Colorado § 8-43-310 - Error disregarded unless prejudicial.

§ 8-43-310. Error disregarded unless prejudicial.

The appeal shall be upon the record returned to the court by the industrial claim appeals office. Upon the hearing of any such action, the court shall disregard any irregularity or error of the director or the panel unless it affirmatively appears that the party complaining was damaged thereby.

Source: L. 90: Entire article R&RE, p. 511, § 1, effective July 1.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 8-53-122 as it existed prior to 1990.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

One of the purposes of the compensation act was to avoid the delay attending ordinary litigation. Kosmos v. Indus. Comm'n, 96 Colo. 90, 39 P.2d 780 (1934).

Thus, report of accident by employer need not be formally introduced in evidence at a hearing in order that it may be considered. N.J. Fid. & Plate Glass Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 86 Colo. 580, 284 P. 334 (1929).

And reversal is not required because of untrue but unnecessary recitation in award. Under the provisions of this section, the supreme court is not called upon to reverse the district court, which affirmed the commission's award, simply because of an untrue, although unnecessary, recitation in the award itself, unless it affects the substantial rights of the parties. Colo. Fuel & Iron Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 85 Colo. 237, 275 P. 910 (1929).

Rules limiting introduction of evidence. It was not the intention of the general assembly, in directing the courts by this section to disregard certain errors of irregularities of the commission (now the industrial claim appeals panel), to allow the latter to put into effect rules limiting the introduction of evidence, which the courts are without authority to adopt. W. Auto Supply Co. v. Washburn, 112 Colo. 430, 149 P.2d 804 (1944).

The court cannot reverse an award simply because of the erroneous admission of incompetent or improper evidence; an award may be reversed if there be no competent evidence to support it. Game & Fish Dept. v. Pardoe, 147 Colo. 363, 363 P.2d 1067 (1961).

But it is not error to exclude original evidence at the trial in the district court. Nat'l Fuel Co. v. Arnold, 121 Colo. 220, 214 P.2d 784 (1950).

If the decision turns on a legal question, any error in commission's fact-finding process would not be prejudicial. Featherstone v. Loomix, Inc., 726 P.2d 246 (Colo. App. 1986).

Even if the commission's interpretation of the law is erroneous, its order will be sustained if a proper interpretation would produce the same legal result. Featherstone v. Loomix, Inc., 726 P.2d 246 (Colo. App. 1986).

No procedural irregularity affecting claimant's substantive rights was found where claimant, while not furnished a copy of the vocational evaluation report, was allowed to examine and present his objections to the report prior to entry of the hearing officer's order, where hearing officer elicited pertinent information from a pro se claimant or where claimant's attorney wrote to hearing officer that the parties were ready for an order. Smith v. Indus. Comm'n, 735 P.2d 921 (Colo. App. 1986).

Where hearing officer strictly followed medical opinion in determining the degree of claimant's industrial disability, it was not harmless error for the hearing officer to have excluded counselor's testimony on the degree of industrial disability merely because it embraced an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. Chambers v. CF & I Steel Corp., 757 P.2d 1171 (Colo. App. 1988).

Error by administrative law judge referring to claimant meeting her "burden of proof in establishing a worsening of condition" was harmless where ALJ focused on causation between the industrial injury and claimant's back condition. El Paso County DSS v. Donn, 865 P.2d 877 (Colo. App. 1993).

Where record does not indicate claimant's emotional condition was raised as an affirmative defense, record contains some evidence of claimant's mental impairment but such evidence was limited to claimant's medical records, claimant did not object to their admission, and second ALJ did not rely on them in determining whether claimant had sustained an industrial injury, claimant's substantial rights were not affected even if evidence of claimant's mental impairment was improperly allowed. Bodensieck v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 183 P.3d 684 (Colo. App. 2008).

Applied in Puffer Mercantile Co. v. Arellano, 34 Colo. App. 434, 528 P.2d 966 (1974); Mtn. Meadows Nursing Ctr. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 990 P.2d 1090 (Colo. App. 1999).