Colorado § 31-4-107 - Appointment of officers - terms.

§ 31-4-107. Appointment of officers - terms.

(1) The members of the city council elected for each city at the meeting at which their terms commence, as provided in section 31-4-105, shall organize the city council. A majority of the total number of members is necessary to constitute a quorum for the transaction of business. They shall be judges of the election returns and qualification of their own members, and they shall determine the rules of their own proceedings. The city clerk shall keep a record of the proceedings, in such form as determined by the city council, which shall be open to the inspection and examination of any citizen. The councilmen may compel the attendance of absent members in such manner and under such penalties as they think fit to prescribe and shall elect from their own body a temporary president.

(2) (a) Upon taking office, or at such other time as may be provided by ordinance or resolution, the city council shall appoint a city attorney and shall appoint or provide for the appointment of such other officers as may be required by statute or ordinance and may appoint such other officers, including a city administrator, as may be necessary or desirable. One or more municipal judges shall be appointed in accordance with section 13-10-105 (1), C.R.S.

(b) One person may hold two or more appointive offices if provided by ordinance and if compatible with the interest of the city government as determined by the council. All officers of the city are subject to the control and direction of the mayor and may be removed by a vote of a majority of all members elected to the city council if appointed to serve at the pleasure of the city council or by such a vote on charges of incompetence, unfitness, neglect of duty, or insubordination, duly made and sustained, if appointed to serve for a term prescribed by ordinance; except that a municipal judge may be removed during his term of office only for cause, as set forth in section 13-10-105 (2), C.R.S. The council may provide by ordinance for the removal or suspension of any officer or employee, except the mayor, councilmen, clerk, treasurer, city administrator, city attorney, and municipal judge, by administrative proceeding presided over by a city officer or employee.

(3) The city council may provide by ordinance for four-year overlapping terms of office for council members. The ordinance may also provide for four-year terms for the mayor and other elective officers. The city council may reinstate the two-year terms provided in this section by ordinance. Any ordinance passed pursuant to this subsection (3) shall be enacted at least one hundred eighty days before the next regular election and shall be subject, notwithstanding an emergency declaration, to referendum if the referendum is brought pursuant to section 31-11-105 or pursuant to an applicable municipal ordinance enacted in accordance with section 1 of article V of the state constitution. No ordinance enacted pursuant to this subsection (3) shall extend or reduce the term for which any person was elected. If any vacancy occurs in an office for which a four-year term is in effect pursuant to this subsection (3), such vacancy shall be filled as provided in sections 31-4-106 and 31-4-108 (2)(b). If the office in which the vacancy occurs is not an office for which a successor would otherwise have been elected at the next regular election, the term of office of the successor elected at that regular election shall be shortened so that the following regular election for said office is held at the time at which it would have been held if no vacancy had occurred.

(4) (a) The city council may submit, by ordinance or resolution, for the approval of the registered electors at a regular or special election a proposal that the position of city clerk or city treasurer, or both such positions, be made appointive rather than elective, the appointments to be made by the city council. Such measure shall be made to take effect in such manner as to avoid shortening or extending the terms of any persons elected to such offices. If approved, appointments to either of such offices shall be in the manner provided for other appointive offices.

(b) The city council may also, by ordinance or resolution, submit for the approval of the registered electors a proposal for returning the office of clerk or treasurer, or both, from appointive to elective status. No such proposal, if approved, shall extend or reduce the term for which any person holds office.

Source: L. 75: Entire title R&RE, p. 1025, § 1, effective July 1. L. 77: (2)(b) amended, p. 794, § 5, effective May 28. L. 79: (3) amended, p. 1173, § 5, effective July 1. L. 81: (2)(b) amended, p. 1494, § 5, effective May 28. L. 83: (3) amended, p. 1254, § 3, effective July 1. L. 93: (3) amended, p. 698, § 5, effective May 4. L. 94: (1) and (2)(a) amended, p. 1192, § 91, effective July 1. L. 95: (3) amended, p. 440, § 26, effective May 8.

Editor's note: The provisions of this section are similar to provisions of several former sections as they existed prior to 1975. For a detailed comparison, see the comparative tables located at the back of the index.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. Since § 31-4-107 is similar to former §§ 31-3-101 and 31-5-105 prior to the 1975 repeal and reenactment of this title, and laws antecedent thereto, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

Council intended as election tribunal. The general assembly intended, by the language used in this section, to designate the council in cities as the tribunal to try election contests between its members. Booth v. County Court, 18 Colo. 561, 33 P. 581 (1893).

Number of council votes required. Since this section contains no provision concerning the number of council votes required to elect city officials, a vote of a majority of the members present, there being a quorum, is sufficient to elect, and the weight of authority is to the effect that a majority vote need not be a majority of those voting and a quorum is in fact present. People ex rel. Sanders v. Hendrick, 93 Colo. 512, 27 P.2d 493 (1933).

Mayor's election cognizable. Since the power to try election contests between its members is by this section plainly lodged with the common council, and since the mayor, by the express terms of § 31-4-102, is designated a member thereof, the contest of his election is expressly made cognizable by that body. Booth v. County Court, 18 Colo. 561, 33 P. 581 (1893).

Concurrent judicial jurisdiction. Where the statute provides that the city council shall be the judge of the qualifications, election, and returns of its own members, the power given is declared to be simply cumulative, and the concurrent jurisdiction of the courts is maintained. Wells v. People ex rel. Dolan, 78 Colo. 77, 239 P. 726 (1925).

Suspension of rules by unanimous consent. Such rules as the council itself may adopt, and which it is authorized to adopt to govern its own proceedings, may properly be suspended by unanimous consent. City of Greeley v. Hamman, 17 Colo. 30, 28 P. 460 (1891).

Additional duties may be imposed on clerk. Under this section the council may, if they see fit so to do, impose upon the clerk, as clerk, in addition to those specified by statute, such other duties as, in their judgment, may be deemed appropriate. Orman v. City of Pueblo, 8 Colo. 292, 6 P. 931 (1885).

Such as receipt of license moneys. There is nothing in the statute directly imposing upon the city clerk the duty of receiving moneys paid for licenses authorized to be issued, but under this section the council are clearly empowered thereby to require of him the performance of such duty. Orman v. City of Pueblo, 8 Colo. 292, 6 P. 931 (1885).

For a case discussing the qualifications of members of the city council as to their right to vote for the officers elected by the city council, see People ex rel. Ralston v. Herring, 30 Colo. 445, 71 P. 413 (1902).

For a case, under the former law, discussing the question of voting for aldermen by voters of their own wards or by voters of the entire city, see Dunton v. People ex rel. Akin, 36 Colo. 128, 87 P. 540 (1906).