Colorado § 7-42-102 - Work after organization.

§ 7-42-102. Work after organization.

(1) Any corporation formed under the provisions of law for the purpose of constructing any ditch, flume, bridge, ferry, or telegraph line, within ninety days from the effective date of its articles of incorporation, shall commence work on such ditch, flume, bridge, ferry, or telegraph line, as shall be named in the articles, and shall complete the work with due diligence. The time of the completion of any such ditch, bridge, ferry, or telegraph line shall not be extended beyond a period of two years from the time work was commenced.

(2) Any corporation failing to commence work within ninety days after the effective date of the articles of incorporation, or failing to complete the same within two years after the time of commencement, shall forfeit all right to the water so claimed, and the same shall be subject to be claimed by any other company. The time for the completion of any flume constructed under the provisions of law shall not be extended beyond a period of four years.

(3) This section shall not apply to any ditch or flume for mining or other purposes constructed through and upon any grounds owned by the corporation. Any company formed to construct a ditch for domestic, agricultural, irrigating, milling, and manufacturing purposes or any of them shall have three years from the time of commencing work thereon within which to complete the same but no longer.

Source: G.L. § 296. G.S. § 314. R.S. 08: § 989. C.L. § 2354. CSA: C. 41, § 142. CRS 53: § 31-14-2. C.R.S. 1963: § 31-14-2. L. 2008: (1) and (2) amended, p. 22, § 11, effective August 5.

ANNOTATION

Limitation for lack of due diligence. Whether a court limits a priority decree because of this section or whether upon general principles it holds that due diligence in the prosecution of the work was not observed is quite immaterial. Water Supply & Storage Co. v. Tenney, 24 Colo. 344, 51 P. 505 (1897).

Decree limiting priorities by court of proper jurisdiction may not be collaterally attacked. Under this section, a decree limiting the priorities of a ditch to the completion of the work pronounced by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter, of the person, and to enter the particular judgment, which is not appealed from, cannot collaterally be attacked and set aside, even though an erroneous conclusion was reached. Water Supply & Storage Co. v. Tenney, 24 Colo. 344, 51 P. 505 (1897).

Applied in Jacobucci v. District Court, 189 Colo. 380, 541 P.2d 667 (1975).