Colorado § 18-17-103 - Definitions.

§ 18-17-103. Definitions.

As used in this article 17, unless the context otherwise requires:

(1) "Documentary material" means any book, paper, document, writing, drawing, graph, chart, photograph, phonorecord, magnetic tape, computer printout, other data compilation from which information can be obtained or from which information can be translated into usable form, or other functionally similar tangible item.

(2) "Enterprise" means any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, trust, or other legal entity or any chartered union, association, or group of individuals, associated in fact although not a legal entity, and shall include illicit as well as licit enterprises and governmental as well as other entities.

(3) "Pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging in at least two acts of racketeering activity which are related to the conduct of the enterprise, if at least one of such acts occurred in this state after July 1, 1981, and if the last of such acts occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after a prior act of racketeering activity.

(4) "Person" means any individual or entity holding or capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.

(5) "Racketeering activity" means to commit, to attempt to commit, to conspire to commit, or to solicit, coerce, or intimidate another person to commit:

(a) Any conduct defined as "racketeering activity" under 18 U.S.C. 1961 (1)(A), (1)(B), (1)(C), and (1)(D); or

(b) Any violation of the following Colorado statutes or any criminal act committed in any jurisdiction of the United States that, if committed in this state, would be a crime under the following Colorado statutes:

(I) Offenses against the person, as defined in sections 18-3-102 (first degree murder), 18-3-103 (second degree murder), 18-3-104 (manslaughter), 18-3-202 (first degree assault), 18-3-203 (second degree assault), 18-3-204 (third degree assault), 18-3-206 (menacing), 18-3-207 (criminal extortion), 18-3-301 (first degree kidnapping), 18-3-302 (second degree kidnapping), 18-3-503 (human trafficking for involuntary servitude), and 18-3-504 (human trafficking for sexual servitude);

(II) Offenses against property, as defined in sections 18-4-102 (first degree arson), 18-4-103 (second degree arson), 18-4-104 (third degree arson), 18-4-105 (fourth degree arson), 18-4-202 (first degree burglary), 18-4-203 (second degree burglary), 18-4-301 (robbery), 18-4-302 (aggravated robbery), 18-4-401 (theft), 18-4-409 (motor vehicle theft), 18-4-409.5 (unauthorized use of a motor vehicle), and 18-4-501 (criminal mischief);

(III) Offenses involving cybercrime, as defined in article 5.5 of this title 18;

(IV) Offenses involving fraud, as defined in sections 18-5-102 (forgery), 18-5-104 (second degree forgery), 18-5-105 (criminal possession of forged instrument), 18-5-109 (criminal possession of forgery devices), 18-5-110.5 (trademark counterfeiting), 6-16-111, C.R.S., (felony charitable fraud), 18-5-206 (defrauding a secured creditor or debtor), 18- 5-309 (money laundering), 18-5-403 (bribery in sports), 18-5-113 (criminal impersonation), 18-5-114 (offering a false document for recording), 18-5-702 (unauthorized use of a financial transaction device), 18-5-705 (criminal possession or sale of a blank financial transaction device), 18-5-706 (criminal possession of forgery devices), 18-5-707 (unlawful manufacture of a financial transaction device), 18-5-902 (identity theft), 18-5-903 (criminal possession of a financial device), 18-5-903.5 (criminal possession of an identification document), 18-5-904 (gathering identity information by deception), and 18-5-905 (possession of identity theft tools);

(V) Offenses involving the family relation, as defined in section 18-6-403 (sexual exploitation of children);

(VI) Offenses relating to morals, as defined in sections 18-7-102 (wholesale promotion of obscenity or promotion of obscenity), 18-7-203 (pandering), 18-7-206 (pimping), 18-7-402 (soliciting for commercial sexual activity with a child), 18-7-403 (pandering of a child), 18-7-404 (keeping a place of commercial sexual activity with a child), 18-7-405 (pimping of a child), and the offenses in sections 18-7-402, 18-7-404, and 18-7-405, as those sections existed before July 1, 2026;

(VII) Offenses involving governmental operations, as defined in sections 18-8-302 (bribery), 18-8-303 (compensation for past official behavior), 18-8-306 (attempt to influence a public servant), 18-8-402 (misuse of official information), 18-8-502 (first degree perjury), 18-8-503 (second degree perjury), 18-8-603 (bribe-receiving by a witness), 18-8-606 (bribing a juror), 18-8-608 (intimidating a juror), 18-8-609 (jury-tampering), 18-8-610 (tampering with physical evidence), 18-8-703 (bribing a witness or victim), 18-8-704 (intimidating a witness or victim), and 18-8-707 (tampering with a witness or victim);

(VIII) Offenses against public peace, order, and decency, as defined in sections 18-9-303 (prohibited wiretapping) and 18-9-304 (prohibited eavesdropping);

