Georgia § 24-7-701 - Lay witness opinion testimony.

§ 24-7-701. Lay witness opinion testimony.

If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness's testimony in the form of opinions or inferences shall be limited to those opinions or inferences which are: Rationally based on the perception of the witness; Helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testimony or the determination of a fact in issue; and Not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Code Section 24-7-702. Direct testimony as to market value is in the nature of opinion evidence. A witness need not be an expert or dealer in an article or property to testify as to its value if he or she has had an opportunity to form a reasoned opinion. (Code 1981, § 24-7-701 , enacted by Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 2/HB 24.) History of section. - Former Code Section 24-9-66, which contained comparable provisions to subsection (b) of this Code section, as effective January 1, 2013, was derived from the decision in Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Skellie, 86 Ga. 686 , 12 S.E. 1017 (1891). Cross references. - Opinion testimony by lay witnessess, Fed. R. Evid. 701. Law reviews. - For article analyzing Georgia business entries provisions, see 4 Mercer L. Rev. 313 (1953). For annual survey of evidence law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 235 (2004); 57 Mercer L. Rev. 187 (2005); and 58 Mercer L. Rev. 151 (2006). For annual 11th Circuit survey of evidence law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 1273 (2005); and 57 Mercer L. Rev. 1083 (2006). For note on admissibility of expert psychological testimony in Georgia, see 4 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 117 (1988). For comment on Caldwell v. State, 82 Ga. App. 480 , 61 S.E.2d 543 (1950), see 14 Ga. B.J. 241 (1951). For comment on Corley v. Russell, 92 Ga. App. 417 , 88 S.E.2d 470 (1955), holding that the opinion of an expert is inadmissible in a negligence action, as that is the very issue the jury is impaneled to try, see 18 Ga. B.J. 338 (1956). For comment on Northwestern Univ. v. Crisp, 211 Ga. 636 , 88 S.E.2d 26 (1955), concerning the admissibility of lay opinions regarding the sanity of a testator, see 19 Ga. B.J. 82 (1956). For comment discussing the use of hypothetical questions to avoid the requirements of first-hand knowledge, see 19 Ga. B.J. 346 (1957). For comment on Western & A.R.R. v. Hart, 95 Ga. App. 810 , 99 S.E.2d 302 (1957), holding that the accuracy of the opinion of a 12-year-old as to the speed of a train is a matter for the jury to decide and its admission into evidence was not error, see 20 Ga. B.J. 395 (1958). For comment on Hoard v. Wiley, 113 Ga. App. 328 , 147 S.E.2d 782 (1966), see 3 Ga. St. B.J. 476 (1967). For comment on Hoard v. Wiley, 113 Ga. App. 328 , 147 S.E.2d 782 (1966), see 3 Ga. St. B.J. 476 (1967).