Colorado § 24-34-307 - Judicial review and enforcement.

§ 24-34-307. Judicial review and enforcement.

(1) Any complainant or respondent claiming to be aggrieved by a final order of the commission, including a refusal to issue an order, may obtain judicial review thereof, and the commission may obtain an order of court for its enforcement in a proceeding as provided in this section.

(2) Such proceeding shall be brought in the court of appeals by appropriate proceedings under section 24-4-106 (11).

(3) Such proceeding shall be initiated by the filing of a petition in the court of appeals and the service of a copy thereof upon the commission and upon all parties who appeared before the commission, and thereafter such proceeding shall be processed under the Colorado appellate rules. The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and the questions determined therein and shall have power to grant such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper and to make and enter upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceedings set forth in such transcript an order enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so modified or setting aside the order of the commission in whole or in part.

(4) An objection that has not been urged before the commission shall not be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances.

(5) Any party may move the court to remit the case to the commission in the interests of justice for the purpose of adducing additional specified and material evidence and seeking findings thereof, if such party shows reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence before the commission.

(6) The findings of the commission as to the facts shall be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.

(7) The jurisdiction of the court shall be exclusive and its judgment and order shall be final, subject to review as provided by law and the Colorado appellate rules.

(8) The commission's copy of the testimony shall be available to all parties for examination at all reasonable times, without cost, and for the purpose of judicial review of the commission's orders.

(9) The commission may appear in court by its own attorney.

(9.5) Upon application by a person alleging a discriminatory housing practice under section 24-34-502 or a person against whom such a practice is alleged, the court may appoint an attorney for such person or may authorize the commencement or continuation of a civil action without the payment of fees, costs, or security, if in the opinion of the court such person is financially unable to bear the costs of such action.

(10) The commission or court upon motion may grant a stay of the commission order pending appeal.

(11) Appeals filed under this section shall be heard expeditiously and determined upon the transcript filed, without requirement for printing. Hearings in the court of appeals under this part 3 shall take precedence over all other matters, except matters of the same character.

(12) If no proceeding to obtain judicial review is instituted by a complainant or respondent within forty-nine days from the service of an order of the commission pursuant to section 24-34-306, the commission may obtain a decree of the district court for the enforcement of such order upon showing that such respondent is subject to the jurisdiction of the commission and resides or transacts business within the county in which the petition for enforcement is brought.

Source: L. 79: Entire part R&RE, p. 927, § 3, effective July 1. L. 81: (2) and (12) amended, p. 1144, § 7, effective April 30. L. 90: (9.5) added, p. 1224, § 1, effective April 16. L. 2015: (12) amended, (SB 15-264), ch. 259, p. 959, § 67, effective August 5.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "One Year Review of Constitutional Law", see 40 Den. L. Ctr. J. 134 (1963). For article, "Fair Housing in Colorado", see 42 Den. L. Ctr. J. 1 (1965).

Civil rights provisions were intended to provide mechanism to eradicate causes of discrimination and to halt discriminatory practices. Red Seal Potato Chip Co. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 44 Colo. App. 381, 618 P.2d 697 (1980).

They were not intended to provide relief to individual claimants. Red Seal Potato Chip Co. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 44 Colo. App. 381, 618 P.2d 697 (1980); Agnello v. Adolph Coors Co., 695 P.2d 311 (Colo. App. 1984).

Claimant's benefits can be only enforced through commission action. Any benefits which may inure to a claimant as a result of a Colorado civil rights commission's action can only be enforced by the commission. Red Seal Potato Chip Co. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 44 Colo. App. 381, 618 P.2d 697 (1980); Agnello v. Adolph Coors Co., 689 P.2d 1162 (Colo. App. 1984).

Although as part of the remedial orders in a Colorado civil rights commission proceeding, a respondent may be directed to rehire or compensate a claimant, that fact does not vest the claimant with any rights which the claimant can enforce by judicial decree. Red Seal Potato Chip Co. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 44 Colo. App. 381, 618 P.2d 697 (1980).

Civil rights commission's sole function is to make a finding of fact as to whether a statutory employer has acted to discriminate against an employee because of race, creed, color, sex, national origin, or ancestry. Umberfield v. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 185 Colo. 165, 522 P.2d 730 (1974) (decided under former law).

Direct evidence is not a prerequisite to a finding of discrimination; such a finding may be based on legitimate inferences from the evidence. Tex. Southland Corp. v. Hogue, 30 Colo. App. 560, 497 P.2d 1275 (1972).

Commission's finding of discrimination is legitimate inference from evidence where it is established, among other things, that the employee is black, that he has been a good worker, and the employer's stated reasons for the discharge of the employee are false. Tex. Southland Corp. v. Hogue, 30 Colo. App. 560, 497 P.2d 1275 (1972).