(IX) Gambling, as defined in sections 18-10-103 (2) (professional gambling), 18-10-105 (possession of a gambling device or record), 18-10-106 (transmission of receipt of gambling information), and 18-10-107 (maintaining gambling premises);

(X) Offenses relating to firearms and weapons, as defined in sections 18-12-102 (possessing an illegal weapon or a dangerous weapon), 18-12-107.5 (illegal discharge of a firearm), and 18-12-109 (possession, use, or removal of explosives or incendiary devices or the possession of components thereof);

(XI) Offenses involving the making, financing, or collection of loans, as defined in sections 18-15-102 (extortionate extension of credit), 18-15-104 (engaging in criminal usury), 18-15-105 (financing extortionate extensions of credit), 18-15-106 (financing criminal usury), 18-15-107 (collection of extensions of credit by extortionate means), and 18-15-108 (possession or concealment of records of criminal usury);

(XII) Fraud upon the department of revenue, as defined in section 39-21-118, C.R.S.;

(XIII) Securities offenses, as defined in sections 11-51-401 and 11-51-603 (registration of brokers and dealers), 11-51-301 and 11-51-603 (registration of securities), and 11-51-501 and 11-51-603 (fraud and other prohibited practices), C.R.S.;

(XIV) Offenses relating to controlled substances (part 1 of article 280 of title 12, part 2 of article 80 of title 27, and article 18 of this title 18);

(XV) Offenses relating to taxation, as defined in section 39-22-621, C.R.S.;

(XVI) Offenses relating to limited gaming, as defined in article 20 of this title 18 or article 30 of title 44; and

(XVII) Offenses relating to telecommunications crime as set forth in section 18-9-309.

(6) "Unlawful debt" means a debt incurred or contracted in an illegal gambling activity or business or which is unenforceable under state or federal law in whole or in part as to principal or interest because of the law relating to usury.

Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1015, § 1, effective July 1; (5)(b)(XIV) amended, p. 2032, § 48, effective July 14. L. 82: (5)(b)(XIII) amended, p. 623, § 19, effective April 2; (5)(b)(II) amended, p. 254, § 11, effective May 3. L. 83: (5)(b)(VI) and (5)(b)(X) amended, p. 2048, §§5, 6, effective October 14. L. 84: (5)(b)(VII) amended, p. 503, § 6, effective July 1. L. 88: (5)(b)(IV) amended, p. 358, § 2, effective July 1. L. 90: (5)(b)(II) amended, p. 987, § 12, effective April 24; (5)(b)(XIII) amended, p. 740, § 4, effective July 1. L. 91: (5)(b)(XVI) added, p. 1582, § 10, effective June 4. L. 93: (5)(b)(X) amended, p. 969, § 3, effective July 1. L. 95: (5)(b)(IV) amended, p. 1256, § 21, effective July 1. L. 97: (5)(b)(XVII) added, p. 991, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2000: (5)(b)(IV) amended, p. 692, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2001: (5)(b)(IV) amended, p. 769, § 4, effective August 8. L. 2006: (5)(b)(IV) amended, p. 1323, § 9, effective July 1. L. 2009: (5)(b)(IV) amended, (SB 09-093), ch. 326, p. 1738, § 4, effective July 1, 2011. L. 2010: (5)(b)(I) amended, (SB 10-140), ch. 156, p. 536, § 2, effective April 21; (5)(b)(IV) amended, (HB 10-1081), ch. 256, p. 1140, §§ 2, 3, effective August 11. L. 2012: (5)(b)(XIV) amended, (HB 12-1311), ch. 281, p. 1620, § 50, effective July 1. L. 2013: (5)(b)(II), (HB 13-1160), ch. 373, p. 2200, § 11, effective June 5. L. 2014: (5)(b)(I) amended, (HB 14-1273), ch. 282, p. 1156, § 19, effective July 1. L. 2018: IP and (5)(b)(III) amended, (HB 18-1200), ch. 379, p. 2293, § 6, effective August 8; IP and (5)(b)(XVI) amended, (SB 18-034), ch. 14, p. 240, § 14, effective October 1. L. 2019: (5)(b)(XIV) amended, (HB 19-1172), ch. 136, p. 1677, § 101, effective October 1. L. 2023: (5)(b)(II) amended, (SB 23-097), ch. 309, p. 1888, § 3, effective July 1; IP(5)(b) and (5)(b)(II) amended, (HB 23-1293), ch. 298, p. 1794, § 54, effective October 1. L. 2026: IP(5)(b) and (5)(b)(VI) amended, (SB 26-015), ch. 335, p. 2042, § 24, effective July 1.

Editor's note: Amendments to subsection (5)(b)(II) by SB 23-097 and HB 23-1293 were harmonized.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2001 act amending subsection (5)(b)(IV), see section 1 of chapter 224, Session Laws of Colorado 2001. For the legislative declaration in SB 26-015, see section 1 of chapter 335, Session Laws of Colorado 2026.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Civil RICO Update: The Evolving 'Pattern' Requirement — Parts I and II", see 16 Colo. Law. 806 and 1004 (1987).

