Colorado § 40-6-115 - Review by district court - mandamus.

§ 40-6-115. Review by district court - mandamus.

(1) Within thirty days after a final decision by the commission in any proceeding, any party to the proceeding before the commission may apply to the district court for a writ of certiorari or review for the purpose of having the lawfulness of the final decision inquired into and determined. Such writ shall be made returnable not later than thirty days after the date of issuance and shall direct the commission to certify its record in the proceeding to said court. On the return day, the cause shall be heard by the district court unless, for a good reason shown, the same be continued. No new or additional evidence may be introduced in the district court, but the cause shall be heard on the record of the commission as certified by it. The commission and each party to the action or proceeding before the commission shall have the right to appear in the review proceedings.

(2) The findings and conclusions of the commission on disputed questions of fact shall be final and shall not be subject to review, except that, in any proceeding wherein the validity of any order or decision is challenged on the ground that it violates any right of a petitioner under the constitution of the United States or the constitution of the state of Colorado, the district court shall exercise an independent judgment on the law and the facts, and the findings or conclusions of the commission material to the determination of the said constitutional question shall not be final.

(3) Upon review, the district court shall enter judgment either affirming, setting aside, or modifying the decision of the commission. So far as necessary to the decision and where presented, the district court shall decide all relevant questions of law and interpret all relevant constitutional and statutory provisions. The review shall not extend further than to determine whether the commission has regularly pursued its authority, including a determination of whether the decision under review violates any right of the petitioner under the constitution of the United States or of the state of Colorado, and whether the decision of the commission is just and reasonable and whether its conclusions are in accordance with the evidence.

(4) The provisions of the Colorado rules of civil procedure relating to writs of certiorari or review, so far as applicable and not in conflict with the provisions of this title, shall apply to proceedings had in the district court under the provisions of this section. No court of this state, except the district court to the extent specified, shall have jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct, or annul any order or decision of the commission, or to suspend or delay the execution or operation thereof, or to enjoin, restrain, or interfere with the commission in the performance of its official duties; but an action in the nature of mandamus shall lie from the district court to the commission in all proper cases.

(5) All actions for review shall be commenced and tried in the district court in and for the county in which the petitioner resides, or if a corporation or partnership in the county in which it maintains its principal office or place of business, or in the district court of the city and county of Denver, at the option of the petitioner. Appellate review may be obtained in the supreme court concerning any final judgment of the district court on review, affirming, setting aside, or modifying any decision of the commission, in the same manner and with the same effect as appellate review of judgments of the district court in other civil actions.

Source: L. 13: p. 497, § 52. C.L. § 2961. CSA: C. 137, § 52. L. 45: p. 531, § 8. CRS 53: § 115-6-15. C.R.S. 1963: § 115-6-15. L. 69: p. 949, § 47. L. 75: (1) and (4) amended, p. 227, § 90, effective July 16. L. 89: (4) amended, p. 1532, § 17, effective April 12. L. 92: (1) amended, p. 2131, § 3, effective July 1. L. 93: (1) amended, p. 2065, § 21, effective July 1.

ANNOTATION

I. General Consideration.

II. Findings of Fact.

III. Scope of Review.

IV. Jurisdiction.

V. Venue.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Law reviews. For article, "Prosecuting an Appeal from a Decision of the Colorado Public Utilities Commission", see 16 Colo. Law. 2163 (1987). For article, "Winning an Appeal from a Decision of the Colorado Public Utilities Commission", see 17 Colo. Law. 1529 (1988). For article, "Can Colorado Administrative Agencies Settle Judicial Review Actions", see 19 Colo. Law. 835 (1990).

Procedure of section intended to be exclusive. By the provisions of this section, the general assembly intended this to be the exclusive procedure for reviewing orders and decisions of the public utilities commission (PUC) made after a full hearing and presentation of evidence on the issues before the PUC. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 182 Colo. 269, 513 P.2d 721 (1973); Archibold v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 933 P.2d 1323 (Colo. 1997).

No basis for review unless administrative remedies exhausted. When the PUC decides to suspend the rates and hold hearings, the burden is on the public utility to establish that the proposed rates comply with law, and, unless a challenger exhausts this administrative remedy, it has no basis for district court review. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. District Court, 186 Colo. 278, 527 P.2d 233 (1974).

