Colorado § 38-5-101 - Use of public highways.

§ 38-5-101. Use of public highways.

Any domestic or foreign electric light power, gas, or pipeline company authorized to do business under the laws of this state or any city or town owning electric power producing or distribution facilities shall have the right to construct, maintain, and operate lines of electric light, wire or power or pipeline along, across, upon, and under any public highway in this state, subject to the provisions of this article. Such lines of electric light, wire or power, or pipeline shall be so constructed and maintained as not to obstruct or hinder the usual travel on such highway.

Source: L. 07: p. 385, § 1. R.S. 08: § 2451. C.L. § 6352. CSA: C. 61, § 42. L. 39: p. 365, § 1. CRS 53: § 50-5-1. L. 63: p. 479, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 50-5-1. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 303, § 2, effective April 12.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Eminent Domain in Colorado", see 29 Dicta 313 (1952). For comment on Englewood v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 163 Colo. 400, 431 P.2d 40 (1967), appearing below, see 40 U. Colo. L. Rev. 167 (1967).

Section within constitutional boundaries. The provisions of this section are well within the boundaries of art. XXV, Colo. Const. City of Englewood v. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co., 163 Colo. 400, 431 P.2d 40 (1967).

Right granted subject to reasonable changes by municipal authorities. The right granted in this section is qualified and subject to the power of the municipal authorities to make such reasonable changes in the grade or an improvement therein as in their judgment the public interests demanded and required. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Horn Tower Constr. Co., 147 Colo. 166, 363 P.2d 175 (1961).

The provisions of this section are not applicable to grant a state franchise to continue using public highways when consent of a city was never obtained by a rural electric association for the use of the city's streets to expand its facilities. City of Greeley v. Poudre Valley R. Elec., 744 P.2d 739 (Colo. 1987).

An intoxicated, speeding driver is not engaged in "usual travel" and, therefore, is not within the class of persons intended to be protected by this section. Jacque v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 890 P.2d 138 (Colo. App. 1994).

Applied in Sternberger v. Cont'l Mines Power & Reduction Co., 68 Colo. 129, 186 P. 910 (1920);City of Northglenn v. City of Thornton, 193 Colo. 536, 569 P.2d 319 (1977).