Reviewing court is bound by commission's findings supported by substantial evidence. A district court on review is bound by the commission's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Umberfield v. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 185 Colo. 165, 522 P.2d 730 (1974).

Review is limited to whether existence of fact inferred by evidence. The judicial review of findings made by an administrative body such as the civil rights commission is limited to the question of whether, based upon the entire record, the findings are supported by evidence so substantial that an inference of the existence of a fact may be reasonably drawn. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n v. State, 30 Colo. App. 10, 488 P.2d 83 (1971); Tex. Southland Corp. v. Hogue, 30 Colo. App. 560, 497 P.2d 1275 (1972).

Commission may sift evidence, rejecting false and accepting true. In applying the "substantial evidence" rule, a commission such as the civil rights commission has the right to sift evidence, accepting the true, rejecting the false, and basing inferences on what it accepts as true. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n v. State, 30 Colo. App. 10, 488 P.2d 83 (1971).

Reviewing court cannot substitute its decisions for tribunal's. In determining whether the commission's order should stand, the question is not whether the court would come to an identical conclusion upon the evidence certified to it. A court cannot, upon the record of the proceedings before the hearing tribunal, substitute its own discretion for that reposed by statute in the tribunal. Due consideration must be accorded the presumption that an administrative body has acted fairly with proper motives, upon valid reasons, and not arbitrarily. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n v. State, 30 Colo. App. 10, 488 P.2d 83 (1971); Agnello v. Adolph Coors Co., 689 P.2d 1162 (Colo. App. 1984).

Agency is unauthorized to change final order while judicial review pending. An administrative agency is without authority to change, alter, or vacate a final order while review proceedings are pending in the district court. Colo. Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Cont'l Air Lines, 143 Colo. 590, 355 P.2d 83 (1960).

And, upon remand, it is without jurisdiction to do other than as directed by court. An attempt by the anti-discrimination commission (now civil rights commission) to vacate its original order is void where a party to the proceedings seeks review by the district court and the district court remands the cause to the commission with directions to make specific findings on specific issues; the commission has no jurisdiction to do other than as directed by the trial court. Colo. Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Cont'l Air Lines, 143 Colo. 590, 355 P.2d 83 (1960).

Appeal to civil rights commission prerequisite to court action. The exhaustion of the administrative remedy of appeal to the Colorado civil rights commission from an adverse ruling of a hearing officer is a prerequisite to the maintenance of a court action challenging the hearing officer's ruling. N. Wash. St. Water & San. Dist. v. Emerson, 626 P.2d 1152 (Colo. App. 1980).

Subsection (1) permits a charging party to challenge the commission's "refusal to issue an order" in the court of appeals. Here the commission entered into a binding private settlement with the respondent in federal court, dismissed charging party's charge without her participation, and issued a closure order. The commission's issuance of a closure order deprived charging party of that process and any potential administrative remedy or settlement. The closure order amounts to the kind of "refusal to issue an order" that subsection (1) contemplates. Charging party had a statutorily established path to challenge the commission's conduct in the court of appeals. Under these circumstances, the commission's closure order represents the culmination of just such a refusal. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Scardina, 2024 CO 67, 556 P.3d 1238.

Where the commission entered a binding private settlement with a respondent in federal court and dismissed charging party's charge without her participation and without issuing the order required under this section, the charging party should have challenged the commission's conduct in the court of appeals. She did not. That choice did not entitle her to pursue the alternate path of filing a district court action. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Scardina, 2024 CO 67, 556 P.3d 1238.

Exhaustion of state remedies is not required prior to federal proceedings. Congress has evidenced its intent to provide parallel or overlapping remedies against discrimination. Thus, the exhaustion of state administrative or judicial remedies is not required prior to proceedings in the federal court. Silverman v. Univ. of Colo., 36 Colo. App. 269, 541 P.2d 93 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 192 Colo. 75, 555 P.2d 1155 (1976).

Federal court may defer proceedings pending commission's determination. A federal trial court should have discretion, if it so determines, to defer proceedings on a claim pending the determination of the claim by the commission. Silverman v. Univ. of Colo., 36 Colo. App. 269, 541 P.2d 93 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 192 Colo. 75, 555 P.2d 1155 (1976) (decided under former law).

Doctrine of res judicata bars relitigation of issues raised before prior administrative body. Where a teacher has a full adversary hearing before the teacher tenure panel, which has the power to determine all his claims of religious discrimination, the doctrine of res judicata operates as a bar to the relitigation of issues before the civil rights commission which the teacher raises or could raise in the hearing before the prior panel and on judicial review. To hold otherwise could result in an anomalous situation where the same reviewing court would be compelled to affirm opposite results of two administrative bodies. Umberfield v. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 185 Colo. 165, 522 P.2d 730 (1974).

Applied in Cont'l Title Co. v. District Court, 645 P.2d 1310 (Colo. 1982).