Colorado § 18-3-101 - Definition of terms.

§ 18-3-101. Definition of terms.

As used in this part 1, unless the context otherwise requires:

(1) "Homicide" means the killing of a person by another.

(2) "Person", when referring to the victim of a homicide, means a human being who had been born and was alive at the time of the homicidal act.

(2.5) One in a "position of trust" includes, but is not limited to, any person who is a parent or acting in the place of a parent and charged with any of a parent's rights, duties, or responsibilities concerning a child, including a guardian or someone otherwise responsible for the general supervision of a child's welfare, or a person who is charged with any duty or responsibility for the health, education, welfare, or supervision of a child, including foster care, child care, family care, or institutional care, either independently or through another, no matter how brief, at the time of an unlawful act.

(3) The term "after deliberation" means not only intentionally but also that the decision to commit the act has been made after the exercise of reflection and judgment concerning the act. An act committed after deliberation is never one which has been committed in a hasty or impulsive manner.

Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 417, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-3-101. L. 74: (1)(c) R&RE, p. 251, § 1, effective January 1, 1975. L. 95: (2.5) added, p. 1221, § 1, effective July 1.

Cross references: For the statutory provision that declares that the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures does not constitute suicide or homicide, see § 15-18-111; for the effect of homicide on probate matters, see § 15-11-803.

ANNOTATION

Meaningful distinction between first and second degree murder intended. The general assembly intended that there be a meaningful distinction between first and second degree murder. People v. Mullins, 188 Colo. 23, 532 P.2d 733 (1975).

Killing may be perpetrated by any means by which death may be occasioned. The unlawful killing may be perpetrated by poisoning, sticking, starving, drowning, stabbing, shooting, or by any other of the various forms or means by which human nature may be overcome, and death thereby occasioned. May v. People, 8 Colo. 210, 6 P. 816 (1885).

"Person" does not include a fetus, even if the child is born following the injury which ultimately results in its death. "Born and was alive at the time of the homicidal act" is clear and unambiguous in its temporal limitation. People v. Lage, 232 P.3d 138 (Colo. App. 2009).

Court incorrectly applied in pari materia doctrine by concluding temporal limitation within this section's definition of "person" could be inferred into other statutory definitions of "person" outside of this part 1. Statutory language here places an explicit limitation on the application of the definitions contained in this section. People v. Lage, 232 P.3d 138 (Colo. App. 2009).

Use of a deadly weapon is not in itself sufficient to show deliberation. People v. Hamrick, 624 P.2d 1333 (Colo. App. 1979), aff'd, 624 P.2d 1320 (Colo. 1981).

Instruction given in prosecution for murder in the first degree erroneously defined "after deliberation" as an interval sufficient for one thought to follow another, but although of constitutional dimension, such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the erroneous language in the challenged instruction did not so distort the definition in another distinction that the prosecution was relieved of its burden of proving the mental culpability requirement beyond a reasonable doubt and where evidence on the issue of deliberation was overwhelming. Key v. People, 715 P.2d 319 (Colo. 1986); People v. Tyler, 728 P.2d 314 (Colo. 1986); Martinez v. People, 2015 CO 16, 344 P.3d 862.

Evidence supports the element of deliberation. Evidence that defendant shot at the victim three times, twice from behind, is sufficient to support the element of deliberation. People v. Cisneros, 720 P.2d 982 (Colo. App. 1986).

The term "after deliberation" means "not only intentionally but also that the decision to commit the act has been made after the exercise of reflection and judgment concerning the act." People v. District Ct., 17th Jud. Dist., 926 P.2d 567 (Colo. 1996).

"After deliberation" is part of the specific intent element of first degree murder. People v. Harlan, 8 P.3d 448 (Colo. 2000) (disapproving People v. Orona, 907 P.2d 659 (Colo. App. 1995)).

Prosecution's closing arguments that exercising judgment and reflection to decide whether to drive through a yellow light could occur as "fast" as "[a] second" distorted a key element of attempted first degree murder. People v. McBride, 228 P.3d 216 (Colo. App. 2009).

Applied in Leonard v. People, 149 Colo. 360, 369 P.2d 54 (1962); People v. Morgan, 637 P.2d 338 (Colo. 1981); People v. Madson, 638 P.2d 18 (Colo. 1981); People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235 (Colo. 1983); People v. Fields, 697 P.2d 749 (Colo. App. 1984).