The party objecting to a decision of the commission has the burden of proving that the decision is unlawful. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Nw. Water Corp., 168 Colo. 154, 451 P.2d 266 (1969); CF&I Steel, L.P. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 949 P.2d 577 (Colo. 1997); Holcim U.S. Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 2025 CO 1, 562 P.3d 55.

In post-hearing, preappeal administrative proceeding, discovery should be available as matter of right only if the party alleging procedural irregularities first shows, by affidavit or other substantial factual evidence, that there is good cause to believe that ex parte communications, personal bias, or other impermissible considerations played a part in the tribunal's decision. Peoples Natural Gas Div. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 626 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1981).

Ex parte exchanges between advocate and adjudicatory tribunal may not arbitrarily be screened from appellate scrutiny. Peoples Natural Gas Div. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 626 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1981).

The return to an application for appellate review is merely the certification by the responding tribunal of the proceedings sought to be reviewed, and that, while the application sometimes commands the respondents to make answer, the certification of the record is the only answer and the only return to the application which the inferior tribunal is required to make. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Weicker Transf. & Storage Co., 168 Colo. 339, 451 P.2d 448 (1969).

Factual allegations of application for appellate review are required to be accepted as uncontroverted in considering the propriety of the action of the court in quashing such application where record contained nothing beyond pleadings in district court and motion to quash challenged sufficiency of application. Snell v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 108 Colo. 162, 114 P.2d 563 (1941).

Application should not be quashed where it appears commission deviated from regular pursuit of authority. An application duly issued by judicial authority to review the action of the PUC in connection with the issuance of a certificate of public necessity and convenience to a public utility, should not be quashed on motion where, from the facts alleged in the application, it appears that the commission deviated from the regular pursuit of its authority in connection with the matters involved. Snell v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 108 Colo. 162, 114 P.2d 563 (1941).

Judicial review barred unless applied for within 30 days. Unless an application for review of the acts of the PUC is filed before the expiration of 30 days from the date of its final decision, judicial review is barred. Mayer v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 104 Colo. 619, 94 P.2d 125 (1939); Archibold v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 933 P.2d 1323 (Colo. 1997).

The date of the hearing is by statute provided to be set on the same date as the return, but since it is also provided that the hearing date can be continued, it may be immaterial where the court set the hearing for a later date. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Weicker Transf. & Storage Co., 168 Colo. 339, 451 P.2d 448 (1969).

Service of process on attorney of record is sufficient. In review by certiorari proceedings in the district court of a commission decision, an indispensable party need not receive personal service of process through its registered agent for service, and service by mail upon the attorney of record in the administrative hearing is sufficient. N. Glenn Sub. Co. v. District Court, 187 Colo. 409, 532 P.2d 332 (1975).

Judicial notice will not be taken of the records of the utilities commission. Denver & S. L. R. R. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 64 Colo. 229, 171 P. 74 (1918).

The utilities commission is under duty to obey the orders of the court. No excuses for disobedience will be received. Denver & S. L. R. R. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 67 Colo. 155, 185 P. 817 (1919).

This section governs the procedure for review of an order or decision of the PUC by a district court. People v. District Court, 134 Colo. 324, 303 P.2d 692 (1956); Consol. Freightways Corps. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 158 Colo. 239, 406 P.2d 83 (1965).

Factors controlling review. Under this section the review in this court of the orders of the PUC is controlled by the considerations applying in other cases, except as otherwise provided by the act. Denver & S. L. R. R. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 64 Colo. 229, 171 P. 74 (1918); Powell v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 956 P.2d 608 (Colo. 1998).

This section provides that no new or additional evidence may be introduced in a district court. People v. District Court, 134 Colo. 324, 303 P.2d 692 (1956).

In reviewing actions of the PUC, the courts are limited to an examination of the record to determine whether there is competent evidence to support the finding and whether the commission acted in excess of its powers. Parrish v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 134 Colo. 192, 301 P.2d 343 (1956); Colo. Transp. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 141 Colo. 203, 347 P.2d 505 (1959).

