Connecticut § 1-2z - Plain meaning rule.

§ 1-2z. Plain meaning rule.

Sec. 1-2z. Plain meaning rule. The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.

(P.A. 03-154, S. 1.)

Construing the plain meaning of Sec. 22a-19 and its relationship to other statutes, court concluded that Sec. 22a-19 allows town to intervene in judicial review of decisions of its wetlands and zoning commission, does not conflict with Secs. 8-1 and 22a-42, which delegates municipal authority to the agencies, and does not yield an absurd or unworkable result. 280 C. 405. Statute did not overrule the principle that ambiguous statutory language is not unconstitutionally vague if the legislative history establishes a clear meaning. 284 C. 573. Under section, ambiguity determination is not limited to the statute itself, but requires viewing the statute at issue in context of other related statutes. Id., 838. The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Id. Plain meaning rule applied to Workers' Compensation Act provisions. 285 C. 348. Because Sec. 14-164(c) is ambiguous re implicit waiver of sovereign immunity, such ambiguity means waiver of sovereign immunity is not implied and therefore no extratextual evidence is necessary. 293 C. 382. Section does not overrule the prior interpretation of any statutory provision merely because the Court failed to apply the plain meaning rule, rather the ordinary principles of stare decisis apply to interpretations of statutory provisions that predate the enactment of section. 326 C. 190. When statutory language, even if ambiguous for purposes of this section, provides greater support for an interpretation of the statute than does the legislative history, court must yield to the implications of the statutory language, particularly when the legislative history is more general in nature and does not furnish any evidence of legislative intent with respect to the specific point of law at issue. 346 C. 711.

When application of alternative minimum tax credit statute resulted in double taxation and a mathematical impossibility that an individual would ever be eligible to recoup a credit, which was an absurd or unworkable result, court looked to extratextual evidence to determine statute's meaning. 98 CA 439. Under section, cannot look beyond text of statutory language if that language, as applied to facts of the case, is plain and unambiguous and does not yield a bizarre or unworkable result. 105 CA 124.

Cited. 49 CS 43.