Colorado § 19-2.5-907 - Procedures at trial.

§ 19-2.5-907. Procedures at trial.

(1) At the adjudicatory trial, that must be conducted pursuant to section 19-1-106, the court shall consider whether the allegations of the petition are supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Jurisdictional matters of the age and residence of the juvenile are deemed admitted by or on behalf of the juvenile unless specifically denied within a reasonable time prior to the trial.

(2) If the juvenile is found not guilty after an adjudicatory trial, the court shall order the petition dismissed and the juvenile discharged from any detention or restriction previously ordered. The juvenile's parents, guardian, or other legal custodian are also discharged from any restriction or other previous temporary order.

(3) If the juvenile is found guilty after an adjudicatory trial, the court may proceed to sentencing or direct that the matter be set for a separate sentencing hearing within forty-nine days following completion of the adjudicatory trial.

Source: L. 2021: Entire article added with relocations, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 625, § 2, effective October 1.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 19-2-804 as it existed prior to 2021.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

Although proceedings under the Colorado Children's Code are civil in nature, a respondent child in such proceedings is entitled to certain of the constitutional safeguards which are afforded in criminal prosecutions. People in Interest of G.D.K. v. G.D.K., 30 Colo. App. 54, 491 P.2d 81 (1971).

Child who is subject of petition for adjudication as delinquent is entitled to constitutional protections afforded adult defendant in criminal case. In re People in Interest of B.M.C., 32 Colo. App. 79, 506 P.2d 409 (1973).

Term "order of adjudication" refers only to orders by which a child is decreed to be delinquent, in need of supervision, or neglected or dependent and does not include orders for revocation of probation. People in Interest of B.L.M. v. B.L.M., 31 Colo. App. 106, 500 P.2d 146 (1972).

C.R.J.P. 8(e) not superceded. This special statutory procedure for waiving jurisdiction of the juvenile court does not supercede C.R.J.P. 8(e). People v. Dist. Court, 199 Colo. 197, 606 P.2d 450 (1980).

Waiver of jurisdiction not final disposition of action. It is evident from the provisions of this section and §§ 19-3-108 (4) and 19-3-109 that an order of the juvenile division of the district court waiving jurisdiction is not a final disposition of the action. People in Interest of D.H., 37 Colo. App. 544, 552 P.2d 29 (1976), aff'd, 192 Colo. 542, 561 P.2d 5 (1977).

When proof beyond reasonable doubt required. Due process and fair treatment require proof beyond a reasonable doubt during the adjudicatory state when a juvenile is charged with an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult. D.W. v. Dist. Court, 193 Colo. 194, 564 P.2d 949 (1976).

Right of alleged delinquent to testify as to criminal intent. Where intent is a material element of the crime charged, a child alleged to be delinquent, grounded on an alleged theft, has the right to testify specifically as to intention in the commission of the acts. People in Interest of J.S.C. v. J.S.C., 30 Colo. App. 381, 493 P.2d 671 (1972).

Court may continue adjudicatory hearing without making an adjudication and may impose certain conditions of conduct under this section, as distinguished from probation under § 19-3-113 (former § 19-2-703). People in Interest of F.D., 735 P.2d 496 (Colo. App. 1987).

An adjudication of delinquency is sufficient to establish a conclusive presumption of intent when intent is an element of the offense, because the adjudication requires a higher burden of proof and provides constitutional protections not available in most civil cases. Swentkowski v. Dawson, 881 P.2d 437 (Colo. App. 1994).

The standards for reviewing the sufficiency of evidence supporting a judgment of juvenile delinquency are the same as those applied in a criminal case. The reviewing court must determine whether the evidence, viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable person that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. People ex rel. J.M.N., 39 P.3d 1261 (Colo. App. 2001); People ex rel. P.C., 80 P.3d 942 (Colo. App. 2003).

Evidence held sufficient. In a proceeding to declare children delinquent, evidence held legally sufficient to warrant a finding that the children were delinquent. Kahm v. People, 83 Colo. 300, 264 P. 718 (1928).

Evidence held insufficient. Evidence held clearly insufficient to support court's finding that minor was a "delinquent child". Carmean v. People, 110 Colo. 399, 134 P.2d 1056 (1943).

Where a minor child aged 16 was alleged to be a delinquent, grounded on the allegation that he had committed an assault and battery, but at the close of the evidence presented by the people, the court ruled that the evidence presented was not sufficient to sustain the allegations of the petition and entered a judgment of acquittal, on appeal by the people it was held that the case was moot. The minor had been acquitted of the charge contained in the petition and could not again be put in jeopardy for this offense. People in Interest of G.D.K. v. G.D.K., 30 Colo. App. 54, 491 P.2d 81 (1971).

A minute order can be effective as a written order or judgment when the parties to an action attend a hearing concerning the subject matter of the order and understand the substantive content of the decision represented by the minute order. Wesson v. Bowling, 199 Colo. 30, 604 P.2d 23 (1979); People v. Easter, 914 P.2d 493 (Colo. App. 1995).

Under the plain language of subsection (6)(a), a written order would include any direction of the court reduced to written form such as a written directive for transfer to the adult court and assigning a criminal action number to the case. People v. Easter, 914 P.2d 493 (Colo. App. 1995).

The written minute order waiving juvenile court jurisdiction triggered the requirement for the prosecution to file an information in district court within five days of the issuance of the order and, since the time limit is mandatory and jurisdictional, the prosecution's failure to file an information within that time limit rendered the waiver null and void and the juvenile court was required to retain jurisdiction. People v. Easter, 914 P.2d 493 (Colo. App. 1995).

The later issuance of a second written order by the juvenile court judge cannot correct the prosecution's failure initially to file the information and is not permitted under the mandatory language of subsection (6)(a). People v. Easter, 914 P.2d 493 (Colo. App. 1995).