Since decision of PUC that it had subject matter jurisdiction over private operator of water system was not a final decision subject to judicial review, district court prematurely accepted jurisdiction to review PUC's decision and erroneously issued writ of prohibition. Keystone, A Div. of Ralston Purina v. Flynn, 769 P.2d 484 (Colo. 1989).

County has standing to seek judicial review of PUC's decision. Douglas County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 829 P.2d 1303 (Colo. 1992).

Acceptance of rate pending review is not voluntary. Where an order of the commission prescribes a division of through rates between certain connecting railway companies, the acceptance of the rate so prescribed, by one of the companies complaining thereof, pending an application for appellate review of the same, is not to be held voluntary. The complaining company succeeding in its appeal is entitled to restitution of whatever it has been unlawfully deprived by complying with the rates. Denver & S. L. R. R. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 67 Colo. 155, 185 P. 817 (1919).

Applied in Colo. Mun. League v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 197 Colo. 106, 591 P.2d 577 (1979); Pub. Serv. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 644 P.2d 933 (Colo. 1982); Phoenix Power Partners v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 952 P.2d 359 (Colo. 1998); Trans Shuttle, Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 89 P.3d 398 (Colo. 2004); Danks v. Colo. Public Utils. Comm'n, 2022 CO 26, 512 P.3d 692.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT.

Commission's findings on disputed facts not subject to review. Findings and conclusions of the commission on disputed questions of fact, when based on competent evidence, are final and not subject to review by the courts. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 68 Colo. 92, 188 P. 747 (1920); Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Loveland, 87 Colo. 556, 289 P. 1090 (1930); Se. Colo. Power Ass'n v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 163 Colo. 92, 428 P.2d 939 (1967); N. E. Motor Freight, Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 178 Colo. 433, 498 P.2d 923 (1972); Contact-Colorado Springs, Inc. v. Mobile Radio Tel. Serv., Inc., 191 Colo. 180, 551 P.2d 203 (1976); Mellow Yellow Taxi Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 644 P.2d 18 (Colo. 1982); Jarco, Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 2 P.3d 116 (Colo. 2000); Lake Durango Water Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 67 P.3d 12 (Colo. 2003).

When two equally reasonable courses of action are open to the commission, a reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the commission in selecting the appropriate alternative. Contact-Colorado Springs, Inc. v. Mobile Radio Tel. Serv., Inc., 191 Colo. 180, 551 P.2d 203 (1976); City of Montrose v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 629 P.2d 619 (Colo. 1981).

Full evidentiary hearing is not required. Where a party, represented by counsel, voluntarily waived a hearing and the administrative law judge made a decision and factual findings based on written submissions from the parties, the procedure comported with all applicable legal and constitutional requirements. Jarco, Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 2 P.3d 116 (Colo. 2000).

Findings of fact must be discernible to reviewing court. While findings of fact by the PUC need not be presented in any particular form, and they may even be implied, where the commission purports to make such findings, they must be discernible to the reviewing court. Caldwell v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 200 Colo. 134, 613 P.2d 328 (1980).

Where there is competent evidence to support the findings of the PUC, a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the commission. Sangre De Cristo Elec. Ass'n v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 185 Colo. 321, 524 P.2d 309 (1974); Morey v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 629 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1981); Colorado-Ute Elec. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 760 P.2d 627 (Colo. 1988); CF&I Steel, L.P. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 949 P.2d 577 (Colo. 1997); Pub. Serv. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 26 P.3d 1198 (Colo. 2001).

Determination by the PUC of whether a substantial opportunity for discrimination or unfair competition exists should not be disturbed unless it is unsupported by competent evidence or is arbitrary and capricious. Mobile Pre-Mix Transit, Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 618 P.2d 663 (Colo. 1980).

The exercise of discretion and judgment of the commission should not be interfered with by the reviewing court. Atchison, T & S. F. Ry. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 194 Colo. 263, 572 P.2d 138 (1977).

The general assembly contemplated that the reviewing court, since it does not have the aid of a staff and the expertise of the commission, should not undertake to duplicate the evaluation and judgment processes followed by the commission in arriving at its decision. Atchison, T & S. F. Ry. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 194 Colo. 263, 572 P.2d 138 (1977); Pub. Serv. Co. v. P.U.C., 765 P.2d 1015 (Colo. 1988).

