Colorado § 43-1-401 - Short title.

§ 43-1-401. Short title.

This part 4 shall be known and may be cited as the "Outdoor Advertising Act".

Source: L. 81: Entire part R&RE, p. 2006, § 1, effective July 1.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 43-1-401 as it existed prior to 1981.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "The Case for Billboard Control: Precedent and Prediction", see 36 Dicta 461 (1959). For article, "Colorado Needs a Constitutional and Effective Roadside Sign Law", see 36 Dicta 475 (1959).

The Outdoor Advertising Act and its accompanying rules are content neutral under the first amendment. Rather than targeting the content of an advertisement, the regulatory scheme regulates the posting of billboards based on whether the speaker compensated the owner of the billboard to erect the device or display the message. Regardless of the message or content on the sign, only for-compensation signs visible from a state highway trigger the regulation. In short, the act and rules do not distinguish between content or messages. Streetmediagroup, LLC v. Stockinger, 79 F.4th 1243 (10th Cir. 2023).

The act and its accompanying rules are not unconstitutionally vague and do not operate as a prior restraint on speech. The act and its rules can be understood by a person of ordinary intelligence and contain adequate constraints against discriminatory or arbitrary application. Streetmediagroup, LLC v. Stockinger, 79 F.4th 1243 (10th Cir. 2023).

First, the act provides people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits. The conduct covered by the act is clear: An individual or entity erecting or maintaining for-compensation signs visible from a state highway must acquire a permit. Second, the act and its accompanying rules outline what must be included in a permit application; provide a deadline for decision-making; and create an administrative right of appeal. Streetmediagroup, LLC v. Stockinger, 79 F.4th 1243 (10th Cir. 2023).

The act and its accompanying rules are rationally related to a legitimate government purpose and do not violate the equal protection clause. The act distinguishes between "advertising devices" and other signs and billboards. The state has legitimate interests in highway safety and reducing visual clutter. Targeting paid billboard advertising, which includes permanent structures with changing content, from companies that have an economic incentive to construct as many billboards in as many visually prominent locations as possible is a legitimate government purpose. Streetmediagroup, LLC v. Stockinger, 79 F.4th 1243 (10th Cir. 2023).

Regulatory scheme for the control of outdoor advertising which imposed permit requirement and set limitations on placement of roadside signs is not violative of due process, but is reasonably related to the achievement of a legitimate state interest. Orsinger Outdoor Adv. v. State Dept. of Hwys., 752 P.2d 55 (Colo. 1988).

Regulatory rule adopted under this act which distinguishes between incorporated and unincorporated areas does not violate equal protection because relevant differences are real in fact and related to legitimate state interests. Orsinger Outdoor Adv. v. State Dept. of Hwys., 752 P.2d 55 (Colo. 1988).

The outdoor advertising act is, in essence, a rezoning statute, restricting the use of outdoor advertising on property adjacent to state and federal highways. State Dept. of Hwys. v. Pigg, 656 P.2d 46 (Colo. App. 1982).

This act supersedes conflicting municipal regulation of outdoor advertising signs that are along state highway system within a home-rule municipality, because regulation of such signs is a matter of mixed local and statewide concern. Nat. Advert. Co. v. State Dept. of Hwys., 751 P.2d 632 (Colo. 1988).

A city's sign code was invalid to the extent it conflicted with this act where the sign code required removal or modification of nonconforming signs and contained a five-year amortization period within which to remove the nonconforming signs. Root Outdoor Advert. v. Ft. Collins, 759 P.2d 59 (Colo. App. 1988).

Applied in State Dept. of Hwys. v. Davis, 626 P.2d 661 (Colo. 1981).