Colorado § 24-34-601 - Discrimination in places of public accommodation - rules.

§ 24-34-601. Discrimination in places of public accommodation - rules.

(1) Repealed.

(2) (a) It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of disability, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, marital status, national origin, or ancestry the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation or, directly or indirectly, to publish, circulate, issue, display, post, or mail any written, electronic, or printed communication, notice, or advertisement that indicates that the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation will be refused, withheld from, or denied an individual or that an individual's patronage or presence at a place of public accommodation is unwelcome, objectionable, unacceptable, or undesirable because of disability, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, marital status, national origin, or ancestry.

(b) Repealed.

(c) (I) An educational institution, including an elementary or secondary school and an institution of higher education, denies a person the full and equal enjoyment of a place of public accommodation when the educational institution:

(A) On the basis of one or more of the protected classes described in subsection (2)(a) of this section, excludes a student from participation in, denies a student the benefits of, or otherwise subjects a student to discrimination in any of the educational institution's programs or activities;

(B) Without a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, nonpretextual basis, and based on one or more of the protected classes described in subsection (2)(a) of this section, denies educational services, benefits, or opportunities to a student or group of students by treating them differently from a similarly situated student who is, or group of students who are, part of a different subgroup of students within the same protected class; or

(C) Has actual notice that a hostile environment based on one or more of the protected classes described in subsection (2)(a) of this section exists at the educational institution but fails to take prompt and effective steps reasonably calculated to eliminate the hostile environment, end the harassment that gave rise to the hostile environment, and prevent the harassment from recurring.

(II) In interpreting the standards in subsection (2)(c)(I) of this section, the division and the commission may consider federal nondiscrimination law as persuasive but nonbinding authority. State law governs in the case of a conflict between applicable state and federal law.

(III) The commission may adopt rules specific to complaints of discrimination involving educational institutions.

(2.5) It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for any person to discriminate against any individual or group because such person or group has opposed any practice made a discriminatory practice by this part 6, because such person or group has requested reasonable accommodations on the basis of a person's disability, or because such person or group has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing conducted pursuant to this part 6.

(3) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this section, it is not a discriminatory practice for a person to restrict admission to a place of public accommodation to individuals of one sex if such restriction has a bona fide relationship to the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of such place of public accommodation.

(4) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires, "nonprofit" means any person that is listed as an exempt organization in 26 U.S.C. sec. 501 (c) and that is exempt from taxation pursuant to 26 U.S.C. sec. 501 (a) of the federal "Internal Revenue Code of 1986", as amended.

(5) A nonprofit does not directly or indirectly participate or intervene in a political campaign merely by renting out space for a political event at the nonprofit's customary and usual rates.

Source: L. 79: Entire part R&RE, p. 937, § 3, effective July 1. L. 89: (2.5) added, p. 1043, § 11, effective July 1. L. 93: (2) amended, p. 1661, § 65, effective July 1. L. 2008: (1) and (2) amended, p. 1596, § 6, effective May 29. L. 2014: (2) amended, (SB 14-118), ch. 250, p. 978, § 7, effective August 6. L. 2021: (2)(a) amended, (HB 21-1108), ch. 156, p. 888, § 7, effective September 7. L. 2024: (1) amended and (4) and (5) added, (HB 24-1124), ch. 224, p. 1393, § 1, effective August 7. L. 2025: (1) repealed, (SB 25-275), ch. 377, p. 2109, § 336, effective August 6; (2)(b) repealed and (2.5) amended, (HB 25-1239), ch. 232, p. 1099, § 2, effective August 6. L. 2026: (2)(c) added, (HB 26-1141), ch. 296, p. 1621, § 1, effective August 12.

Editor's note: (1) In 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 600 U.S. 570 (2023), the United States Supreme Court held that under the first amendment of the United States Constitution subsection (2)(a) is unconstitutional as applied to a website designer by forcing the designer to create expressive designs speaking messages with which the designer disagrees.

(2) Subsection (1) was relocated to § 24-34-600.3 in 2025.

(3) Section 4 of chapter 296 (HB 26-1141), Session Laws of Colorado 2026, provides that the act changing this section applies to discriminatory practices committed on or after August 12, 2026.

Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration contained in the 2008 act amending subsections (1) and (2), see section 1 of chapter 341, Session Laws of Colorado 2008.

(2) For the legislative declaration in HB 21-1108, see section 1 of chapter 156, Session Laws of Colorado 2021. For the legislative declaration in HB 25-1239, see section 1 of chapter 232, Session Laws of Colorado 2025.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For comment on Crosswaith v. Bergin, appearing below, see 7 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 78 (1934). For article, "Civil Rights in Colorado", see 46 Den. L.J. 181 (1969). For article, "Practicing Before the Colorado Civil Rights Commission", see 17 Colo. Law. 259 (1988). For comment, "New York State Club Association, Inc. v. City of New York: As 'Distinctly Private' is Defined, Women Gain Access", see 66 Den. U. L. Rev. 109 (1988). For article, "Beyond Discrimination: Market Humiliation and Private Law", see 95 U. Colo. L. Rev. 87 (2024).

