Colorado § 18-2-301 - Criminal solicitation.

§ 18-2-301. Criminal solicitation.

(1) Except as to bona fide acts of persons authorized by law to investigate and detect the commission of offenses by others, a person is guilty of criminal solicitation if he or she commands, induces, entreats, or otherwise attempts to persuade another person, or offers his or her services or another's services to a third person, to commit a felony, whether as principal or accomplice, with intent to promote or facilitate the commission of that crime, and under circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent.

(2) It is a defense to a prosecution under this section that, if the criminal object were achieved, the defendant would be the sole victim of the offense or the offense is so defined that his conduct would be inevitably incident to its commission or he otherwise would not be guilty under the statute defining the offense or under section 18-1-603 dealing with complicity.

(3) It is no defense to a prosecution under this section that the person solicited could not be guilty of the offense because of lack of responsibility or culpability, or other incapacity.

(4) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that the defendant, after soliciting another person to commit a felony, persuaded him not to do so or otherwise prevented the commission of the felony, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of the defendant's criminal intent.

(5) Criminal solicitation is subject to the penalties provided for criminal attempt in section 18-2-101.

Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 417, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-2-301. L. 98: (1) amended, p. 1443, § 29, effective July 1.

Cross references: For affirmative defenses generally, see §§ 18-1-407, 18-1-710, and 18-1-805.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For note, "Comment: Constitutional Law — Symbolic Speech — Colorado Flag Desecration Statute", see 48 Den. L. J. 451 (1971). For article, "Mens Rea and the Colorado Criminal Code", see 52 U. Colo. L. Rev. 167 (1981).

This section is constitutional. People v. Latsis, 195 Colo. 411, 578 P.2d 1055 (1978).

Section is constitutional even though it fails to expressly require a close temporal proximity between the "strongly corroborative" circumstances and this particular act of solicitation. People v. Aalbu, 696 P.2d 796 (Colo. 1985).

Section distinguished from complicity statute. Although encouragement of a criminal offense is prohibited under both this section and § 18-1-603, this statute concerns incomplete acts, while the complicity statute covers consummated criminal offenses. Because the provisions proscribe distinguishable behavior, there is no violation of equal protection. Alonzi v. People, 198 Colo. 160, 597 P.2d 560 (1979).

Section distinguished from attempt statute. Degree of "preparation" involved, while relevant to crime of attempt, is not relevant to crime of solicitation. People v. Washington, 865 P.2d 145 (Colo. 1994).

The unit of prosecution for criminal solicitation under subsection (1) is based on each person solicited, not the number of victims targeted. People v. Manzanares, 2020 COA 140M, 490 P.3d 919.

Identity or motive of the person solicited is irrelevant. Where defendant was charged with soliciting an undercover police officer for the purchase of drugs, fact that officer was already "passing himself off as a drug dealer" did not affect question of whether probable cause existed for defendant's arrest. People v. Washington, 865 P.2d 145 (Colo. 1994).

Conspiracy distinguished. A conspiracy may be committed without the inducement required for the crime of solicitation, and solicitation may be committed without the parties ever reaching an agreement or without any overt act taken to complete the object of the solicitation. Therefore, neither crime is included in the other and the two crimes do not merge. People v. Hood, 878 P.2d 89 (Colo. App. 1994).

The statutory elements of the general inchoate offense of solicitation do not apply to the separate substantive offense of soliciting for child prostitution. The offense of soliciting for child prostitution is an offense in and of itself with its own designated penalty level. People v. Jacobs, 91 P.3d 438 (Colo. App. 2003).

Solicitation for deviate sexual intercourse is no longer prohibited. People v. Gibson, 184 Colo. 444, 521 P.2d 774 (1974).

PART 4

RENUNCIATION AND ABANDONMENT