Except on a showing of a clear abuse of discretion, a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the commission as to the propriety of a particular billing practice. City of Montrose v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 629 P.2d 619 (Colo. 1981).

Evidence must be reviewed in the light most favorable to the commission's findings and decision. Morey v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 629 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1981).

Order of commission is presumed to be reasonable. Caldwell v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 200 Colo. 134, 613 P.2d 328 (1980).

The findings and conclusions of the commission are presumed to be reasonable and valid and will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Morey v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 629 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1981).

A conflict in the evidence would deprive the trial court of its right to exercise its independent judgment on the facts. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Nw. Water Corp., 168 Colo. 154, 451 P.2d 266 (1969).

Findings may be set aside if not supported by substantial evidence. But such findings and conclusions may be set aside or modified if based upon propositions of fact in support of which there is no substantial evidence. Denver & S. L. R. R. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 64 Colo. 229, 171 P. 74 (1918); Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Loveland, 87 Colo. 556, 289 P. 1090 (1930).

"Independent judgment on the law" is exercised in the context of this constitutional issue exception when the court determines whether the PUC has regularly pursued its authority. This would involve whether the decision is based upon the evidence introduced before the commission at the hearing; whether its order is supported by findings of fact; whether the commission applied the legislative standards set forth for the guidance of the commission; and whether the commission acted within the authority conferred or went beyond it. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Nw. Water Corp., 168 Colo. 154, 451 P.2d 266 (1969).

Under the judicial review provisions of this section, a court exercises its independent judgment when it makes a determination as to whether the PUC has regularly pursued its authority. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 182 Colo. 269, 513 P.2d 721 (1973).

Commission's decision to use cost of service study prepared by commission's staff was supported by substantial evidence, notwithstanding differing expert opinions, evidence that the study contained errors, and the absence of some specific finding of the commission regarding objections to the study. The commission did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in accepting the staff's study under circumstances where the experts' opinions were varied and presented irreconcilable differences. Perfect mathematical precision is not required of such study and is not the standard by which the commission's decision is reviewed. In the absence of evidence that the staff study was inherently unsound, commission's decision should not be abandoned. Consumer Counsel v. P.U.C., 786 P.2d 1086 (Colo. 1990).

In a rate case, the commission's inclusion of a merger savings adjustment and an adjustment reflecting the transition from one accounting method to another was within the commission's authority and was just and reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 26 P.3d 1198 (Colo. 2001).

Rate-making is not an exact science, but rather, a matter of reasoned judgment and the commission is not required to base its rate-making decisions on quantitative evidence supported by empirical data. CF&I Steel, L.P. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 949 P.2d 577 (Colo. 1997).

Application of just and reasonable standard of review to PUC's authority to sanction. A sanction imposed by the PUC is deemed to be just and reasonable if the sanction is within its statutory authority, has a rational foundation in fact, and is fairly proportionate to the seriousness of the violation given all of the circumstances of the case. News & Film Serv. v. P.U.C., 787 P.2d 169 (Colo. 1990).

Applied in Colo. Mun. League v. P.U.C., 687 P.2d 416 (Colo. 1984); Colorado-Ute Elec. v. P.U.C., 760 P. 2d 627 (Colo. 1988); City of Ft. Morgan v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 159 P.3d 87 (Colo. 2007).

