Colorado § 38-35-201 - Definitions.

§ 38-35-201. Definitions.

As used in this part 2, unless the context otherwise requires:

(1) "Federal official or employee" means an appointed or elected official or any employee of the government of the United States of America or of any agency of such government as defined for purposes of the "Federal Tort Claims Act", 28 U.S.C. sec. 2671.

(2) "Lien" means an encumbrance on real or personal property as security for the payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.

(3) "Spurious document" means any document that is forged or groundless, contains a material misstatement or false claim, or is otherwise patently invalid.

(4) "Spurious lien" means a purported lien or claim of lien that:

(a) Is not provided for by a specific Colorado or federal statute or by a specific ordinance or charter of a home rule municipality;

(b) Is not created, suffered, assumed, or agreed to by the owner of the property it purports to encumber; or

(c) Is not imposed by order, judgment, or decree of a state court or a federal court.

(5) "State court" means a court established pursuant to title 13, C.R.S.

(6) "State or local official or employee" means an appointed or elected official or any employee of:

(a) The state of Colorado;

(b) Any agency, board, commission, or state department in any branch of state government;

(c) Any institution of higher education; or

(d) Any school district, political subdivision, county, municipality, intergovernmental agency, or other unit of local government in Colorado.

Source: L. 97: Entire part added, p. 35, § 1, effective March 20. L. 98: (4)(a) amended, p. 152, § 1, effective April 2.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "In 'Case' You Missed It: Recent Real Estate Case Law Highlights", see 50 Colo. Law. 36 (Apr. 2021).

For purposes of satisfying the definition of "spurious document" under subsection (3), a document is "groundless" for which a proponent can advance no rational argument based on evidence or the law to support the claim of a lien. Westar Holdings P'ship v. Reece, 991 P.2d 328 (Colo. App. 1999).

The "spuriousness" of a lis pendens turns on whether the lis pendens is filed in connection with a claim that affects title to real property and not on an assessment of the merits of the claim in connection with which the lis pendens was filed. Better Baked, LLC v. GJG Prop., LLC, 2020 COA 51, 465 P.3d 84 (disagreeing with Westar Holdings P'ship v. Reece annotated above).

Notice of lis pendens may be a spurious document, which includes any document that is forged or groundless, contains a material misstatement or false claim, or is otherwise patently invalid. Pierce v. Francis, 194 P.3d 505 (Colo. App. 2008); Shyanne Props., LLC v. Torp, 210 P.3d 490 (Colo. App. 2009).

"Wild deed" is "patently invalid" and thus a spurious document under subsection (3). A deed of trust executed by a grantor with no right, title, or interest in the subject properties the deed purported to convey is outside the chain of title, a "wild deed", and a spurious document. GMAC Mortgage Corp. v. PWI Grp., 155 P.3d 556 (Colo. App. 2006).

Notices of lis pendens were not spurious documents under subsection (3) because wife, who recorded the notices, claimed an interest in the properties as marital assets in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. The notices were not groundless or patently invalid, as wife advanced a rational argument in support of her claim and established a vested interest in the encumbered properties in the dissolution of marriage proceeding. Carter Holdings Inc. v. Carter, 2023 COA 26, 531 P.3d 437.

Use of notices of lis pendens in will contests appropriate. Pierce v. Francis, 194 P.3d 505 (Colo. App. 2008).

Claims in underlying will contest sufficient to justify a notice of lis pendens. Pierce v. Francis, 194 P.3d 505 (Colo. App. 2008).

Likelihood of success at trial or on appeal not required to rebuff a challenge to a lis pendens notice. Pierce v. Francis, 194 P.3d 505 (Colo. App. 2008).

Because mechanic's liens are provided for by statute, article 22 of title 38, they are excluded from definition of "spurious liens" and cannot be invalidated on that basis. Moreover, mechanic's liens cannot be challenged as "spurious documents". Tuscany, LLC v. W. States Excavating Pipe & Boring, LLC, 128 P.3d 274 (Colo. App. 2005).

Courts of general jurisdiction have the authority to weigh the validity of a mechanic's lien on other grounds and apply the spurious liens and documents' statutes. SR Condos., LLC v. K.C. Constr., Inc., 176 P.3d 866 (Colo. App. 2007).

Notice of lis pendens cannot be a spurious lien because such notice is not a lien. A notice of lis pendens does not encumber property but merely informs third parties that litigation is pending that could affect title to the property. Pierce v. Francis, 194 P.3d 505 (Colo. App. 2008).

A deed of trust must be examined as a spurious lien under subsection (4), not as a spurious document under subsection (3). Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v. Samora, 2013 COA 81, 321 P.3d 590.

A district court magistrate's order is an "order" of a state court for purposes of subsection (4)(c). Evans v. Evans, 2019 COA 179, 469 P.3d 498.

Abstract of magistrate's order allocating previously undisclosed marital assets filed with county clerk and recorder by wife's attorney and that appeared as an encumbrance against husband's property is not a "spurious lien" under subsection (4). The magistrate's order was an enforceable order at the time the abstract was recorded. And it was an order of a state court for purposes of subsection (4)(c). The statute does not require that a lien imposed by a court order be a judgment lien. Rather, any type of lien imposed by order, judgment, or decree of a state court cannot be spurious, regardless of how it was created or what it is called. Evans v. Evans, 2019 COA 179, 469 P.3d 498.

Abstract of magistrate's order was not a "spurious document" within subsection (3). A spurious document is one for which a proponent can advance no rational argument based on evidence or the law to support the claim. Evans v. Evans, 2019 COA 179, 469 P.3d 498.

Wife advanced a rational argument that the abstract reflected an enforceable order. Even if the abstract were invalid, it is not the type of patently invalid document that this section was enacted to invalidate. Evans v. Evans, 2019 COA 179, 469 P.3d 498.