Colorado § 42-2-203 - Authority to revoke license of habitual offender.

§ 42-2-203. Authority to revoke license of habitual offender.

The department shall immediately revoke the license of any person whose record brings such person within the definition of an habitual offender in section 42-2-202. The procedure specified in section 42-2-125 (3) and (4) shall be employed for the revocation.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2159, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2009: Entire section amended, (HB 09-1234), ch. 91, p. 353, § 2, effective August 5.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "There Must Be Fifty Ways to Lose Your (Driver's) License", see 22 Colo. Law. 2385 (1993).

This section contains adequate procedural safeguards to afford a defendant due process of law. Crocker v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 652 P.2d 1067 (Colo. 1982).

Traffic laws and revocation procedures are aimed at all drivers who operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or while their ability is impaired, regardless of their status as alcoholics or problem drinkers. Heninger v. Charnes, 200 Colo. 194, 613 P.2d 884 (1980).

Section does not create statutory classification of alcoholics and problem drinkers with respect to traffic offenses. Heninger v. Charnes, 200 Colo. 194, 613 P.2d 884 (1980).

Issuance of driver's license does not confer upon licensee right that is independently entitled to protection against any and all governmental interference or restriction. Heninger v. Charnes, 200 Colo. 194, 613 P.2d 884 (1980).

Revocation of driver's license implicates procedural due process protections. People v. McKnight, 200 Colo. 486, 617 P.2d 1178 (1980).

Revocation of driver's license does not burden right to travel interstate. While the right to travel interstate is without question a fundamental right under the United States constitution, revocation of a driver's license pursuant to this section does not burden this fundamental right. Heninger v. Charnes, 200 Colo. 194, 613 P.2d 884 (1980).

Constitutional due process standards do not mandate that notice be given to persons adjudged habitual traffic offenders under this section as to the possible criminal penalty for driving in violation of an administrative order revoking the habitual traffic offender's driver's license. People v. McKnight, 200 Colo. 486, 617 P.2d 1178 (1980).

Revocation proceeding is not criminal proceeding. People v. Able, 200 Colo. 115, 618 P.2d 1110 (1980).

Procedural differences with habitual criminal proceeding are reasonable. The differences in procedures between a license revocation proceeding and those procedures applicable to a habitual criminal prosecution are reasonably related to legitimate state objectives, as the subject matter addressed by these statutes is so different and the policy considerations underlying each statutory scheme are so distinct that the classifications cannot be found to be unreasonable or lacking in a rational relationship to legitimate state objectives. People v. Shaver, 630 P.2d 600 (Colo. 1981).

Revocation proceeding is civil. The administrative proceeding to revoke a driver's license because of habitual traffic offender status is a civil one. People v. Shaver, 630 P.2d 600 (Colo. 1981).

Proceeding is civil in nature. The administrative proceeding conducted by the division to consider defendant's eligibility to retain a license to operate a motor vehicle in Colorado is civil in nature. People v. Rocha, 669 P.2d 1366 (Colo. 1983).

Constitutional defense cannot be raised at hearing. A defendant cannot invoke a constitutional defense in an administrative departmental hearing where the sole purpose is to determine if the department's records of the licensee's traffic offense convictions support the revocation of the licensee's driver's license pursuant to this section. State v. Laughlin, 634 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1981).

There is a duty to comply with order of revocation until it is rescinded pursuant to a direct appeal rather than a collateral attack. People v. District Court, 623 P.2d 55 (Colo. 1981).

Driver with three driving while ability impaired convictions within a seven-year period is an habitual traffic offender and may have his or her license revoked by the department. Kramer v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 964 P.2d 629 (Colo. App. 1998).

Convictions under the law of another state that "substantially conform" to the statutory provisions of Colorado may be included for purposes of habitual traffic offender status. Thus, even if plaintiff's Idaho convictions are the equivalent of Colorado driving while ability impaired convictions, they may be considered for purposes of imposing habitual traffic offender status. Kramer v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 964 P.2d 629 (Colo. App. 1998).

Applied in Dunn v. Tice, 43 Colo. App. 55, 598 P.2d 530 (1979); Anderson v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 44 Colo. App. 157, 615 P.2d 51 (1980); Laughlin v. State, 44 Colo. App. 157, 618 P.2d 689 (1980); People v. Roybal, 618 P.2d 1121 (Colo. 1980); People v. Hampton, 619 P.2d 48 (1980); People v. Torres, 625 P.2d 1034 (Colo. 1981); Reasoner v. Dept. of Rev., 628 P.2d 187 (Colo. App. 1981); People v. Dooley, 630 P.2d 608 (Colo. 1981); Berry v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 656 P.2d 721 (Colo. App. 1982); People v. Clements, 665 P.2d 624 (Colo. 1983); People v. Lesh, 668 P.2d 1362 (Colo. 1983); DiMarco v. Dept. of Rev., MVD, 857 P.2d 1349 (Colo. App. 1993).