III. SCOPE OF REVIEW.

Scope of review. Under this section, review by the courts of the decisions of the PUC shall not extend further than to determine whether the commission has regularly pursued its authority, including a determination of whether an order or decision violates any constitutional right, and whether such order is just and reasonable and in accordance with the evidence. Lepel v. District Court, 33 Colo. 24, 78 P. 682 (1904); Bulger v. People, 61 Colo. 187, 156 P. 800 (1916); Denver & S. L. R. R. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 64 Colo. 229, 171 P. 74 (1918); People v. District Court, 72 Colo. 525, 211 P. 626 (1923); Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Loveland, 87 Colo. 556, 289 P. 1090 (1930); State Bd. v. Savelle, 90 Colo. 177, 8 P.2d 693 (1932); Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Town of Erie, 92 Colo. 151, 18 P.2d 906 (1933); Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Watson, 138 Colo. 108, 330 P.2d 138 (1958); Colo. Transp. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 141 Colo. 203, 347 P.2d 505 (1959); Consol. Freightways Corps. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 158 Colo. 239, 406 P.2d 83 (1965); Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Nw. Water Corp., 168 Colo. 154, 451 P.2d 266 (1969); City of Montrose v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 629 P.2d 619 (Colo. 1981); RAM Broad. of Colo. v. P.U.C., 702 P.2d 746 (Colo. 1985); Office of Consumer Counsel v. P.U.C., 752 P.2d 1049 (Colo. 1988); Integrated Network Servs. v. PUC, 875 P.2d 1373 (Colo. 1994); Boulder Airporter v. Shuttlines, 918 P.2d 1118 (Colo. 1996); CF&I Steel, L.P. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 949 P.2d 577 (Colo. 1997); Avicomm, Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 955 P.2d 1023 (Colo. 1998); Holcim U.S. Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 2025 CO 1, 562 P.3d 55.

Judicial review of a PUC decision involves the issue of whether or not a PUC decision is supported by adequate evidence and whether its order, particularly when there is disputed evidence, is supported by findings of fact. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 182 Colo. 269, 513 P.2d 721 (1973).

The standard of review is limited to an examination of the record to determine whether the conclusions were supported by findings of fact, whether the findings of fact and conclusions were based upon adequate evidence, and whether the commission reached its decision by applying the appropriate constitutional and legislative standards. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 194 Colo. 263, 572 P.2d 138 (1977).

Judicial review of PUC, in determining who should receive certification in a new area, is limited to the issue of whether the commission has acted within its authority and whether there is sufficient evidence in the record as a whole to support the commission's decision. Rocky Mt. Natural Gas Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 199 Colo. 352, 617 P.2d 1175 (1980).

Because the PUC is an expert commission with fact-finding and policy-making authority, judicial review of a commission rate decision is relatively narrow. City of Montrose v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 629 P.2d 619 (Colo. 1981); CF&I Steel, L.P. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 949 P.2d 577 (Colo. 1997); Holcim U.S. Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 2025 CO 1, 562 P.3d 55.

Same standard applies in supreme court on appeal as in district court on initial review. Jarco, Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 2 P.3d 116 (Colo. 2000).

Court's failure to determine whether commission acted pursuant to authority does not invalidate decision. When a trial court carries out its statutory duty by affirming a decision of the commission, the court's decision is not invalid on the theory that it did not properly review the case because it did not determine whether or not the commission acted pursuant to its authority or whether such action was just and reasonable. N. E. Motor Freight, Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 178 Colo. 433, 498 P.2d 923 (1972).

Court has duty to set aside where decision not supported by substantial evidence. If a trial court concludes that there is not substantial evidence to support a decision of the commission under the record as made, it is the duty of the court to set aside that decision on that very ground. People v. District Court, 134 Colo. 324, 303 P.2d 692 (1956); Consol. Freightways Corps. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 158 Colo. 239, 406 P.2d 83 (1965).

Decisions which are not supported by substantial evidence must be set aside. City of Montrose v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 629 P.2d 619 (Colo. 1981); Home Builders Ass'n of Metro. Denver v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 552 (Colo. 1986); CF&I Steel, L.P. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 949 P.2d 577 (Colo. 1997).

Where PUC's findings are factually inconsistent, the court cannot perform even its limited review function of determining whether competent evidence in the record supports the findings, and the order of the PUC is set aside as arbitrary and capricious. Peoples Natural Gas Div. v. P.U.C., 698 P.2d 255 (Colo. 1985); Colorado-Ute Elec. v. P.U.C., 760 P.2d 627 (Colo. 1988).

While findings of the PUC which are supported by the evidence may not be set aside, findings of the commission not supported by evidence cannot be upheld on appeal. J.C. Trucking v. P.U.C., 776 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1989).

When determining whether there is substantial evidence to support a decision of the commission, the reviewing court must view the record in a light most favorable to the commission's decision. Ace W. Trucking v. P.U.C., 788 P.2d 755 (Colo. 1990); Boulder Airporter v. Shuttlines, 918 P.2d 1118 (Colo. 1996); CF&I Steel, L.P. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 949 P.2d 577 (Colo. 1997).

