Colorado § 8-42-113 - Limitations on payments to prisoners - incentives to sheriffs and department of corrections.

§ 8-42-113. Limitations on payments to prisoners - incentives to sheriffs and department of corrections.

(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, any individual who is otherwise entitled to benefits under articles 40 to 47 of this title shall neither receive nor be entitled to such benefits for any week following conviction during which such individual is confined in a jail, prison, or any department of corrections facility.

(1.5) (a) In the event the identifying information transmitted to the department of labor and employment pursuant to section 17-26-118.5 (2), C.R.S., results in the termination of workers' compensation benefits pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the employer or the insurance carrier, if any, shall pay to the sheriff a reward equal to ten percent of one week's benefit to which the ineligible individual would otherwise be eligible to receive.

(b) An individual who is ineligible pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall repay to the employer or the insurance carrier, if any, any amounts received while not eligible.

(2) After such individual's release from confinement, the individual shall be restored to the same position with respect to entitlement to benefits under articles 40 to 47 of this title as said individual would otherwise have enjoyed at the point in time of such release from confinement. However, except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, said individual shall not be able to recover, recoup, or otherwise be retroactively entitled to any of the benefits to which the individual would have been entitled without the limitation specified in subsection (1) of this section.

(3) If upon appeal such conviction is overturned, such individual shall be entitled to recover the benefits to which such individual would have been entitled except for the operation of subsection (1) of this section.

(4) This section shall not apply to benefits under articles 40 to 47 of this title to which an inmate of a department of corrections facility or a city, county, or city and county jail is entitled for injury or occupational disease arising out of and in the course of the inmate working, performing services, or participating in a training, rehabilitation, or work release program that has been certified by the federal prison industry enhancement certification program pursuant to the federal "Justice System Improvement Act of 1979", 18 U.S.C. sec. 1761 (c). The inmate shall be entitled to benefits in accordance with section 8-40-301 (3)(a).

Source: L. 90: Entire article R&RE, p. 495, § 1, effective July 1. L. 99: (1.5) added, p. 553, § 3, effective August 4. L. 2010: (1) amended and (4) added, (HB 10-1109), ch. 171, p. 606, § 2, effective August 11.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 8-52-104.5 as it existed prior to 1990.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Update on Colorado Appellate Decisions in Workers' Compensation Law", see 33 Colo. Law. 117 (Nov. 2004).

Annotator's note. Since § 8-42-113 is similar to § 8-52-104.5 as it existed prior to the 1990 repeal and reenactment of the "Workers' Compensation Act of Colorado", articles 40 to 47 of this title, a relevant case construing that provision has been included in the annotations to this section.

This section does not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws because it does not impose criminal penalties. The intent behind this section is to relieve employers and insurance carriers of the obligation to pay benefits as compensation for lost earning capacity to persons who have no earning capacity because they are imprisoned. Wood v. Beatrice Foods Co., 813 P.2d 821 (Colo. App. 1991).

Statute was not applied retroactively where claimant did not receive award of benefits until after the section was enacted, even though the events supporting the award occurred before the section was enacted. Wood v. Beatrice Foods Co., 813 P.2d 821 (Colo. App. 1991).

The statute does not deny the claimant due process where the claimant did not have a vested entitlement to an award of benefits when the statute was enacted. The existence of workers' compensation benefits is dependent on the workers' compensation statutes, and legislation limiting those benefits does not affect a constitutionally protected property interest. Wood v. Beatrice Foods Co., 813 P.2d 821 (Colo. App. 1991).

The statute does not violate due process or equal protection requirements because the distinction made between prisoners and other persons claiming workers' compensation benefits bears a rational relationship to the purpose of the statute which is to protect employees injured in the course of their work from becoming wards of the state by providing compensation for lost earning capacity. Wood v. Beatrice Foods Co., 813 P.2d 821 (Colo. App. 1991).

Suspension of claimant's medical impairment benefits during incarceration was required by the clear and unambiguous language of this section. Salazar v. Hi-Land Potato Co., 917 P.2d 326 (Colo. App. 1996).

Under subsection (2), upon release from prison, a claimant may again receive medical, disability, and death benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act. Landeros v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 214 P.3d 544 (Colo. App. 2008).

Subsection (2) of this section does not toll the statute of limitations while claimant is in prison. And nothing in either this article 42 or article 43 of the Workers' Compensation Act provides authority for tolling the limitation periods provided in § 8-43-303 while a claimant is in prison. Landeros v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 214 P.3d 544 (Colo. App. 2008).

A community corrections facility is not a "jail, prison, or any department of corrections facility." A community corrections facility is specifically excluded from the definition of a minimum security corrections facility. Therefore, confinement in a community corrections facility does not suspend benefits. City & County of Denver v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 98 P.3d 969 (Colo. App. 2004).