Colorado § 22-32-101 - Corporate status of school districts.

§ 22-32-101. Corporate status of school districts.

Each regularly organized school district heretofore or hereafter formed is declared to be a body corporate with perpetual existence, and in its name it may hold property for any purpose authorized by law, sue and be sued, and be a party to contracts for any purpose authorized by law.

Source: L. 64: p. 573, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 123-30-1.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. Since § 22-32-101 is similar to § 123-10-1, CRS 53, CSA, C. 146, § 73, and laws antecedent thereto, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

A school district is a body corporate with power to sue and be sued and has the power to compromise actions and claims. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Faker, 106 Colo. 356, 105 P.2d 406 (1940).

Individual taxpayers do not own the school house or other property nor have they any legal or equitable interest in it. Gorrell v. Bevans, 66 Colo. 67, 179 P. 337 (1919).

The status of taxpayers is analogous to that of stockholders, which neither equity nor law will protect, except through the corporation, till that body is shown to be hostile or at least negligent of their rights after request. Gorrell v. Bevans, 66 Colo. 67, 179 P. 337 (1919).

A school district is immune from negligence liability. A school district as a subdivision of the state of Colorado is immune from liability for negligence under the settled pronouncements of the supreme court. Tesone v. Sch. Dist. No. RE-2, 152 Colo. 596, 384 P.2d 82 (1963) (decided prior to enactment of the "Colorado Governmental Immunity Act", article 10 of title 24).

There is no question that school districts are political subdivisions of the state, created by law and supported in their activities with public funds. Bagby v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 Colo. 428, 528 P.2d 1299 (1974).

School districts' status as political subdivisions does not disentitle them from bringing an action under the supremacy clause to enforce the terms of the Colorado Enabling Act merely because the defendant state officials are sued in their official capacities representing the state that created those subdivisions. Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619 (10th Cir. 1998).

Financial maintenance of public schools held not to be local or municipal matter. Wilmore v. Annear, 100 Colo. 106, 65 P.2d 1433 (1937).

A school board's participation in collective bargaining is not per se an unlawful delegation of its authority. Littleton Educ. Ass'n v. Arapahoe County Sch. Dist., 191 Colo. 411, 553 P.2d 793 (1976).

Collective bargaining agreements between a county school board and a local education association which did not provide for binding arbitration of unresolved disputes and which gave board power to make final decision on all unresolved issues, without further negotiation, was not invalid as an unlawful delegation of authority. Littleton Educ. Ass'n v. Arapahoe County Sch. Dist., 191 Colo. 411, 553 P.2d 793 (1976).

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies to disputes between a public employee and a school district. Brown v. Jefferson County Sch., 2012 COA 98, 297 P.3d 976.

Applied in Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982).