To enable reviewing court to determine whether commission's decision is in accordance with the evidence under this section, § 40-6-113 (6) must be construed to incorporate into the record all factual information considered by the commission, including factual information contained in an advisory memorandum that was read at an open meeting of the commissioners and that was not otherwise made part of the record. Bd. of County Comm'rs of San Miguel v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 157 P.3d 1083 (Colo. 2007).

Mandamus will lie when action has been taken arbitrarily or if it reflects a gross abuse of discretion, regardless of whether a governmental proceeding is quasi-judicial in nature. Peoples Natural Gas Div. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 626 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1981); Integrated Network Servs. v. PUC, 875 P.2d 1373 (Colo. 1994).

Mandamus is only justified when a state agency has failed to perform a statutory duty or to adhere to its statutory responsibility. Peoples Natural Gas Div. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 626 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1981); Keystone, A Div. of Ralston Purina Co. v. Flynn, 769 P.2d 484 (Colo. 1989).

Mandamus is improper if court must give directions about the manner in which administrative discretion is to be exercised. Peoples Natural Gas Div. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 626 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1981).

Mandamus not available to enjoin PUC from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over private operator of water system alleged to be public utility when operator did not demonstrate that appellate review was not adequate remedy and did not seek to compel performance of any duty imposed upon PUC by statute. Keystone, A Div. of Ralston Purina v. Flynn, 769 P.2d 484 (Colo. 1989).

Supreme court's duty in review. This section requires the supreme court to set aside a decision of the PUC which is unjust and discriminatory or arbitrary and capricious. City of Montrose v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 197 Colo. 119, 590 P.2d 502 (1979).

Generally, the supreme court will defer to the commission's interpretation of its own language. Sangre De Cristo Elec. Ass'n v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 185 Colo. 321, 524 P.2d 309 (1974); CF&I Steel, L.P. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 949 P.2d 577 (Colo. 1997).

But the supreme court will set aside actions or interpretations that are clearly erroneous, arbitrary, in excess of the commission's authority, or not in accordance with the law. Sangre de Cristo Elec. Ass'n, Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 524 P.2d 309 (Colo. 1974); CF&I Steel, L.P. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 949 P.2d 577 (Colo. 1997).

Interpretation of contract language is generally a question of law, and the commission's interpretation, though entitled to respectful consideration, is not controlling. Union Rural Elec. Ass'n v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 661 P.2d 247 (Colo. 1983).

In a proceeding to review an order of the PUC, a district court under this section may affirm, set aside, or modify the order, but it has no authority to remand the case to the commission for further hearings. Denver & S. L. R. R. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 64 Colo. 229, 171 P. 74 (1918); Colo. Power Co. v. Halderman, 295 F. 178 (D. Colo. 1924); People v. District Court, 134 Colo. 324, 303 P.2d 692 (1956).

A district court is limited to a review of the record as presented and has no power to remand a case for an expansion of the commission's findings or for a rehearing. Haney v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 194 Colo. 481, 574 P.2d 863 (1978).

District court also has power to affirm portions of commission's decision supported by record and to reverse those not supported by record. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. District Court, 181 Colo. 24, 506 P.2d 371 (1973).

A court cannot modify order by fixing division or rates. Denver & S. L. R. R. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 64 Colo. 229, 171 P. 74 (1918).

Authority of district court to suspend public utility rates pending appeal necessarily creates the power and the duty to order restitution if the suspended rates are upheld on appeal. Atl. Richfield v. District Court, 794 P.2d 253 (Colo. 1990).

In remanding a cause back to the commission for a rehearing, a district court exceeds its jurisdiction and abuses its discretion. This leaves a petitioner without a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy and without any remedy at all. People v. District Court, 134 Colo. 324, 303 P.2d 692 (1956); Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. District Court, 181 Colo. 24, 506 P.2d 371 (1973).

Where an order of the commission is set aside, such order is from that time a nullity. Denver & S. L. R. R. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 67 Colo. 155, 185 P. 817 (1919).

Presumption of regularity of commission's acts. There is express authority throughout the statute governing procedures before the PUC for hearings to be conducted before the full commission, or before any one commissioner or any examiner of the commission. The presumption of reading and considering is merely one facet of the general presumption of regularity, which supports the official acts of public officers and, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their official duties. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. District Court, 163 Colo. 462, 431 P.2d 773 (1967); Pub. Serv. Co. v. P.U.C., 765 P.2d 1015 (Colo. 1988).

