Colorado § 42-4-1713 - Conviction record inadmissible in civil action.

§ 42-4-1713. Conviction record inadmissible in civil action.

Except as provided in sections 42-2-201 to 42-2-208, no record of the conviction of any person for any violation of this article shall be admissible as evidence in any court in any civil action.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2425, § 1, effective January 1, 1995.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-4-1508 as it existed prior to 1994.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Plea of Guilty as an Admission", see 33 Dicta 188 (1956).

Annotator's note. Since § 42-4-1713 is similar to § 42-4-1508 as it existed prior to the 1994 amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1, relevant cases construing that provision have been included with the annotations to this section.

This section prohibits the admission in evidence of the record of conviction of any person, for violation of the state traffic laws, in a civil action. Ripple v. Brack, 132 Colo. 125, 286 P.2d 625 (1955).

This section prevents the admission of evidence of conviction for failure to yield in violation of § 42-4-703 (3). That evidence may not be introduced at trial or during summary judgment and may not serve as the basis for issue preclusion on the question of violation of a statute. Bullock v. Wayne, 623 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (D. Colo. 2009).

Evidence of convictions under this article are only permissible in a habitual traffic offender proceeding. Alhilo v. Kliem, 2016 COA 142, 412 P.3d 902.

Unless §§ 42-2-201 to 42-2-208 are implicated, evidence of a driver's prior traffic convictions is not admissible in a civil action, even if such convictions caused the driver's license to be suspended at the time of the accident that is the subject of the civil action. Absent an adjudication by the department of revenue that the driver was an habitual offender, the convictions are inadmissible for any purpose, including to show that the prior convictions giving rise to the suspension indicated a habit, practice, and pattern of disregard for traffic regulations. Lawrence v. Taylor, 8 P.3d 607 (Colo. App. 2000).

Highly speculative assertion in personal injury action that plaintiff's decedent would have been convicted of driving under suspension had he survived, and thus qualify as an habitual offender under §§ 42-2-201 to 42-2-208, does not meet the exception in this section. Thus, the decedent's prior traffic convictions were properly excluded at trial. Lawrence v. Taylor, 8 P.3d 607 (Colo. App. 2000).

Section prohibits admission of evidence of charge of violation. By this section, the general assembly obviously intended, by prohibiting the admission in evidence in a civil action of the record of conviction of any person for violation of the traffic laws, to prohibit also the asking questions as to whether or not the plaintiff had been charged in justice's court with a violation of the state traffic laws. Ripple v. Brack, 132 Colo. 125, 286 P.2d 625 (1955).

No prejudice to defendant. The medical witness stated: "An auto hit him in the back and he got a ticket for reckless driving." The statement is ambiguous; for that reason it was proper to clarify since the plaintiff did not receive a ticket, and the defendant's counsel did not move to strike the statement. The facts do not bring the motion for mistrial within the ambit of the proscription of the statute, since the statement made no mention of a "conviction", nor was any effort made to introduce a "record of the conviction of any person". There was no prejudice to the defendant. Thompson v. Tartler, 166 Colo. 247, 443 P.2d 365 (1968).

Applied in McCormick v. United States, 539 F. Supp. 1179 (D. Colo. 1982).