Neither the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) nor this act require that the plaintiff in a civil action aver and prove that the conduct described as racketeering activity is connected to organized crime. Plains Res., Inc. v. Gable, 782 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1986).

Federal case law under RICO is instructive in determining existence of a pattern of racketeering activity, in absence of prior interpretation by state courts, because Colorado Organized Crime Control Act (COCCA) was modeled after the federal act. People v. Chaussee, 847 P.2d 156 (Colo. App. 1992), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 880 P.2d 749 (Colo. 1994).

In order to establish "pattern of racketeering activity" under COCCA, it was not necessary to prove that the criminal acts meet standards of continuity or of relatedness to one another as those requirements have been established by judicial construction under RICO. People v. Chaussee, 880 P.2d 749 (Colo. 1994).

"Pattern of racketeering activity" under subsection (3) can be established by proving at least two acts of "racketeering", as defined in subsection (5), that are related to the conduct of the enterprise. People v. Chaussee, 880 P.2d 749 (Colo. 1994).

"Pattern of racketeering activity", as defined in subsection (3), found to exist. People v. Chaussee, 847 P.2d 156 (Colo. App. 1992), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 880 P.2d 749 (Colo. 1994).

As long as one act included in the pattern of racketeering activity occurred within its respective statute of limitations, evidence of other prior acts may be presented to establish a pattern, even if they could not give rise to a separate prosecution due to their own statutes of limitation, provided that the acts occurred within 10 years of the final charged act. People v. Davis, 2012 COA 56, 296 P.3d 219.

Alleged perjury and forgery in court proceedings arising from fraudulent scheme were not part of a "pattern of racketeering activity". People v. Chaussee, 847 P.2d 156 (Colo. App. 1992), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 880 P.2d 749 (Colo. 1994).

Acts intended solely to avoid personal liability after the enterprise has disbanded or ended cannot be predicate acts under COCCA. People v. Randell, 2012 COA 108, 297 P.3d 989.

Definition of "enterprise" not unconstitutionally impermissibly vague. Although the definition is broad, it is not so vague that a person of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning. People v. McGlotten, 166 P.3d 182 (Colo. App. 2007).

Defendant fit within the definition of "enterprise" where indictment defined "enterprise" as "a group of individuals..." and where alleged prostitution ring qualified as "a group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity". People v. Cerrone, 867 P.2d 143 (Colo. App. 1993), aff'd on other grounds, 900 P.2d 45 (Colo. 1995).

COCCA requires an "associated-in-fact enterprise" to have (1) a minimum amount of structure — namely, a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit the associates to pursue the enterprise's purpose and (2) an ongoing organization of associates, functioning as a continuing unit, that exists separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering activity in which it engages. McDonald v. People, 2021 CO 64, 494 P.3d 1123 (overruling in part People v. James, 40 P.3d 36 (Colo. App. 2001)).

Evidence failed to show an ongoing organization of associates functioning as a continuing unit that existed apart from the pattern of racketeering activity itself, as required to prove an "associated-in-fact enterprise", where the prosecution only presented evidence that the defendant was "close to" and "lived together" with certain of his associates and had "strong connections" with others. People v. Woodyard, 2023 COA 78, 540 P.3d 278.

Where the prosecution's proof of an "associated-in-fact enterprise" was sufficient to sustain the defendant's COCCA convictions under the law at the time of trial, the prosecution is not precluded by the double jeopardy bar from retrying the defendant on the COCCA charges. People v. Woodyard, 2023 COA 78, 540 P.3d 278.

Enterprise need not be separate and distinct from the racketeering activity. People v. Cerrone, 867 P.2d 143 (Colo. App. 1993), aff'd on other grounds, 900 P.2d 45 (Colo. 1995).

Defendant can be both the "person" and the "enterprise" defined in the statute. People v. Cerrone, 867 P.2d 143 (Colo. App. 1993), aff'd on other grounds, 900 P.2d 45 (Colo. 1995).

Vicarious liability claim against mortgage brokerage firm that employed licensed securities broker who violated this section survives motion to dismiss. Dolin v. Contemporary Fin. Sols., Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Colo. 2009).

Defendant's physical absence from any given illegal purchase by money launderer does not negate his culpability for a "pattern of racketeering activity" as a complicitor. Sufficient evidence was presented at trial that defendant intentionally aided, abetted, or encouraged illegal activity with knowledge of the circumstances surrounding money laundering and is therefore a complicitor in money laundering activity. People v. Butler, 2017 COA 98, 454 P.3d 280, aff'd on other grounds, 2019 CO 87, 450 P.3d 714.

Applied in Niemi v. Burgess, 874 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (D. Colo. 2012).