Colorado § 2-4-108 - Computation of time.

§ 2-4-108. Computation of time.

(1) In computing a period of days, the first day is excluded and the last day is included.

(2) If the last day of any period is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period is extended to include the next day which is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.

(3) If a number of months is to be computed by counting the months from a particular day, the period ends on the same numerical day in the concluding month as the day of the month from which the computation is begun, unless there are not that many days in the concluding month, in which case the period ends on the last day of that month.

Source: L. 73: R&RE, p. 1423, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 135-1-108.

Cross references: For provisions governing publication of legal notices and advertisements and the computation of time therefor, see part 1 of article 70 of title 24; for computation of time under the "Uniform Election Code of 1992", articles 1 to 13 of title 1, see § 1-1-106.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Service of Process on Sunday", see 16 Dicta 320 (1939).

This section cannot be viewed as retroactive just because it operates on antecedent facts. Rowe v. Tucker, 38 Colo. App. 532, 560 P.2d 843 (1977).

Rather, the question is whether applying this section to a particular controversy would deprive a party of accrued rights. Rowe v. Tucker, 38 Colo. App. 532, 560 P.2d 843 (1977).

When right accrues. For purposes of applying this section, a right accrues only when litigation could have been successfully maintained thereunder. Rowe v. Tucker, 38 Colo. App. 532, 560 P.2d 843 (1977).

Application of section held not retroactive. Where only after the foreclosure sale did the right to limit redemption to the statutory period accrue and this took place after the effective date of this section, application of this statute to subsequent redemption proceedings raised no retroactivity problem. Rowe v. Tucker, 38 Colo. App. 532, 560 P.2d 843 (1977).

Sunday included within number of days to do statutory act, unless excluded. Where a statutory provision declares that an act must be done within a certain number of days, Sunday is reckoned as one of these days, though it happens to be the last, unless it is expressly or impliedly excluded. City and County of Denver v. Londoner, 33 Colo. 104, 80 P. 117 (1905), rev'd on other grounds, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).

Therefore, no time extension granted to filing election statement. The extension of time granted to judicial acts when the last day falls on a Sunday does not apply to the filing of a statement in an election contest. Vailes v. Brown, 16 Colo. 462, 27 P. 945 (1891).

Section not applicable to computation of a tort action's three-year statute of limitations under § 13-80-101. Gomez v. Walker, 2023 COA 79, 540 P.3d 936.

Section not applicable to computation of three-year statute of limitations in § 33-44-111 of the Ski Safety Act. Schafer v. Aspen Skiing Corp., 742 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1984).

In calculating the two-year limitation for filing a personal property tax abatement petition pursuant to § 39-10-114 (1)(a)(I)(A), the day from which the two-year period runs is excluded and the last day is included. If the last day is a holiday, the period is extended one day. Golden Aluminum v. Weld County Comm'rs, 867 P.2d 190 (Colo. App. 1993).

A period of years ends on and includes the anniversary date in the concluding year, that is, the same month and day of the concluding year as the month and day from which the computation began. People v. Brunner, 87 P.3d 267 (Colo. App. 2004).

This section shall not be construed as resulting in a tolling, waiver, or extension of the 180-day filing requirement pursuant to § 24-10-109. Rather, this section merely allows the 180-day period to be given effect and provide a uniform method for determining when a statutory period begins and ends. Matthews v. City & County of Denver, 20 P.3d 1227 (Colo. App. 2000).

Applied in People v. Bielecki, 41 Colo. App. 256, 588 P.2d 377 (1978); Shaball v. State Comp. Ins. Auth., 799 P.2d 399 (Colo. App. 1990); Ralston Purina-Keystone v. Lowry, 821 P.2d 910 (Colo. App. 1991); N.E., Inc. v. Iliff & Monaco Assocs., 890 P.2d 146 (Colo. App. 1994); Matthews v. City & County of Denver, 20 P.3d 1227 (Colo. App. 2000).