Colorado § 4-2-315 - Implied warranty - fitness for particular purpose.

§ 4-2-315. Implied warranty - fitness for particular purpose.

Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is, unless excluded or modified under section 4-2-316, an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.

Source: L. 65: p. 1311, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 155-2-315.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "The Uniform Commercial Code and Sales Warranties in Colorado", see 38 U. Colo. L. Rev. 7 (1965). For note, "Implied Warranties — Sales of Used Cars in Colorado", see 42 U. Colo. L. Rev. 473 (1971). For article, "Buyer-Secured Party Conflicts Under Section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code", see 46 U. Colo. L. Rev. 33 (1974-75). For comment, "Implied Warranties in the Sale of Real Estate in Colorado: Rational Boundaries of the Doctrine", see 53 U. Colo. L. Rev. 137 (1981).

Annotator's note. Since § 4-2-315 is similar to repealed § 121-1-15(1)(b), (3), and (4), C.R.S. 1963, § 121-1-15(1), (4), and (5), CRS 53, and CSA, C. 143A, § 15(1), (4), and (5)(uniform sales act), relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

This section provides for an implied warranty that the goods be reasonably fit for the uses, made known to the seller by the buyer, for which they were purchased. Wallower v. Elder, 126 Colo. 109, 247 P.2d 682 (1952).

This section includes cases for which an implied warranty hinges on the question of whether or not the buyer makes known to the seller the uses for which he desires the chattels. Wallower v. Elder, 126 Colo. 109, 247 P.2d 682 (1952).

Expressly or by implication. There is no implied warranty of fitness for any particular purpose unless the buyer expressly or by implication makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required. Schlottman v. Pressey, 96 F. Supp. 979 (D. Colo. 1951); Schlottman v. Pressey, 195 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1952); Comet Indus., Inc. v. Best Plastic Container Corp., 222 F. Supp. 723 (D. Colo. 1963).

General or specific purpose. The buyer's particular purpose may be equivalent to nothing more than a general purpose or it may relate to a more specific purpose. Comet Indus., Inc. v. Best Plastic Container Corp., 222 F. Supp. 723 (D. Colo. 1963).

Under this section the buyer's reliance on the seller's skill or judgment must be shown before an implied warranty of fitness of purpose can arise. Wallower v. Elder, 126 Colo. 109, 247 P.2d 682 (1952); Comet Indus., Inc. v. Best Plastic Container Corp., 222 F. Supp. 723 (D. Colo. 1963); Klipfel v. Neill, 30 Colo. App. 428, 494 P.2d 115. (1972).

Actual reliance is required; affidavit alleging that a purchaser would have relied on the seller had the seller advised her the product was unsuitable does not create a genuine issue of material fact when the purchaser testified that she decided to buy the product before entering the seller's store. Wallman v. Kelley, 976 P.2d 330 (Colo. App. 1998).

The several types of warranties coexist. Westric Battery Co. v. Standard Elec. Co., 482 F.2d 1307 (10th Cir. 1973).

Implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose may coexist when there is sufficient evidence to support the creation of each warranty. Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984); Hawkinson v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 595 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Colo. 1984).

Evidence that woman selected intrauterine device not only for the ordinary purpose of preventing pregnancy, but also for the particular purpose of providing her with a safe contraceptive device was sufficient to justify submission to the jury of the dual implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose and merchantability. Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984).

Doctrine of strict liability adopted where design renders unreasonably dangerous an otherwise properly manufactured product. Pust v. Union Supply Co., 38 Colo. App. 435, 561 P.2d 355 (1976), rev'd sub nom. Holly Sugar Corp. v. Union Supply Co., 194 Colo. 316, 572 P.2d 148 (1977) (party indemnification issue), and aff'd, 196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978).

Design enhances extent of injuries. Strict liability attaches to an automobile design defect which, though not contributing to the collision itself, may have enhanced the injuries sustained. Roberts v. May, 41 Colo. App. 82, 583 P.2d 305 (1978).

For effect on manufacturer's liability where product is unavoidably unsafe, see Belle Bonfils Mem. Blood Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118 (Colo. 1983).

Warranties arise in every contract for sale unless excluded. Warranties of merchantability and of fitness for a particular purpose assuming all other statutory prerequisites have been met, arise in every contract for sale, unless properly excluded. Lease Fin., Inc. v. Burger, 40 Colo. App. 107, 575 P.2d 857 (1977).

Defect in design may render product unmerchantable or not fit for the particular purposes for which it was required. Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978).

Fertilizer containing herbicides was neither fit for its ordinary purpose nor for the farmers particular purpose, and therefor, breaches both the implied warranty of fitness and the implied warranty of merchantability. Deacon v. Am. Plant Food Corp., 782 P.2d 861 (Colo. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Stone's Farm Supply, Inc. v. Deacon, 805 P.2d 1109 (Colo. 1991).

Admission of industry safety codes as substantive evidence on strict liability issue of whether a product is in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous is valid. Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978).

Evidence of industry safety standards, when relevant as to a defect must be introduced through an expert, must be authenticated as reliable and bona fide industry-wide safety codes and sufficient advance notice of the intended use of such standards must be given to the adverse party so that he will have sufficient time to prepare to meet the evidence. Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978).

Summary judgment improper where factual question as to reasonableness of design. Where plaintiff's experts raise a factual question about the reasonableness of defendant's design strategies, the drastic remedy of summary judgment is improper, and the issue of whether the design of the car unreasonably increased the risks of injury by collision should be presented to the jury. Roberts v. May, 41 Colo. App. 82, 583 P.2d 305 (1978).

