Colorado § 16-19-116 - Commitment to await requisition - bail.

§ 16-19-116. Commitment to await requisition - bail.

If from the examination before the judge it appears that the person held is the person charged with having committed the crime alleged and, except in cases arising under section 16-19-107, that he or she has fled from justice, the judge shall, by a warrant reciting the accusation, commit him or her to the county jail for such a time not exceeding thirty-five days and as specified in the warrant as will enable the arrest of the accused to be made under a warrant of the governor on a requisition of the executive authority of the state having jurisdiction of the offense, unless the accused gives bail as provided in section 16-19-117, or until he or she is legally discharged.

Source: L. 53: p. 318, § 15. CSA: C. 72, § 60. CRS 53: § 60-1-15. C.R.S. 1963: § 60-1-15. L. 2012: Entire section amended, (SB 12-175), ch. 208, p. 861, § 98, effective July 1.

ANNOTATION

Requisition and warrant must issue. Although extradition proceedings need not necessarily be instituted by formal requisition from the executive authority of the demanding state and warrant from the executive authority of the asylum state, such a requisition and warrant must issue at some point in the proceedings. Capra v. Miller, 161 Colo. 448, 422 P.2d 636 (1967).

Once valid governor's warrant is issued, illegalities and irregularities relating to detention of fugitive are moot. Whittington v. Bray, 200 Colo. 17, 612 P.2d 72 (1980); Casler v. Nelson, 661 P.2d 1166 (Colo. 1983).

This section, together with § 16-19-118, imposes an outside limit of ninety days during which a person may be committed to the county jail while awaiting the execution of the governor's warrant issued in accordance with the requisition of the executive authority of the demanding state. Garcia v. Cooper, 711 P.2d 1255 (Colo. 1986).

Second extradition proceeding not precluded by expiration of ninety days. Garcia v. Cooper, 711 P.2d 1255 (Colo. 1986).

Extension of time was within court's discretion. Where the governor's warrant was issued on the same day the district attorney applied for and was granted the extension of time, and the defendant had shown no prejudice, the extension of time was clearly within the court's discretion. Norrod v. Bower, 187 Colo. 421, 532 P.2d 330 (1975).

Although appellant was held in jail thirty-nine days before continuance was requested, the court did have the authority to grant a continuance under § 16-19-118 and the extension granted was within the court's discretion, where the appellant was not prejudiced by the detention. Whittington v. Bray, 200 Colo. 17, 612 P.2d 72 (1980); Alliey v. Lamm, 711 P.2d 1258 (Colo. 1986).

Res judicata may not be invoked to bar a second extradition proceeding. An initial discharge and dismissal of an extradition proceeding does not constitute an adjudication on the merits that the defendant was not wanted by the state of Florida for violating the terms of his probation. Garcia v. Cooper, 711 P.2d 1255 (Colo. 1986); Morris v. McGoff, 728 P.2d 720 (Colo. 1986).

Applied in Gerard v. Ossola, 649 P.2d 1110 (Colo. 1982); Schumm v. Nelson, 659 P.2d 1389 (Colo. 1983); Dawson v. Nelson, 661 P.2d 683 (Colo. 1983).