Section is constitutional. Darius v. Apostolos, 68 Colo. 323, 190 P. 510 (1920); Crosswaith v. Bergin, 95 Colo. 241, 35 P.2d 848 (1934).

The first amendment's free speech clause prohibits the state from enforcing the accommodation clause in subsection (2)(a) to compel a website designer to create custom websites celebrating or depicting same-sex weddings or otherwise create or depict original, expressive, graphic, or website designs inconsistent with the designer's beliefs regarding same-sex marriage. 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 600 U.S. 570 (2023); 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 725 F. Supp. 3d 1235 (D. Colo. 2024).

The first amendment's free speech clause prohibits the state from enforcing the communication clause in subsection (2)(a) to prevent a website designer from posting on the designer's website a proposed statement regarding the designer's religious beliefs that prevent the designer from creating websites promoting and celebrating ideas or messages that violate the designer's beliefs regarding marriage or from making materially similar statements on designer's website and directly to prospective clients. 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 725 F. Supp. 3d 1235 (D. Colo. 2024).

The United States supreme court has recognized that, in some cases, conduct cannot be divorced from status. This is so when the conduct is so closely correlated with the status that it is engaged in exclusively or predominantly by persons who have that particular status. The act of same-sex marriage is closely correlated to sexual orientation, because it is engaged in exclusively or predominantly by gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 2015 COA 115, 370 P.3d 272, rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 584 U.S. 617 (2018).

But for their sexual orientation, petitioners would not have sought to enter into a same-sex marriage, and therefore, the administrative law judge did not err when he found that respondents' refusal to create a wedding cake for petitioners was "because of" their sexual orientation, in violation of the Colorado anti-discrimination act and not, as respondents claim, because of petitioners' intended conduct — to enter into a marriage with a same-sex partner. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 2015 COA 115, 370 P.3d 272, rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 584 U.S. 617 (2018).

Because baker agreed to make a custom pink cake with blue frosting before the customer disclosed why she wanted it, the baker's refusal was "because of" the customer's transgender status and therefore discriminatory and in violation of this section. This finding was further supported by the baker's acknowledgment that a pink cake with blue frosting "has no intrinsic meaning and does not express any message". Scardina v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 2023 COA 8, 528 P.3d 926, vacated, 2024 CO 67, 556 P.3d 1238 (decided under former law).

The pink and blue cake requested by a customer expressed no message and therefore could not fall within the "offensiveness rule" argued by the baker. Scardina v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 2023 COA 8, 528 P.3d 926, vacated, 2024 CO 67, 556 P.3d 1238 (decided under former law).

Creating a pink cake with blue frosting is not inherently expressive and any message or symbolism it provides to an observer would not be attributed to the baker. Therefore, the baker was not compelled to speak through the creation and sale of the cake to the customer to celebrate her transformation from a man to a woman. Scardina v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 2023 COA 8, 528 P.3d 926, vacated, 2024 CO 67, 556 P.3d 1238 (decided under former law).

Right of women to frequent saloons taken away by Denver city charter. If this section, when enacted, gave to women the right equally with men to frequent saloons, and if this right depended solely upon the underlying statutory provision, it was taken away by the general assembly when, at a later date, it adopted a charter for the city of Denver, whereby the authority was conferred upon the city to deprive women of the enjoyment of this so-called right. Adams v. Cronin, 29 Colo. 488, 69 P. 590 (1902), aff'd, 192 U.S. 108 (1904) (decided under former law).

This section applies to organizations that conduct activities in facilities, such as parks and sports fields, that are open to the public. Creek Red Nation, LLC v. Jeffco Midget Football Ass'n, 175 F. Supp. 3d 1290 (D. Colo. 2016).

Bootblacking stand is a place of public accommodation. Darius v. Apostolos, 68 Colo. 323, 190 P. 510 (1920).

Refusal of restaurant to serve a person because of his race is discrimination against which section is aimed. Crosswaith v. Bergin, 95 Colo. 241, 35 P.2d 848 (1934).

Determination that regulation violates student's right to exercise religion outside section's scope. A determination by the Colorado civil rights commission that a school hair regulation violates an Indian student's constitutional right to freely exercise his religion is outside the scope of subsection (2) and is an issue appropriately resolved in a court of law. Sch. Dist. No. 11-J v. Howell, 33 Colo. App. 57, 517 P.2d 422 (1973).

Disparity in the procedure for verifying students' religious beliefs constitutes discriminatory practice prohibited by this section. Sch. Dist. No. 11-J v. Howell, 33 Colo. App. 57, 517 P.2d 422 (1973).

Plaintiff must show that he or she would not have been denied full privileges of a place of public accommodation if it had not been for his or her disability. The plaintiff does not need to establish that the disability was the only cause for being denied full privileges of a place of public accommodation. Tesmer v. Colo. High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 140 P.3d 249 (Colo. App. 2006).

For an impairment to be considered a substantial limitation, it must prevent or severely restrict an individual from performing a major life activity and must be of a permanent or long-term nature. Plaintiff's attention deficit disorder does not constitute a substantial limitation under subsection (2). Tesmer v. Colo. High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 140 P.3d 249 (Colo. App. 2006).