Colorado § 18-1-502 - Requirements for criminal liability in general and for offenses of strict liability and of mental culpability.

§ 18-1-502. Requirements for criminal liability in general and for offenses of strict liability and of mental culpability.

The minimum requirement for criminal liability is the performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act which he is physically capable of performing. If that conduct is all that is required for commission of a particular offense, or if an offense or some material element thereof does not require a culpable mental state on the part of the actor, the offense is one of "strict liability". If a culpable mental state on the part of the actor is required with respect to any material element of an offense, the offense is one of "mental culpability".

Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 404, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-1-602.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Homicides Under the Colorado Criminal Code", see 49 Den. L.J. 137 (1972). For article, "Criminal Prosecutions under the Colorado Securities Act", see 47 U. Colo. L. Rev. 233 (1976). For article, "Mens Rea and the Colorado Criminal Code", see 52 U. Colo. L. Rev. 167 (1981).

The minimum requirements for criminal liability are set out in this section. People v. Caddy, 189 Colo. 353, 540 P.2d 1089 (1975).

Conscious mental activity required. The minimal requirement for a "strict liability" offense is proof that the proscribed conduct was performed voluntarily — i.e., that such act must be the product of conscious mental activity involving effort or determination. People v. Rostad, 669 P.2d 126 (Colo. 1983).

Intoxication provision applicable in analysis of "voluntary act". Section 18-1-804 applies not only to the mental state of a defendant in general intent crimes but is also applicable in the analysis of a "voluntary act", as that phrase is used in the definition of criminal liability in this section. People v. Huskey, 624 P.2d 899 (Colo. App. 1980).

This section expressly removes any ambiguity as to the culpability requirement of § 18-4-105. That section states that if an offense does not require a culpable mental state on the part of the actor, the offense is one of strict liability. People v. Garcia, 189 Colo. 347, 541 P.2d 687 (1975).

Construed in accordance with this section, § 18-4-105 would be inapplicable to those situations in which there was no voluntary act or omission to perform an act within the physical capabilities of the person. Thus, the statute would not apply to a fire started by events beyond the actor's control. People v. Garcia, 189 Colo. 347, 541 P.2d 687 (1975).

However, the phrase "starts or maintains a fire" in § 18-4-105 must be read in accordance with § 18-1-501(9) and this section. People v. Garcia, 189 Colo. 347, 541 P.2d 687 (1975).

Cruelty to animals as proscribed by § 35-42-112 held to be strict liability offense. People v. Wilhelm, 676 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1984).

Cruelty to animals as proscribed by § 18-9-202 held to be an offense of mental culpability. People v. Wilhelm, 676 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1984).

Defendant did not perform a voluntary act required to commit the offense of taking protected wildlife without authorization where the taking was accomplished by events beyond defendant's control. A rainstorm, and not defendant's own conduct, caused one of defendant's wastewater containment ponds to flood into a river and kill fish downstream. Dept. of Nat. Res. v. 5 Star Feedlot, 2021 CO 27, 486 P.3d 250.

Applied in People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1981); People v. Noble, 635 P.2d 203 (Colo. 1981); Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1982); People v. Saiz, 660 P.2d 2 (Colo. App. 1982).