Colorado § 4-3-113 - Date of instrument.

§ 4-3-113. Date of instrument.

(a) An instrument may be antedated or postdated. The date stated determines the time of payment if the instrument is payable at a fixed period after date. Except as provided in section 4-4-401 (c), an instrument payable on demand is not payable before the date of the instrument.

(b) If an instrument is undated, its date is the date of its issue or, in the case of an unissued instrument, the date it first comes into possession of a holder.

Source: L. 94: Entire article R&RE, p. 847, § 1, effective January 1, 1995.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 4-3-114 as it existed prior to 1994.

ANNOTATION

I. General Consideration.

II. Dating, Antedating, and Postdating.

III. Presumption as to Date.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

II. DATING, ANTEDATING, AND POSTDATING.

Lack of timely presentment of check. Where stolen check bore a 1971 date and was not cashed until 1973, when the time for presentment had long since passed, the lack of timely presentment would not have destroyed its negotiability as the negotiability of an instrument is not affected by the fact that it is undated, antedated, or postdated. Thus, the stolen check indorsed by accused falls squarely within the terms of the forgery statute under which he was convicted. People v. Palmer, 189 Colo. 358, 540 P.2d 341 (1975).

The fact that an instrument is postdated does not render it void, but merely defers negotiability to a subsequent time. Gentry v. People, 166 Colo. 60, 441 P.2d 675 (1968) (decided under repealed § 95-1-12, C.R.S. 1963, negotiable instruments law).

Postdating of check does not make obligation conditional. The fact that a check is postdated does not qualify the check or make conditional the promissory obligation represented by the check. Esecson v. Bushnell, 663 P.2d 258 (Colo. App. 1983).

III. PRESUMPTION AS TO DATE.

Date presumption not applicable to fiduciary relationships. The general presumption of date of promissory notes is overcome by the specific presumption arising where there is a fiduciary relationship in which case the claimant must overcome, by evidence, the presumption of undue influence with which the transaction is tainted because of the existence of the fiduciary relationship. Arnold v. Abernethy, 134 Colo. 573, 307 P.2d 1106 (1957) (decided under repealed § 95-1-11, CRS 53, negotiable instruments law).