Colorado § 42-4-703 - Entering through highway - stop or yield intersection.

§ 42-4-703. Entering through highway - stop or yield intersection.

(1) The department of transportation and local authorities, within their respective jurisdictions, may erect and maintain stop signs, yield signs, or other official traffic control devices to designate through highways or to designate intersections or other roadway junctions at which vehicular traffic on one or more of the roadways is directed to yield or to stop and yield before entering the intersection or junction. In the case of state highways, such regulations shall be subject to the provisions of section 43-2-135 (1)(g), C.R.S.

(2) Every sign erected pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall be a standard sign adopted by the department of transportation.

(3) Except when directed to proceed by a police officer, every driver of a vehicle approaching a stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection, or if none, then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering it. After having stopped, the driver shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time when such driver is moving across or within the intersection or junction of roadways.

(4) The driver of a vehicle approaching a yield sign, in obedience to such sign, shall slow to a speed reasonable for the existing conditions and, if required for safety to stop, shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection, or if none, then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering it. After slowing or stopping, the driver shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time such driver is moving across or within the intersection or junction of roadways; except that, if a driver is involved in a collision with a vehicle in the intersection or junction of roadways after driving past a yield sign without stopping, such collision shall be deemed prima facie evidence of the driver's failure to yield right-of-way.

(5) Any person who violates any provision of this section commits a class A traffic infraction.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2347, § 1, effective January 1, 1995.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-4-603 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-4-703 was relocated to § 42-4-803.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. Since § 42-4-703 is similar to § 42-4-603 as it existed prior to the 1994 amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1, relevant cases construing that provision have been included with the annotations to this section.

This section governs traffic at rural intersections. Seifried v. Mosher, 129 Colo. 156, 268 P.2d 411 (1954).

The phrase "approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard" necessarily imposes due care and caution on the part of the approaching driver under all the facts and circumstances present. Seifried v. Mosher, 129 Colo. 156, 268 P.2d 411 (1954).

Violation of a traffic statute may serve as the basis of a negligence per se determination. Subsection (3) was adopted for the public's safety and may be used as a basis for asserting negligence per se. Bullock v. Wayne, 623 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (D. Colo. 2009).

Section 42-4-1713 prevents the admission of evidence of conviction for failure to yield in violation of subsection (3) of this section. That evidence may not be introduced at trial or during summary judgment. Bullock v. Wayne, 623 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (D. Colo. 2009).

Violation is question for jury. Whether or not either of the drivers or both were negligent in violating this section and whether said negligence was the proximate cause of this accident, or whether it was caused by the joint and concurrent negligence of both, were questions of fact for the jury to determine. Amos v. Remington Arms Co., 117 Colo. 399, 188 P.2d 896 (1948).

Negligence is generally for the jury, and always so when the measure of duty is reasonable care. Seifried v. Mosher, 129 Colo. 156, 268 P.2d 411 (1954).

Applied in Smith v. Charnes, 649 P.2d 1089 (Colo. 1982).