Colorado § 42-4-108 - Public officers to obey provisions - exceptions for emergency vehicles.

§ 42-4-108. Public officers to obey provisions - exceptions for emergency vehicles.

(1) The provisions of this article applicable to the drivers of vehicles upon the highways shall apply to the drivers of all vehicles owned or operated by the United States, this state, or any county, city, town, district, or other political subdivision of the state, subject to such specific exceptions as are set forth in this article with reference to authorized emergency vehicles.

(2) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency call, or when in pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, or when responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm, may exercise the privileges set forth in this section, but subject to the conditions stated in this article. The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle may:

(a) Park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this title;

(b) Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation;

(c) Exceed the lawful speeds set forth in section 42-4-1101 (2) or exceed the maximum lawful speed limits set forth in section 42-4-1101 (8) so long as said driver does not endanger life or property;

(d) Disregard regulations governing directions of movement or turning in specified directions.

(3) The exemptions and conditions provided in paragraphs (b) to (d), in their entirety, of subsection (2) of this section for an authorized emergency vehicle shall continue to apply to section 24-10-106 (1)(a), C.R.S., only when such vehicle is making use of audible or visual signals meeting the requirements of section 42-4-213, and the exemption granted in paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section shall apply only when such vehicle is making use of visual signals meeting the requirements of section 42-4-213 unless using such visual signals would cause an obstruction to the normal flow of traffic; except that an authorized emergency vehicle being operated as a police vehicle while in actual pursuit of a suspected violator of any provision of this title need not display or make use of audible or visual signals so long as such pursuit is being made to obtain verification of or evidence of the guilt of the suspected violator. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require an emergency vehicle to make use of audible signals when such vehicle is not moving, whether or not the vehicle is occupied.

(4) The provisions of this section shall not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver from the consequences of such driver's reckless disregard for the safety of others.

(5) The state motor vehicle licensing agency shall designate any particular vehicle as an authorized emergency vehicle upon a finding that the designation of that vehicle is necessary to the preservation of life or property or to the execution of emergency governmental functions. Such designation shall be in writing, and the written designation shall be carried in the vehicle at all times, but failure to carry the written designation shall not affect the status of the vehicle as an authorized emergency vehicle.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2231, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 96: (3) amended, p. 958, § 4, effective July 1.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. Since § 42-4-108 is similar to § 42-4-106 as it existed prior to the 1994 amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1, relevant cases construing that provision have been included in the annotations to this section.

Proper standard under subsection (2) for determining whether an emergency vehicle operator was responding to an emergency call is an objective standard from the perspective of the reasonable emergency vehicle operator. Courts must decide whether the emergency vehicle operator reasonably believed that he or she was responding to an emergency based on information he or she knew or should have known. Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082 (Colo. 2000).

Proper standard under subsection (2)(c) for determining whether an emergency vehicle driver endangered life or property while speeding is to ask whether the emergency vehicle operator's speed created an unreasonable risk of injury or damage to life or property. Courts should limit their inquiry to the relationship between the conduct of the emergency operator prior to the accident and the circumstances surrounding the conduct and important factors include, but are not limited to, the legal speed limit in the area, the speed at which the operator was driving, the conditions of the road, and the type of area in which the operator was driving. Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082 (Colo. 2000).

Firefighters and city immune from liability when an eight-foot section of hard suction hose came loose from the truck and plaintiff drove over the hose, causing personal injury and damage to the car, because the fire truck was responding to a fire alarm and was using its emergency lights and sirens. City of Grand Junction v. Sisneros, 957 P.2d 1026 (Colo. 1998).

An emergency driver waives governmental immunity in an accident when the driver does not activate emergency warning lights or sirens only if a plaintiff's injuries could have resulted from the driver's failure to use alerts while speeding in pursuit of a suspected or actual lawbreaker. Hice v. Giron, 2024 CO 9, 543 P.3d 385.

The possibility that an officer's failure to use emergency lights or a siren until the final five to ten seconds of a pursuit could have contributed to an accident with another motorist is a waiver of governmental immunity under § 24-10-106 (1)(a) for the officer and the town that employed the officer. Giron v. Hice, 2025 COA 17, 568 P.3d 20.

Police officer not immune from liability if operating an emergency vehicle with "reckless disregard for the safety of others". Zapp v. Kukuris, 847 P.2d 150 (Colo. App. 1992).

Running a red light without slowing down is not within the provisions of subsection (2)(b). Therefore, the government may be held liable for an accident resulting from such conduct. Tunget v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 992 P.2d 650 (Colo. App. 1999).

Under the emergency vehicle exception provided for by subsection (2)(c) of this section and § 24-10-106 (1)(a), a trial court must find that a police officer who exceeded the speed limit in pursuit of a fleeing crime suspect did not endanger life or property before granting immunity from a lawsuit resulting from a pursuit-related traffic accident. Case remanded where the trial court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity without making such a finding. Quintana v. City of Westminster, 8 P.3d 527 (Colo. App. 2000).

The general assembly chose not to apply the conditions of subsection (2) of this section to the indemnification provisions of § 24-10-110 (1)(b)(II) because this section refers only to § 24-10-106 (1)(a). A public entity does not have immunity if an operator of an emergency vehicle speeds and endangers life or property in violation of subsection (2)(c) of this section, but the public entity is liable for any claims against the operator of the emergency vehicle. Only when the operator's acts causing the injuries are willful and wanton is the operator personally liable. Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082 (Colo. 2000).

Public entity and its employees immune from tort liability if employee operating police vehicle while in actual pursuit of a suspected violator of title 42, even if the employee is not using the vehicle's emergency lights or sirens, if the pursuit is made to obtain verification of or evidence of the guilt of the suspected violator. Tidwell v. City & County of Denver, 62 P.3d 1020 (Colo. App. 2002), rev'd on other grounds, 83 P.3d 75 (Colo. 2003).

Police officer was engaged in a pursuit within the provisions of subsection (3) when the driver of a car fled the scene in a clear attempt to avoid arrest or further investigation and the officer followed the car. Tidwell v. City & County of Denver, 83 P.3d 75 (Colo. 2003).

Police officer's pursuit was not investigatory in nature when the officer already had authority to stop and arrest the driver of a car and the officer was pursuing the driver of the car for that reason. Therefore the officer was required to activate his emergency signals in order for the city to claim the protection of governmental immunity under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act. Tidwell v. City & County of Denver, 83 P.3d 75 (Colo. 2003).

Police officer's alleged conduct could be viewed as reckless and conscience-shocking for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Police officer's alleged conduct, particularly his decision to speed against a red light through an intersection on a major boulevard without slowing down or activating his siren in non-emergency circumstances, all in violation of state law and police regulations, could be viewed as reckless and conscience-shocking. Williams v. City & County of Denver, 99 F.3d 1009 (10th Cir. 1996).

Dismissal of claim based on simple negligence in operation of an emergency vehicle was proper, since standard of care created in subsection (4) is "reckless disregard". Zapp v. Kukuris, 847 P.2d 150 (Colo. App. 1992).

Applied in Brown v. Kreuser, 38 Colo. App. 554, 560 P.2d 105 (1977); Mobell v. City & County of Denver, 671 P.2d 433 (Colo. App. 1983); Sierra v. City & County of Denver, 730 P.2d 902 (Colo. App. 1986).