Colorado § 16-4-201 - Bail after conviction.

§ 16-4-201. Bail after conviction.

(1) (a) After conviction, either before or after sentencing, the defendant may orally, or in writing, move for release on bail pending determination of a motion for a new trial or motion in arrest of judgment or during any stay of execution or pending review by an appellate court, and, except in cases where the defendant has been convicted of a capital offense, the trial court, in its discretion, may continue the bond given for pretrial release, or may release the defendant on bond with additional conditions including monetary conditions, or require bond under one or more of the alternatives set forth in section 16-4-104.

(b) The district attorney must be present at the time the court passes on a defendant's motion for release on bail after conviction.

(c) Bond shall not be continued in effect following a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere or following conviction unless the written consents of the sureties, if any, are filed with the court. In the initial bond documents filed with the court, a surety shall indicate, in writing and at the time of the posting of bond, if the surety consents to the continuance of the bond through sentencing of the defendant. If the surety does not provide written consent at the time of the initial posting of bond, the surety may provide written consent at the time of the plea of guilty or nolo contendere or within a reasonable time thereafter as determined by the court. A court shall not require the posting of any form of bond that allows for the continuance of said bond after a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere or following conviction without filing with the court the written consents of the sureties, if any.

(d) For a defendant who has been convicted of a felony offense, a condition of bail bond shall be that the court shall require the defendant to execute or subscribe a written prior waiver of extradition stating that the defendant consents to extradition to this state and waives all formal procedures incidental to extradition proceedings in the event that he or she is arrested in another state while released on such bail bond and acknowledging that he or she shall not be admitted to bail in any other state pending extradition to this state.

(2) After conviction, a defendant who is granted probation pursuant to section 18-1.3-202, C.R.S., may orally, or in writing, move for a stay of probation pending determination of a motion for a new trial or a motion in arrest of judgment or pending review by an appellate court. The trial court, in its discretion, may grant a stay of probation and require the defendant to post an appeal bond under one or more of the alternatives set forth in section 16-4-104. The district attorney shall be present at the time the court passes on a defendant's motion for stay of probation after conviction.

Source: L. 72: R&RE, p. 209, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 39-4-201. L. 85: Entire section amended, p. 621, § 3, effective July 1. L. 94: Entire section amended, p. 97, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2002: (2) amended, p. 1490, § 131, effective October 1. L. 2006: (1) amended, p. 341, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2012: (1)(c) amended, (HB 12-1310), ch. 268, p. 1393, § 5, effective June 7. L. 2013: (1)(a) amended, (HB 13-1236), ch. 202, p. 839, § 3, effective May 11.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (2), see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Staying Enforcement of a Judgment Pending Appeal", see 48 Colo. Law. 30 (May 2019).

Annotator's note. Since § 16-4-201 is similar to repealed § 39-2-19, CRS 53, and laws antecedent to CSA, C. 48, § 443, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

The court had authority at common law to admit to bail after conviction. People v. Junes, 77 Colo. 38, 233 P. 1109 (1925).

The trial court retains jurisdiction to grant or deny an appeal bond even after the defendant has filed a notice of appeal. The trial court retains jurisdiction to act with respect to matters which are not relative to or do not affect the order or judgment on appeal. Since the granting or denial of an appeal bond has no impact or bearing upon the underlying conviction or related issues pending on appeal, the trial court retains jurisdiction. People v. Stewart, 26 P.3d 17 (Colo. App. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 55 P.3d 107 (Colo. 2002).

Purpose of section. The purpose of § 16-4-106 and this section is to authorize the court to exercise discretion rather than follow a fixed policy and to permit a recognizance to remain in effect, without the necessity of a new bond, after conviction and until disposition of the case in the trial court. Trujillo v. District Court, 131 Colo. 428, 282 P.2d 703 (1955).

Section 16-4-106 and this section must be read together and reconciled if possible. Rodriguez v. People, 191 Colo. 540, 554 P.2d 291 (1976).

Power to admit to bail after conviction is discretionary with the trial court; it is not a matter of right. People v. Junes, 77 Colo. 38, 233 P. 1109 (1925).

Probationer awaiting adjudication of a petition to revoke probation or a deferred judgment does not have a right to bond despite the fact that the revocation motions are based on a new charge for which the probationer is presumed innocent. People v. Johnson, 2017 COA 97, 488 P.3d 232.

Entry of guilty verdict or acceptance of guilty plea completes conviction. For purposes of the bail bond statute, a "conviction" occurs and is complete either upon the entry of a guilty verdict following trial or upon the acceptance of a plea of guilty, either to the original charge or to a lesser included charge. People v. Bartsch, 37 Colo. App. 52, 543 P.2d 1273 (1975).

"Conviction" occurs upon entry of a plea of guilty. Rodriguez v. People, 191 Colo. 540, 554 P.2d 291 (1976).

The word "conviction" in this section cannot include sentencing; it must refer to an occurrence before sentence. People v. Bartsch, 37 Colo. App. 52, 543 P.2d 1273 (1975).

Misdescription of crime in recognizance, after conviction, is not fatal. People v. Junes, 77 Colo. 38, 233 P. 1109 (1925).

Where defendant entered plea of guilty, surety's obligation under recognizance bond was terminated. Rodriguez v. People, 191 Colo. 540, 554 P.2d 291 (1976).

And trial court could not continue bond without first obtaining surety's consent. Rodriguez v. People, 191 Colo. 540, 554 P.2d 291 (1976).

Although the trial judge may continue the original bond to final disposition, he must obtain the consent of the surety to continue it beyond conviction. Rodriguez v. People, 191 Colo. 540, 554 P.2d 291 (1976).

This section does not require separate or renewed consent of sureties at various stages of the proceeding. O'Neil v. People, 198 Colo. 9, 595 P.2d 235 (1979).

Statutes relating to bail constitute part of the surety's contract. People v. Hampton, 662 P.2d 498 (Colo. App. 1983).

Applicability of pretrial bond to post-trial period. While the terms of the original pretrial bond may also cover the post-trial period, without such a provision, this section is controlling as to post-trial continuances of a bond. Where the language and terms of the original bond do not provide the court with the requisite written consent to continue liability beyond conviction, oral statements to the court, after the defendant fails to appear, do not bind the surety. People v. Hampton, 662 P.2d 498 (Colo. App. 1983).

Where contract deemed to impose postconviction liability. By executing bail bond contracts containing language binding them until the final sentence or order of the court, sureties are deemed to have given the statutorily required written consent to continue their liability on the bonds after conviction and until sentencing. O'Neil v. People, 198 Colo. 9, 595 P.2d 235 (1979).

Defendant's tender of signed petition and stipulation constituted a "plea of guilty" within the meaning of the bond statute, and a formal statement by the court accepting the guilty plea was not necessary. People v. Hernandez, 902 P.2d 846 (Colo. App. 1995).

A conviction is not necessary to exonerate the surety; a plea of guilty suffices. People v. Hernandez, 902 P.2d 846 (Colo. App. 1995).

Entry of a guilty plea constitutes an "answer" to the charges and satisfies the terms of a bond that bound the surety until the defendant "answered" the charges against him. People v. Hernandez, 902 P.2d 846 (Colo. App. 1995).

Applied in People v. Tyler, 784 P.2d 815 (Colo. App. 1989).