Colorado § 8-42-115 - Death from injury - benefits.

§ 8-42-115. Death from injury - benefits.

(1) In case death proximately results from the injury, the benefits shall be in the amount and to the persons following:

(a) If there are no dependents, compensation shall be limited to the expenses provided for medical, hospital, and funeral expense of the deceased, together with such sums as may have accrued or been paid to the deceased during the deceased's lifetime for disability, and any amount or payment which is due under section 8-46-101.

(b) If there are wholly dependent persons at the time of death, the payment shall be in accordance with the provisions of section 8-42-114.

(c) If there are partially dependent persons at the time of death, the payment shall not exceed sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the average weekly wages, subject to the limitations of articles 40 to 47 of this title as to maximum and minimum weekly amounts, to continue for such period after the date of death as is required to pay, at the weekly rate, the total amount awarded by the director to be paid to such partially dependent persons.

Source: L. 90: Entire article R&RE, p. 495, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2000: (1)(a) amended, p. 821, § 1, effective May 24.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 8-50-111 as it existed prior to 1990.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. Since § 8-41-115 is similar to § 8-50-111 as it existed prior to the 1990 repeal and reenactment of the "Workers' Compensation Act of Colorado", articles 40 to 47 of this title, relevant cases construing that provision have been included in the annotations to this section.

Payment of expenses as payment of compensation. In this section the general assembly shows an intent to treat the payment of medical, hospital, and funeral expenses as the payment of compensation. Royal Indem. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 88 Colo. 113, 293 P. 342 (1930).

Burden on claimant to establish accident and causal connection between accident and death. In order for a claimant to recover workmen's compensation, the burden is upon the one seeking the benefits under the act to establish by competent evidence an accident and the causal connection between the accident and death. Claimants In re Death of Rumsey v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 162 Colo. 545, 427 P.2d 694 (1967).

A computation of death benefits without regard to statutory maximums and credits would result in a larger death benefit award to a disabled employee who dies of causes unrelated to a work-connected injury than the benefit conferred on an employee whose death results from his work-connected, disabling injury. Such results contravene the mandate of statutory construction which we must follow requiring us to read together all portions of the workmen's compensation act and to harmonize them if possible. Schenfeld v. Shaffer, 29 Colo. App. 425, 487 P.2d 818 (1971).

The word "accrued" in this section is used in the sense of due and payable. Employers' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 89 Colo. 475, 3 P.2d 1079 (1931).

Since the general assembly can legitimately deny nondependent heirs benefits upon the death of an employee, the fact that payments in cases where there are no statutory dependents may be made to the subsequent injury fund does not wrongfully deprive nondependent heirs of property. Ryan v. Centennial Race Track, Inc., 196 Colo. 30, 580 P.2d 794 (1978).

Survivors are entitled to death benefits if a decedent's death proximately resulted from more than one condition, so long as one condition was the occupational disease. Subsequent Injury Fund v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 131 P.3d 1224 (Colo. App. 2006).

For a death to proximately result from a compensable injury or occupational disease, there must be a significant, direct, and consequential nexus between the death and the injury or disease. Subsequent Injury Fund v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 131 P.3d 1224 (Colo. App. 2006).

A compensable injury would necessarily be a significant, direct, and consequential cause of death if the death would not have occurred "but for" the compensable injury; if the injury was "a necessary precondition or trigger" of the death; or if the injury was the sole cause of the death. Subsequent Injury Fund v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 131 P.3d 1224 (Colo. App. 2006).