Georgia § 17-5-30 - Motion to suppress evidence illegally seized generally.

§ 17-5-30. Motion to suppress evidence illegally seized generally.

A defendant aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the court for the return of property, the possession of which is not otherwise unlawful, and to suppress as evidence anything so obtained on the grounds that: The search and seizure without a warrant was illegal; or The search and seizure with a warrant was illegal because the warrant is insufficient on its face, there was not probable cause for the issuance of the warrant, or the warrant was illegally executed. The motion shall be in writing and state facts showing that the search and seizure were unlawful. The judge shall receive evidence out of the presence of the jury on any issue of fact necessary to determine the motion; and the burden of proving that the search and seizure were lawful shall be on the state. If the motion is granted the property shall be restored, unless otherwise subject to lawful detention, and it shall not be admissible in evidence against the movant in any trial. The motion shall be made only before a court with jurisdiction to try the offense. If a criminal accusation is filed or if an indictment or special presentment is returned by a grand jury, the motion shall be made only before the court in which the accusation, indictment, or special presentment is filed and pending. (Ga. L. 1966, p. 567, § 13.) Cross references. - Appeal by state from order, decision, or judgment sustaining motion to suppress evidence illegally seized, § 5-7-1 . Law reviews. - For article discussing limited application of this section by the state appellate courts and advocating a state exclusionary rule, see 11 Ga. L. Rev. 105 (1976). For article surveying developments in Georgia criminal law from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 95 (1981). For annual survey of criminal law, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 129 (1986). For annual survey on criminal law and procedure, see 42 Mercer L. Rev. 141 (1990). For note, "Arizonia v. Evans: Carving Out Another Good-Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule," see 47 Mercer L. Rev. 1135 (1996). For note, "United States v. Patane: The Supreme Court's Continued Assault on Miranda," see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 1499 (2005). For comment on Talbert v. State, 224 Ga. 291 , 161 S.E.2d 279 (1968), see 5 Ga. St. B.J. 256 (1968). For comment on Connally v. State, 237 Ga. 203 , 227 S.E.2d 352 , see 11 Ga. L. Rev. 200 (1976). For comment on warrantless search of defendant's home, see 41 Emory L.J. 321 (1992).