Colorado § 31-25-538 - No action maintainable - exception - grounds - limitations.

§ 31-25-538. No action maintainable - exception - grounds - limitations.

(1) No legal or equitable action shall be brought or maintained except to enjoin the collection of assessments levied under this part 5 upon the grounds:

(a) That notice of a hearing upon the amount of the assessment was not given as required in this part 5. Any person presenting objections to the governing body at or before the hearing on assessment shall be deemed to have waived this ground.

(b) That the hearing upon the amount of the assessment as provided in this part 5 was not held;

(c) That the improvement ordered was not one authorized by this part 5;

(d) That the assessment levied exceeds the benefits received by the property assessed.

(2) No action shall be brought on the grounds provided in paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section unless a hearing on the proposed improvements is required pursuant to section 31-25-503 and unless the objections on which such action is based have been presented to the governing body in writing prior to or at such hearing. No action shall be brought on the grounds provided in paragraph (d) of subsection (1) of this section unless the objections on which such action is based have been presented to the governing body in writing prior to or at the hearing on the assessment roll. Any action brought with respect to the ordering of any improvements, the creation of any district, the authorization or issuance of any bonds, the levying of any assessments, or any other action taken under this part 5 shall be commenced within thirty days after the passage of the ordinance or resolution ordering the improvements, creating the district, authorizing or issuing bonds, or levying assessments or within thirty days after performance of any other action complained of or else shall be forever barred.

Source: L. 75: Entire title R&RE, p. 1201, § 1, effective July 1. L. 86: (2) amended, p. 1052, § 16, effective July 1.

Editor's note: (1) This section is similar to former § 31-25-539 as it existed prior to 1975.

(2) This section was originally numbered as § 31-25-537 in House Bill 75-1089 but was renumbered on revision in 1977 for ease of location.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. Since § 31-25-538 is similar to former § 31-25-539 prior to the 1975 repeal and reenactment of this title, and laws antecedent thereto, a relevant case construing a prior provision has been included in the annotations to this section.

Right of appeal exists only by statute. Right to appeal to courts from a special assessment for public improvements does not exist except by statute. Orchard Court Dev. Co. v. City of Boulder, 182 Colo. 361, 513 P.2d 199 (1973).

Section does not specify nature of review to be taken. Although this section requires that court review must be brought within 30 days from the effective day of the ordinance in question, it does not specify the nature of the review that may be taken. Orchard Court Dev. Co. v. City of Boulder, 182 Colo. 361, 513 P.2d 199 (1973).

Time limitations for attacking assessments. Reasonable limitations regarding the time within which actions can be commenced attacking the validity of special assessments for public improvements are necessary. To meet the expenses of such improvements bonds must be negotiated, and unless there is some reasonable limit within which actions may be commenced to attack assessments levied for the purpose of liquidating such bonds when they mature, they could not be disposed of advantageously because parties purchasing would never know when an action might be commenced by some dissatisfied taxpayer; and on the other hand, after the lapse of the statutory period they would have the right to presume no such actions could be maintained, and their rights ought to be protected by a statute which fixes a time within which suits must be commenced, unless it is apparent that thereby some constitutional right of the taxpayer has been denied or invaded. Hildreth v. City of Longmont, 47 Colo. 79, 105 P. 107 (1909).

Determination of assessments is left to discretion of municipal authorities. Orchard Court Dev. Co. v. City of Boulder, 182 Colo. 361, 513 P.2d 199 (1973).

And conclusive unless fraudulent or unreasonable. Determination of assessments is conclusive on the courts unless it appears such was fraudulent or unreasonable. Orchard Court Dev. Co. v. City of Boulder, 182 Colo. 361, 513 P.2d 199 (1973).

When a formula designed to produce a reasonable approximation of assessments to benefits is prescribed, the results obtained should not be disturbed absent fraud or unreasonableness in the apportionment process. Satter v. City of Littleton, 185 Colo. 90, 522 P.2d 95 (1974).

Court's duty in reviewing assessment proceedings is to determine if the assessing tribunal abused its power. Orchard Court Dev. Co. v. City of Boulder, 182 Colo. 361, 513 P.2d 199 (1973).

De novo evidentiary hearing beyond court's power. A de novo evidentiary hearing for the purpose of making independent findings concerning a home-rule city's assessments would clearly be beyond the court's power and authority. Orchard Court Dev. Co. v. City of Boulder, 182 Colo. 361, 513 P.2d 199 (1973).

Presumption of validity inheres in council's determination that the benefits specially accruing to properties equal or exceed the assessments thereon. Satter v. City of Littleton, 185 Colo. 90, 522 P.2d 95 (1974).

Burden of proof was upon objectors to assessments to affirmatively show that the result of the apportionment was not according to the benefits. Orchard Court Dev. Co. v. City of Boulder, 182 Colo. 361, 513 P.2d 199 (1973); Satter v. City of Littleton, 185 Colo. 90, 522 P.2d 95 (1974).

Benefit must be occasioned to premises assessed at least equal to burden imposed. Satter v. City of Littleton, 185 Colo. 90, 522 P.2d 95 (1974).

But standard of apportionment of costs to benefits received is not one of absolute equality, but rather one of reasonable approximation. Satter v. City of Littleton, 185 Colo. 90, 522 P.2d 95 (1974).

Front-foot, side-foot formula applied by city in determining amount of assessments has long been approved as an essentially fair method of apportionment of paving costs. Satter v. City of Littleton, 185 Colo. 90, 522 P.2d 95 (1974).