Colorado § 4-9-301 - Law governing perfection and priority of security interests.

§ 4-9-301. Law governing perfection and priority of security interests.

Except as otherwise provided in sections 4-9-303 to 4-9-306.7, the following rules determine the law governing perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in collateral:

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, while a debtor is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in collateral.

(2) While collateral is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a possessory security interest in that collateral.

(3) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (4) of this section, while negotiable tangible documents, goods, instruments, or money is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs:

(A) Perfection of a security interest in the goods by filing a fixture filing;

(B) Perfection of a security interest in timber to be cut; and

(C) The effect of perfection or nonperfection and the priority of a nonpossessory security interest in the collateral.

(4) The local law of the jurisdiction in which the wellhead or minehead is located governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in as-extracted collateral.

Source: L. 2001: Entire article R&RE, p. 1341, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2006: IP(3) amended, p. 501, § 37, effective September 1. L. 2023: IP and IP(3) amended, (SB 23-090), ch. 136, p. 550, § 52, effective August 7.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 4-9-103 as it existed prior to 2001.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Buyer-Secured Party Conflicts Under Section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code", see 46 U. Colo. L. Rev. 333 (1974-75).

Annotator's note. Since § 4-9-301 is similar to § 4-9-103 as it existed prior to the 2001 repeal and reenactment of this article, relevant cases construing that provision have been included in the annotations to this section.

The validity of foreign security interests in personal property is governed by this section except to the extent that motor vehicle titles are governed by § 42-6-131, and the usage of the broad term "motor vehicle titles" indicates the legislative intent that whenever the question as to title to a motor vehicle arises with regard to a foreign security interest, the question is to be answered by application of § 42-6-131 and is precluded from the application of the provisions of § 4-9-103(3). Doenges-Glass, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 175 Colo. 518, 488 P.2d 879 (1971).

Code as enacted in New York determined validity and perfection of security interest. Where seller's only office is located in New York, and assignee of seller's accounts receivable is a New York corporation, the requirements of the uniform commercial code as enacted by New York determines the validity and perfection of assignee's security interest in accounts receivable. Barocas v. Bohemia Import Co., 33 Colo. App. 263, 518 P.2d 850 (1974).

The right to collect annual campground membership dues is a right to payment for services rendered, which is an ordinary commercial account receivable. If the security interest is in accounts, the law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located governs the perfection and the effect of perfection or nonperfection of the security interest. Therefore, since the debtor was located at its place of business in Florida, Florida was the proper jurisdiction in which to file in order to perfect a security interest in the collateral, making the location of the collateral in Colorado irrelevant. Capitran Inc. v. Great W. Bank, 872 P.2d 1370 (Colo. App. 1994).

Farm combine which was type used by custom crop cutting in multi-state operations is mobile equipment within the meaning of § 4-9-103 (3)(a). Golden Plains Credit Union v. Konkel, 759 P.2d 788 (Colo. App. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 778 P.2d 660 (Colo. 1989).

The provisions of this section and § 4-9-401 (1) are not mutually exclusive and, if equipment meets the requirements of both statutory provisions, it must be considered to fall into both categories. Golden Plains Credit Union v. Konkel, 759 P.2d 788 (Colo. App. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 778 P.2d 660 (Colo. 1989).