Colorado § 18-4-403 - Statutory intent.

§ 18-4-403. Statutory intent.

If any law of this state refers to or mentions larceny, stealing, embezzlement (except embezzlement of public moneys), false pretenses, confidence games, or shoplifting, that law shall be interpreted as if the word "theft" were substituted therefor; and in the enactment of sections 18-4-401 to 18-4-403 it is the intent of the general assembly to define one crime of theft and to incorporate therein such crimes, thereby removing distinctions and technicalities which previously existed in the pleading and proof of such crimes.

Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 429, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-4-403.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For note, "Larceny, Embezzlement, and False Pretenses in Colorado — A Need for Consolidation", see 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 446 (1951). For article, "Joinder of Criminal Charges, Election, Duplicity", see 30 Dicta 117 (1953).

Annotator's note. Since § 18-4-403 is similar to former § 40-5-2, C.R.S. 1963, a relevant case construing that provision has been included in the annotations to this section.

The theft statute is clearly meant to encompass generally acquisition type crimes. Hucal v. People, 176 Colo. 529, 493 P.2d 23 (1971).

This section is a short-cut method of substituting the word "theft" in every statute in which the words larceny, stealing, embezzlement (except embezzlement of public moneys), false pretenses, confidence game, or shoplifting are used, without having to list all the statutes affected; this technique avoids rendering inoperative, by inadvertence, any statute containing one of the enumerated words. Hucal v. People, 176 Colo. 529, 493 P.2d 23 (1971).

Exception for embezzlement of public money is not limitation. Just because the word "theft" should not be substituted for "embezzlement of public moneys" is no indication of a limitation on the general theft statute. Clearly, the crime of embezzlement is included, for unless the general assembly intent is clearly shown to be otherwise, enactment of a specific criminal statute does not preclude prosecution under a general criminal statute, but rather allows the single criminal transaction to be prosecuted under either statute. Hucal v. People, 176 Colo. 529, 493 P.2d 23 (1971).