Colorado § 16-19-106 - Extradition of persons imprisoned or awaiting trial.

§ 16-19-106. Extradition of persons imprisoned or awaiting trial.

(1) When it is desired to have returned to this state a person charged in this state with a crime, and such person is imprisoned or is held under criminal proceedings then pending against him in another state, the governor of this state may agree with the executive authority of the other state for the extradition of that person before the conclusion of such proceedings or his term of sentence in the other state, upon condition that such person be returned to the other state at the expense of this state as soon as the prosecution in this state is terminated.

(2) The governor of this state may also surrender on demand of the executive authority of any other state any person in this state who is charged in the manner provided in section 16-19-124 with having violated the laws of the state whose executive authority is making the demand, even though such person left the demanding state involuntarily.

Source: L. 53: p. 315, § 5. CSA: C. 72, § 50. CRS 53: § 60-1-5. C.R.S. 1963: § 60-1-5.

ANNOTATION

Section deals with problem of extraditing prisoners already in custody. This section was specifically designed to deal with the problem of extraditing and returning those prisoners who are already in the custody of the authorities of another state by reason of imprisonment or awaiting trial. Watson v. Enslow, 183 Colo. 435, 517 P.2d 1346 (1974).

This section is both a grant and limitation of executive authority. Watson v. Enslow, 183 Colo. 435, 517 P.2d 1346 (1974).

And sets forth the course of conduct which the Colorado governor must follow. Watson v. Enslow, 183 Colo. 435, 517 P.2d 1346 (1974).

Subsection (1) affirmative duty on executive and provides standard to state of origin. The clause in subsection (1) requiring that return be made "as soon as the prosecution in this state is terminated" is an affirmative duty that the general assembly has imposed in the executive, is clearly intended to provide a standard to the state of origin, informing that state as to the proper time for demand, and gives the governor of Colorado a standard for determining when a demand for return is both timely and proper. Watson v. Enslow, 183 Colo. 435, 517 P.2d 1346 (1974).

This grant of authority is addressed to governor's discretion. But once having exercised that discretion, the powers and duties of the governor are controlled by the terms of this section. Watson v. Enslow, 183 Colo. 435, 517 P.2d 1346 (1974).

Executive authority limited to make surrender at later date. Where an executive agreement based on this statute has been made, the failure to return a person according to the terms of the statute limits the authority of Colorado executive to make surrender at a later date. Watson v. Enslow, 183 Colo. 435, 517 P.2d 1346 (1974).

Governor was without authority to make return. Where extradition request was filed more than eight years after petitioner's appellate proceedings in Colorado had terminated, Colorado governor, who had entered into an executive agreement with requesting state, was without authority under this section to make the requested return. Watson v. Enslow, 183 Colo. 435, 517 P.2d 1346 (1974).

Demand in alternative adequate. Demand for extradition complied with § 16-19-104 although the requisition documents contained both a demand for extradition, pursuant to § 16-19-103, and a request for extradition predicated on this section, which controls executive agreements, since the executive agreement, which accompanied the requisition documents, served only to ensure that the demanding state would return and surrender defendant to the Colorado authorities upon the completion of the trial in the demanding state. Buffalo v. Tanksley, 189 Colo. 45, 536 P.2d 827 (1975).

"Flagging device" on file permitted. Another state may request that Colorado authorities notify it 60 days prior to the petitioner's release so that his consecutive sentence could be served there. The request for notification is no more than a "flagging device", which allows the requesting state to take whatever action it deems appropriate. Moore v. Ricketts, 654 P.2d 837 (Colo. 1982).