Colorado § 17-22.5-301 - Good time.

§ 17-22.5-301. Good time.

(1) Each person sentenced for a crime committed on or after July 1, 1979, but before July 1, 1981, whose conduct indicates that he has substantially observed all of the rules and regulations of the institution or facility in which he has been confined and has faithfully performed the duties assigned to him shall be entitled to a good time deduction of fifteen days a month from his sentence. The good time authorized by this section shall vest quarterly and may not be withdrawn once it has vested. No more than forty-five days of good time may be withheld by the department in any three-month period of sentence.

(2) Each person sentenced for a crime committed on or after July 1, 1981, but before July 1, 1985, shall be subject to all the provisions of this part 3; except that the good time authorized by this section shall vest semiannually and no more than ninety days of good time may be withheld by the department in any six-month period of sentence.

(3) Each person sentenced for a crime committed on or after July 1, 1985, shall be subject to all the provisions of this part 3; except that the good time authorized by this section shall not vest and may be withheld or deducted by the department.

(4) Nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the department from withholding good time earnable in subsequent periods of sentence, but not yet earned, for conduct occurring in a given period of sentence.

Source: L. 84: Entire article R&RE, p. 520, § 1, effective July 1. L. 85: (3) amended, p. 646, § 1, effective June 6. L. 98: (3) amended, p. 727, § 10, effective May 18.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 17-22.5-101 as it existed prior to 1984.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Adult Parole in Colorado: An Overview", see 44 Colo. Law. 37 (May 2015).

Annotator's note. Since § 17-22.5-301 is similar to former § 17-22.5-101, relevant cases construing that provision have been included with the annotations to this section. For other cases construing good time provisions, see the annotations under § 17-22.5-201.

There is no constitutional right to good-time credits for presentence confinement. People v. Cooper, 662 P.2d 478 (Colo. 1983); People v. Turman, 659 P.2d 1368 (Colo. 1983).

But former § 17-22.5-101 mandated good-time credit for presentence confinement. People v. Chavez, 659 P.2d 1381 (Colo. 1983).

The creation and distribution of good time credits is a matter committed to the authority of the legislature. A trial court order stipulating that credit be given an inmate for good time, presentence confinement, and time served in a community corrections program does not override the discretionary authority granted the department of corrections by the general assembly to withhold or withdraw such credits. Renneke v. Kautzky, 782 P.2d 343 (Colo. 1989).

For crimes committed on or after July 1, 1985, credit for good time is within discretionary authority of the department of corrections. Since the department of corrections may withhold or deduct good time credits, an inmate's maximum control date, as initially calculated by the department of corrections, is not necessarily the date upon which he is entitled to unconditional release. Renneke v. Kautzky, 782 P.2d 343 (Colo. 1989).

Presentence confinement. There is no statutory requirement that a sentencing court include in the mittimus information concerning a defendant's eligibility for good time credit for time spent in presentence confinement. Although such information is often included in the mittimus, it is the department of corrections alone which ultimately determines whether a defendant receives and maintains good time credit. People v. White, 981 P.2d 624 (Colo. App. 1998).

Confinement in county jail. To the extent that a defendant's sentence is served by confinement in county jail, the good-time credit provisions of former § 17-22.5-101 applied. People v. Chavez, 659 P.2d 1381 (Colo. 1983); People v. Roedel, 701 P.2d 891 (Colo. App. 1985).

By statute, good time credit for presentence confinement exists only in the case of crimes committed on or after July 1, 1979. People v. Emig, 676 P.2d 1156 (Colo. 1984).

When defendant entitled to credits. Where the trial court accepts a stipulation stating that the defendant substantially observed all of the rules and regulations of the county jail and faithfully performed the duties assigned to him, he is entitled to good-time credits for his presentence confinement. People v. Hamilton, 662 P.2d 177 (Colo. 1983); People v. Roedel, 701 P.2d 891 (Colo. App. 1985).

Where presentence report reflects that defendant had met the other requirements for a "good time" credit for the period of his presentence confinement, this section requires that the department of corrections recognize such credit. People v. Chavez, 659 P.2d 1381 (Colo. 1983); People v. Johnson, 776 P.2d 1141 (Colo. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 797 P.2d 1296 (Colo. 1990).

Use of word "shall" mandates good time deduction to each person whose conduct indicates that he or she has observed the rules and regulations of the facility in which such person is confined. People v. Galvin, 835 P.2d 603 (Colo. App. 1992).

Because equal protection and due process claims were not clearly established rights at the time presentence good time credits of inmate were improperly withheld, individual defendants are qualifiedly immune from suit for compensatory damages. Griess v. State of Colo., 841 F.2d 1042 (10th Cir. 1988) (decided under former § 17-20-107).

An inmate who is incarcerated in the state prison system is eligible for two types of time deduction from his sentence. The first is "good time", under this section, which rewards the inmate who substantially observes the rules and regulations of the facility in which he is confined and who faithfully performs his assigned duties. The second is "earned time" pursuant to § 17-22.5-302 (1) which is provided if the inmate makes substantial progress in matters such as work and training. Bynum v. Kautzky, 784 P.2d 735 (Colo. 1989).

Aggregation of consecutive sentences is proper when calculating good time credit. People v. Broga, 750 P.2d 59 (Colo. 1988).

Good time and earned time credits do not constitute service of sentence and are only used to determine inmate's parole eligibility date. Thorson v. Dept. of Corr., 801 P.2d 540 (Colo. 1990); Myers v. Price, 842 P.2d 229 (Colo. 1992).

For inmates convicted of crimes committed after July 1, 1993, good time credits awarded by this section are only applied to calculate parole eligibility and not applied toward an inmate's mandatory release date. Ankeney v. Raemisch, 2015 CO 14, 344 P.3d 847.

Although the legislature revised and relocated the good time, earned time, and parole provisions originally included in § 16-11-310, eventually moving them to their present location in the statutes in this section and §§ 17-22.5-302 and 17-22.5-303, there is nothing in those revisions which would indicate that § 16-11-310 was meant to render inoperative the provision in § 17-22.5-303 allowing reincarceration for a parole violation. Such an interpretation is unjustified since it would severely undermine the ability of the parole system to effect the successful reintegration of former inmates into the community while recognizing the need for public safety. Bynum v. Kautzky, 784 P.2d 735 (Colo. 1989).

The earned time and good time provisions of this section and § 17-22.5-302 do not preclude the reincarceration of an inmate for violation of his parole. These sections, together with § 16-11-310 (now repealed), were only intended to establish the mandatory date of release on parole. Thus, with respect to parole, the good time and earned time credits "vest" only for the purpose of determining parole eligibility, not for purposes of determining whether reincarceration is possible once a former inmate has violated his parole. Bynum v. Kautzky, 784 P.2d 735 (Colo. 1989); Williamson v. Jordan, 797 P.2d 744 (Colo. 1990); Jones v. Martinez, 799 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1990).

Section does not limit the place of confinement where good-time credit can be earned to only those facilities under the supervision of the department of corrections. Community corrections board also has the discretion to withhold or deduct against good-time credits. People v. Galvin, 835 P.2d 603 (Colo. App. 1992).

Good time and earned time credits are not to be credited towards service of sentence but only toward eligibility for parole. Rather v. Suthers, 973 P.2d 1264 (Colo. 1999).

Person convicted of a sex offense is not entitled to mandatory parole; therefore, the accumulation of good time and earned time credits do not make person eligible for immediate release. Rather v. Suthers, 973 P.2d 1264 (Colo. 1999).