Any person who commits an offense defined in this section is guilty of a Class B1 felony. Upon conviction, a person convicted under this section has no rights to custody of or rights of inheritance from any child born as a result of the commission of the rape, nor shall the person have any rights related to the child under Chapter 48 or Subchapter 1 of Chapter 7B of the General Statutes. History (1979, c. 682, s. 1; 1979, 2nd Sess., c. 1316, s. 4; 1981, c. 63; c. 106, ss. 1, 2; c. 179, s. 14; 1983, c. 175, ss. 4, 10; c. 720, s. 4; 1994, Ex. Sess., c. 22, s. 2; 2004-128, s. 7; 2015-181, s. 3(a), (b); 2017-30, s. 1.) Cross References. - As to privileged nature of communications with agents of rape crisis centers and domestic violence programs, see G.S. 8-53.12 . As to essentials of bill of indictment for rape, see G.S. 15-144.1 . As to exclusion of bystanders during trial for rape or other sex offense, see G.S. 15-166 . As to venue for trial of sex offenses where victim was transported, see G.S. 15A-136 . As to office of coordinator of services for victims of sexual assault, see G.S. 143B-394.1 et seq. Editor's Note. - This section was formerly codified as G.S. 14-27.2 . It was recodified as G.S. 14-27.2 1 by Session Laws 2015-181, s. 3(a), effective December 1, 2015. Session Laws 2015-181, s. 48, made the recodification and amendment of this section by Session Laws 2015-181, s. 3(a), (b), effective December 1, 2015, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date, and further provided that: "Prosecutions for offenses committed before the effective date of this act are not abated or affected by this act, and the statutes that would be applicable but for this act remain applicable to those prosecutions." Session Laws 2017-30, s. 3, made the substitution of "Uses, threatens to use, or displays" for "Employs or displays" at the beginning of subdivision (a)(1), by Session Laws 2017-30, s. 1, effective December 1, 2017, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date. Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2004-128, s. 7, effective December 1, 2004, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date, added subsection (c). Session Laws 2015-181, s. 3(b), effective December 1, 2015, inserted "forcible" in the section heading; in subsection (a), in the introductory paragraph, substituted "first-degree forcible rape" for "rape in the first-degree," added "with another person by force and against the will of the other person" which had been included in former subdivision (2), and added "and does any of the following" at the end of the paragraph, deleted former subdivision (1), which read: "With a victim who is a child under the age of 13 years and the defendant is at least 12 years old and is at least four years older that the victim," redesignated former subdivision (2)a, b and c as subdivisions (1), (2) and (3), and made related stylistic changes. For applicability, see editor's note. Session Laws 2017-30, s. 1, substituted "Uses, threatens to use, or displays" for "Employs or displays" at the beginning of subdivision (a)(1). For effective date and applicability, see editor's note. Legal Periodicals. - For note on United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S. Ct. 1209, 20 L. Ed. 2d 138 (1968), and its impact upon State capital punishment legislation, see 47 N.C.L. Rev. 421 (1969). For comment on constitutional restrictions on the imposition of capital punishment, see 5 Wake Forest Intra. L. Rev. 183 (1969). For survey of 1979 criminal law, see 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1350 (1980). For comment on capital punishment and evolving standards of decency, see 16 Wake Forest L. Rev. 737 (1980). For an article on plea bargaining statutes and practices in North Carolina, see 59 N.C.L. Rev. 477 (1981). For article on a model act to prevent the sexual exploitation of children, see 17 Wake Forest L. Rev. 535 (1981). For note discussing the constitutionality of North Carolina's Rape-Shield Law, see 17 Wake Forest L. Rev. 781 (1981). For survey of 1981 criminal law, see 60 N.C.L. Rev. 1289 (1982). For survey of 1982 law relating to criminal law, see 61 N.C.L. Rev. 1060 (1983). For note discussing "serious personal injury" in rapes and sexual offenses in light of State v. Boone, 307 N.C. 198 , 297 S.E.2d 585 (1982), see 19 Wake Forest L. Rev. 881 (1983). For comment, "The Use of Rape Trauma Syndrome as Evidence in a Rape Trial: Valid or Invalid?," see 21 Wake Forest L. Rev. 93 (1985). For note, "State v. Smith: Facilitating the Admissibility of Hearsay Statements in Child Sexual Abuse Cases," see 64 N.C.L. Rev. 1352 (1986). For note, "State v. Stafford: Rape Trauma Syndrome and the Admissibility of Statements Made by Rape Victims," see 64 N.C.L. Rev. 1364 (1986). For article, "Culpability, Dangerousness, and Harm: Balancing the Factors on Which Our Criminal Law Is Predicated," see 66 N.C.L. Rev. 283 (1988). For note, "State v. Strickland: Evening the Odds in Rape Trials! North Carolina Allows Expert Testimony on Post Traumatic Stress Disorder to Disprove Victim Consent," see 69 N.C.L. Rev. 1624 (1991). For note entitled, "Michigan v. Lucas: Failure to Define the State Interest in Rape Shield Legislation," see 70 N.C.L. Rev. 1592 (1992). For comment, "Old Wine in New Bottles: The 'Marital' Rape Allowance," see 72 N.C.L. Rev. 261 (1993). For note, "Serious Personal Injury Requirement for Rape Is Met by Mental Injury Alone - State v. Baker," see 21 N.C. Cent. L.J. 368 (1995). For comment, "The Amy Jackson Law - A Look at the Constitutionality of North Carolina's Answer to Megan's Law," see 20 Campbell L. Rev. 347 (1998). For article, "Poor Whites, Benevolent Masters, and the Ideologies of Slavery: The Local Trial of a Slave Accused of Rape," see 85 N.C.L. Rev. 489 (2007). For article, "The Least of These: A Constitutional Challenge to North Carolina's Sexual Offender Laws and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.18," see 33 N.C. Cent. L. Rev. 53 (2010).