Because of the presumption of regularity, the mere allegation that the commissioners did not consider the entire record is insufficient. Since the board has the right to rely upon information of its subordinates as to the evidence submitted, the allegation that the members of the board did not consider the evidence in arriving at the decision is insufficient to justify the court in granting relief. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. District Court, 163 Colo. 462, 431 P.2d 773 (1967).

Courts will not set aside rate methodologies chosen by the commission unless they are inherently unsound and the commission is not bound by a previously utilized methodology when it has a reasonable basis for adopting a different one. Bennett Bear Creek Farm Water Dist. v. City & County of Denver, 928 P.2d 1254 (Colo. 1996); CF&I Steel, L.P. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 949 P.2d 577 (Colo. 1997).

Decision as to weight to be placed on evidence is uniquely within province of PUC, and court will not substitute its judgment for that of the PUC. RAM Broad. of Colo. v. PUC, 702 P.2d 746 (Colo. 1985).

Commissioner need not recite all evidence. The PUC has not summarized all the evidence in the record. It has merely drawn from the whole evidence and presented as subsidiary findings the evidentiary facts upon which it has based its ultimate findings that specified provisions of the act were violated. It was not incumbent upon the commission to recite all the evidence, or all the undisputed evidence, or the evidence from which inferences opposed to its own might have been drawn. Aspen Airways, Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 169 Colo. 56, 453 P.2d 789 (1969).

This section does not authorize the PUC to alter its decision which is the subject of the appeal by entering into a settlement agreement after the appellate review is commenced pursuant to this section. O'Bryant v. PUC, 778 P.2d 648 (Colo. 1989).

In light of generality of standards for judicial review found in subsection (3) of this section, a district court may look to the more specific guidelines for review found in § 24-4-106 (7) of the State Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Ace W. Trucking v. P.U.C., 788 P.2d 755 (Colo. 1990); Colo. Office of Consumer Counsel v. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co., 816 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1991).

Where provisions of public utilities law and the APA conflict, the former governs. Home Builders Ass'n v. P.U.C., 720 P.2d 552 (Colo. 1986).

IV. JURISDICTION.

The law fully provides that every order or decision made by the commission may be reviewed by the supreme court for the purpose of having the lawfulness of the order or revision determined. The mere fact that the general assembly provided for judicial review is indicative of its intention that the commission adhere strictly to the law. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Colo. Motorway, Inc., 165 Colo. 1, 437 P.2d 44 (1968).

Not until reduced to final judgment by commission. Unless and until a matter before the PUC is reduced to final judgment, settling all the issues between the parties, the supreme court will not review it. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Poudre Valley Rural Elec. Ass'n, 173 Colo. 364, 480 P.2d 106 (1970).

The court first acquiring jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter has exclusive jurisdiction. Since the action in the Denver district court was commenced prior to the Adams county action, exclusive jurisdiction rested with the Denver district court, where the action was properly brought according to statute. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Miller, 135 Colo. 575, 313 P.2d 998 (1957).

Procedures in this section provide exclusive method for initiating and obtaining judicial review of PUC decisions and conflicting pleading requirements of C.R.C.P. 106 must yield to the statutory scheme. Silver Eagle Servs. v. PUC, 768 P.2d 208 (Colo. 1989).

District court has jurisdiction to cure writ that substantially complies with this section. If an action to review a PUC decision substantially complies with public utilities law and the defective pleading causes no prejudice, the action does not violate this section. Trans Shuttle, Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 58 P.3d 47 (Colo. 2002).

If a case is filed in a court in which venue is improper, the court retains jurisdiction under subsection (5) to transfer the case to a court in which venue is proper. Associated Gov'ts v. Pub. Utils., 2012 CO 28, 275 P.3d 646.

V. VENUE.

Subsection (5) sets a venue requirement, which is procedural, not substantive. Therefore a court in which venue is improper has jurisdiction to transfer the case to a court in which venue is proper. Associated Gov'ts v. Pub. Utils., 2012 CO 28, 275 P.3d 646.