If the buyer has equal or superior skill and experience to that of the seller, has full opportunity to exercise it by examination and actual test in the uses intended, and fails to do so, then he is not warranted in relying solely upon a seller's statement that whatever is about to be furnished will accomplish the desired result. Wallower v. Elder, 126 Colo. 109, 247 P.2d 682 (1952).

Where the transaction is one of oral consummation, any question or dispute arising therefrom as to the matter of whether in implied warranty exists or not is a jury question. Wallower v. Elder, 126 Colo. 109, 247 P.2d 682 (1952).

Where there is no evidence that the seller was informed concerning the particular purpose for which a product is required, and it affirmatively appears that the buyer did not place reliance upon the "skill or judgment" of seller, because they were fully advised that he had no experience with such product, the essential elements set forth in this section which give rise to an implied warranty are wholly absent. Lindsey v. Stalder, 120 Colo. 58, 208 P.2d 83 (1949).

Where one purchases by relying on the trade name and manufacturer's reputation, there is no implied warranty as to fitness under this section. Elwood Edwards Auto Sales, Inc. v. Kinsey, 123 Colo. 52, 225 P.2d 59 (1950).

Where the sale is of a known, described, and definite article, designed and on the market for a particular purpose, such carries with it a warranty of fitness for the purpose for which it was sold. Platte Valley Motor Co. v. Wagner, 130 Colo. 365, 278 P.2d 870 (1954).

Such fitness for a particular purpose may be merely the equivalent of merchantability; in such a case, the warranties coexist and a recovery may be founded upon either. Comet Indus., Inc. v. Best Plastic Container Corp., 222 F. Supp. 723 (D. Colo. 1963).

The buyer of a machine may, either under the common law or this section rely upon an implied warranty of fitness for the purpose indicated where he made known to the manufacturer and seller the purpose for which the machine was desired and trusted to the latter's skill and judgment to furnish a machine suitable for the purpose. Duncan v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 154 Colo. 447, 391 P.2d 368 (1964).

Implied warranty liability extended to component parts manufacturer. As in the area of strict liability, implied warranty liability may extend to the manufacturer of component parts if the lack of fitness for the purpose or use required is found in the component parts before they leave the component parts manufacturer, and not merely in the completed system. Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978); Shaw v. General Motors Corp., 727 P.2d 387 (Colo. App. 1986).

Warranty applicable to heating system which was moved into buyers' residence for installation and later removed. Thomas v. Bove, 687 P.2d 534 (Colo. App. 1984).

Warranty's existence or breach for trier of fact. The question of the existence of a warranty and whether that warranty was breached is ordinarily one for the trier of fact. Stroh v. Am. Recreation & Mobile Home Corp., 35 Colo. App. 196, 530 P.2d 989 (1975); Aetna Cas. & Sur. v. Crissy Fowler Lumber, 687 P.2d 514 (Colo. App. 1984).

Plaintiff established a prima facie case of breach of warranty and injury resulting from that breach, where it was shown that the plaintiff used the product according to the manufacturer's directions for its intended use, and the product was shown to be contaminated and an inference of proximate cause could arise from the fact of proven injury following use of the product. West v. Alberto Culver Co., 486 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1973).

Corporation's dissemination of information qualified as warranties. Where a corporation disseminated information using advertising materials, trade publications, or technical publications and oral statements representing the quality of its product, this activity qualifies in law as warranties. Westric Battery Co. v. Standard Elec. Co., 482 F.2d 1307 (10th Cir. 1973).

An implied warranty is present whether the seller is the manufacturer or not; the seller in such instance warrants that the goods are fit for the purpose for which they are purchased. Comet Indus., Inc. v. Best Plastic Container Corp., 222 F. Supp. 723 (D. Colo. 1963).

Seller is under no duty to inspect or remedy small details of mechanism of national brand articles sold in the ordinary course of business. Am. Furn. Co. v. Veazie, 131 Colo. 340, 281 P.2d 803 (1955).

A seller who has substantially complied with prescribed specifications will not be held to have extended a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose or be held responsible for the consequences of a deficiency in the specifications. Klipfel v. Neill, 30 Colo. App. 428, 494 P.2d 115 (1972); Shaw v. General Motors Corp., 727 P.2d 387 (Colo. App. 1986).

If a manufacturer undertakes to manufacture a machine according to his own judgment and plans, which is intended by the buyer for a disclosed purpose, there is an implied warranty that the machine will be fit for such purpose. Duncan v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 154 Colo. 447, 391 P.2d 368 (1964).

This section also covers used or second-hand chattels. Wallower v. Elder, 126 Colo. 109, 247 P.2d 682 (1952); Platte Valley Motor Co. v. Wagner, 130 Colo. 365, 278 P.2d 870 (1954).

Where the buyer fails to give seller notice of a claimed breach of such a warranty within reasonable time, this failure relieves seller of any liability. Am. Furn. Co. v. Veazie, 131 Colo. 340, 281 P.2d 803 (1955).

Evidence showed water conditioner unfit for buyer's residence. Cherokee Inv. Co. v. Voiles, 166 Colo. 270, 443 P.2d 727 (1968).

Lessee as third party beneficiary of warranties. Although a lessee of a machine does not directly receive the benefits of the warranties made by the seller to the lessor, the lessee may be a third party beneficiary of such warranties who could "reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods". Lease Fin., Inc. v. Burger, 40 Colo. App. 107, 575 P.2d 857 (1977).

Applied in Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n v. Envirotech Corp., 524 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Colo. 1981).