Colorado § 6-4-115 - Enforcement - civil damages.

§ 6-4-115. Enforcement - civil damages.

(1) Any person injured, either directly or indirectly, in its business or property by reason of any violation of this article 4 may sue and, if successful, is entitled to recover any actual damages that the person sustained. If the violation alleged and proved is determined by the court to be a per se violation of this article 4, the person may recover three times the actual damages that the person sustains.

(2) In any action brought pursuant to this section, the court, in its discretion, may award the prevailing party its expert fees, the costs of the action, and reasonable attorney fees.

(3) No damages, costs, expert fees, costs of investigation, civil penalties, or attorney fees may be recovered from:

(a) A governmental or public entity;

(b) Any official, agent, or employee of a governmental or public entity acting in an official capacity; or

(c) Any person based on any official action directed by a governmental or public entity.

Source: L. 2023: Entire article R&RE, (HB 23-1192), ch. 427, p. 2516, § 2, effective June 7.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 6-4-114 as it existed prior to 2023.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Antitrust and the Lay Lawyer", see 44 Den. L.J. 558 (1967). For article, "Colorado Antitrust Law Seven Years Later", see 13 Colo. Law. 1808 (1984).

Annotator's note. Since § 6-4-115 is similar to § 6-4-114 as it existed prior to the 2023 repeal and reenactment of this article and to laws antecedent to that section, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

End users of software lacked standing to pursue a class action claim under this section. Software was obtained by end user class members from original equipment manufacturers and retailers rather than from the software manufacturer and was licensed through an end user licensing agreement. The licensing agreement was the functional equivalent of a sale, and the end users, though licensees, were therefore essentially indirect purchasers of the software precluded from pursuing a claim under Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). Pomerantz v. Microsoft Corp., 50 P.3d 929 (Colo. App. 2002).

The end user licensing agreements did not create functional economic unity between software manufacturer and original equipment manufacturers and retailers, and the end users, therefore, were not direct purchasers of software. Pomerantz v. Microsoft Corp., 50 P.3d 929 (Colo. App. 2002).

No claim presented under this section where discharged employee was not injured "by reason of" alleged anticompetitive effect of employer's conduct. Winther v. DEC Int'l Inc., 625 F. Supp. 100 (D. Colo. 1985).

Applied in Colo. Petroleum Marketers Ass'n v. Southland Corp., 476 F. Supp. 373 (D. Colo. 1979).