Colorado § 18-6-201 - Bigamy.

§ 18-6-201. Bigamy.

(1) A married person who, while still married, marries or enters into a civil union in this state with another person commits bigamy, unless as an affirmative defense it appears that at the time of the subsequent marriage or subsequent civil union:

(a) The accused reasonably believed the prior spouse to be dead; or

(b) The prior spouse had been continually absent for a period of five years during which time the accused did not know the prior spouse to be alive; or

(c) The accused reasonably believed that he or she was legally eligible to remarry or legally eligible to enter into a civil union.

(1.5) A person who is a partner in a civil union, while still legally in a civil union, who marries or enters into another civil union in the state with another person other than a current partner in a civil union commits bigamy, unless as an affirmative defense it appears that at the time of the subsequent marriage or subsequent civil union:

(a) The accused reasonably believed the prior partner to be dead; or

(b) The prior partner had been continually absent for a period of five years during which time the accused did not know the prior partner to be alive; or

(c) The accused reasonably believed that he or she was legally eligible to marry or legally eligible to enter into a civil union.

(2) Bigamy is a class 2 misdemeanor.

Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 447, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-6-201. L. 89: (2) amended, p. 839, § 76, effective July 1. L. 2016: Entire section amended, (SB 16-150), ch. 263, p. 1081, § 7, effective July 1. L. 2021: (2) amended, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3191, § 257, effective March 1, 2022. L. 2026: IP(1) and IP(1.5) amended, (SB 26-013), ch. 9, p. 37, § 1, effective August 12.

Cross references: (1) For the "Uniform Marriage Act", see article 2 of title 14; for the "Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act", see article 10 of title 14.

(2) For the legislative declaration in SB 16-150, see section 1 of chapter 263, Session Laws of Colorado 2016.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For note, "The Presumption of Death and a Second Marriage", see 27 Dicta 414 (1950). For article, "Criminality of Voluntary Sexual Acts in Colorado", see 40 U. Colo. L. Rev. 268 (1968).

Annotator's note. Since § 18-6-201 is similar to former C.L. § 6835, and laws antecedent thereto, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

"Absent" means being away from the home. The word "absent", as used in bigamy statutes, has been regarded as having such confined and technical meaning as it has in the rule regarding the presumption of death. "Absent" therefore means being away from the home or place where one has established a residence. Schell v. People, 65 Colo. 116, 173 P. 1141 (1918).

Remarriage within statutory period is at party's peril. It is the clear intent of this section that one who marries within the period designated by the statute shall do so at his peril. Schell v. People, 65 Colo. 116, 173 P. 1141 (1918).

But death of former spouse or divorce may validate prior marriage. Upon the dissolution of the subsisting marriage by death or by a competent decree of divorce, an intended marriage contracted in good faith by a party thereto prior to the removal of the disability is rendered valid and binding by the continued cohabitation of the parties to such union, as the original intention to become husband and wife, is presumed to continue so as to effectuate a valid common-law marriage. Davis v. People, 83 Colo. 295, 264 P. 658 (1928).

Cohabitation a question for jury. When acts and complicating circumstances are proved, it becomes largely a question for the jury to determine whether there was in fact such continuation as amounted to a living together. People v. Bright, 77 Colo. 563, 238 P. 71 (1925).

The wife is a competent witness against the husband in a prosecution for bigamy. The offense is construed to be a crime against the wife. Schell v. People, 65 Colo. 116, 173 P. 1141 (1918).

Defense of ignorance that former spouse was living must be established by defendant. Clause of this section concerning knowledge that a former spouse is still living constitutes an exception which it is neither for the information to negative, nor for the prosecution in the first instance to disprove. If defendant relies upon the fact that he did not know that his former wife was still alive, he must produce evidence thereof. Magee v. People, 79 Colo. 328, 245 P. 708 (1926).

Spouse held not absent. Defendant deserted his family, leaving them in Nebraska, in 1903, where they continued at their then residence until 1913. Defendant's second marriage occurred in less than two years after the first wife's departure from the former matrimonial domicile. While remaining at such former domicile the first wife was not "absent", within the meaning of this section, and a conviction was affirmed. Schell v. People, 65 Colo. 116, 173 P. 1141 (1918).

Information that follows this section is sufficient. An information which describes the offense in the language of this section, or so clearly that what is charged may be readily understood by a jury, is sufficient. Magee v. People, 79 Colo. 328, 245 P. 708 (1926).