Colorado § 31-25-102 - Legislative declaration.

§ 31-25-102. Legislative declaration.

(1) The general assembly finds and declares that there exist in municipalities of this state slum and blighted areas which constitute a serious and growing menace, injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare of the residents of the state in general and of the municipalities thereof; that the existence of such areas contributes substantially to the spread of disease and crime, constitutes an economic and social liability, substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of municipalities, retards the provision of housing accommodations, aggravates traffic problems and impairs or arrests the elimination of traffic hazards and the improvement of traffic facilities; and that the prevention and elimination of slums and blight is a matter of public policy and statewide concern in order that the state and its municipalities shall not continue to be endangered by areas which are focal centers of disease, promote juvenile delinquency, and consume an excessive proportion of its revenues because of the extra services required for police, fire, accident, hospitalization, and other forms of public protection, services, and facilities.

(2) The general assembly further finds and declares that certain slum or blighted areas, or portions thereof, may require acquisition, clearance, and disposition subject to use restrictions, as provided in this part 1, since the prevailing conditions therein may make impracticable the reclamation of the area by conservation or rehabilitation; that other slum or blighted areas, or portions thereof, through the means provided in this part 1, may be susceptible of conservation or rehabilitation in such a manner that the conditions and evils enumerated in this section may be eliminated, remedied, or prevented; and that salvable slum and blighted areas can be conserved and rehabilitated through appropriate public action, as authorized or contemplated in this part 1, and the cooperation and voluntary action of the owners and tenants of property in such areas.

(3) The general assembly further finds and declares that the powers conferred by this part 1 are for public uses and purposes for which public money may be expended and the police power exercised and that the necessity in the public interest for the provisions enacted in this part 1 is declared as a matter of legislative determination.

(4) The general assembly further finds and declares that:

(a) Urban renewal areas created for the purposes described in subsections (1) and (2) of this section shall not include agricultural land except in connection with the limited circumstances described in this part 1; and

(b) The inclusion of agricultural land within urban renewal areas is a matter of statewide concern.

Source: L. 75: Entire title R&RE, p. 1158, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2010: (4) added, (HB 10-1107), ch. 89, p. 298, § 1, effective June 1.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 31-25-102 as it existed prior to 1975.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Current Trends in Business Real Estate Transactions", see 35 U. Colo. L. Rev. 131 (1962). For comment on Rabinoff v. District Court (145 Colo. 225, 360 P.2d 114 (1961)), see 35 U. Colo. L. Rev. 269 (1963). For article, "Governmental Issues Related to Real Estate Development", see 11 Colo. Law. 2527 (1982).

For there to be an unconstitutional "taking" under the U.S. constitution, it must be shown that no public purpose exists for the proposed urban renewal project. Oberndorf v. City & County of Denver, 696 F. Supp. 552 (D. Colo. 1988), aff'd, 900 F.2d 1434 (10th Cir. 1990).

Public purpose. The acquisition of properties and the elimination of their slum or blighted character constitutes a public purpose; that what is involved is an urban reclamation project; and the fact that when the redevelopment is achieved the properties are sold to private individuals for the purpose of development does not rob the taking of its public purpose. Rabinoff v. District Court, 145 Colo. 225, 360 P.2d 114 (1961).

Private ownership does not defeat public purpose. Although the general assembly's method is to be accomplished not by public ownership of the land but rather through private endeavor and ownership under the direction of authorized officials. The acquisition and transfer to private parties is a mere incident of the chief purpose of the act which is rehabilitation of the area. The fact that the property would not continue to be owned by the city does not mean that the use was not a public one. Rabinoff v. District Court, 145 Colo. 225, 360 P.2d 114 (1961).

The power of eminent domain may be exercised. The sale or leasing of property for redevelopment with restrictions to prevent blight are for public uses and purposes for which the power of eminent domain may properly be exercised. Rabinoff v. District Court, 145 Colo. 225, 360 P.2d 114 (1961).

An owner of property a city declared blighted has a property interest in its statutory cause of action to challenge the blight determination process for abuse of discretion. The right to challenge the blight determination is not just a right to a hearing for its own sake, but a right to overturn a blight determination that was an abuse of discretion pursuant to this Urban Renewal Law. M.A.K. Inv. Grp., LLC v. City of Glendale, 897 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 2018).

Due process requires a city to provide a property owner with direct notice of the adverse blight determination. In contemporary terms this means notice had to be mailed, emailed, or personally served. An owner's ability to preserve its property right in the statutory right of review depends on its knowledge of the simple fact the blight finding exists. M.A.K. Inv. Grp., LLC v. City of Glendale, 897 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 2018).

Even if owners can argue their property is not blighted if and when condemnation proceedings begin, that does not preserve the cause of action for immediate review of the blight determination itself. M.A.K. Inv. Grp., LLC v. City of Glendale, 897 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 2018).

While letting owners know they have only thirty days to challenge a blight finding may be a best practice, it is not constitutionally compelled. There is no need to require individualized notice of state law remedies that are established by published, generally available state statutes and case law. M.A.K. Inv. Grp., LLC v. City of Glendale, 897 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 2018).

Urban renewal is a substantial state interest that can justify taking property dedicated to religious uses. Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 181 Colo. 411, 509 P.2d 1250 (1973).

Applied in People v. Bailey, 41 Colo. App. 504, 595 P.2d 252 (1978).