Colorado § 16-14-103 - Duties of superintendent upon delivery of request.

§ 16-14-103. Duties of superintendent upon delivery of request.

(1) Any request made pursuant to section 16-14-102 shall be delivered to the superintendent where the prisoner is confined who shall forthwith:

(a) Certify the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served on the sentence, the time remaining to be served, the earned time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state board of parole relating to the prisoner; and

(b) Send, by registered mail, a copy of the request made by the prisoner and a copy of the information certified under paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) to both the court having jurisdiction of the untried offense and to the prosecuting official charged with the duty of prosecuting the offense.

Source: L. 69: p. 291, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 39-23-2. L. 76: IP(1) amended, p. 532, § 8, effective April 9. L. 90: (1)(a) amended, p. 954, § 21, effective June 7.

Cross references: For provisions concerning good time and parole, see article 22.5 of title 17.

ANNOTATION

Provisions similar to interstate agreement on detainers (IAD). Provisions in this article mandating that prison authorities "forthwith" furnish the certified statement and request, and directing that failure to comply with the specified time requirements for commencing trial will result in dismissal, are almost identical to the analogous provision in the IAD. People v. Bean, 44 Colo. App. 373, 619 P.2d 72 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 650 P.2d 565 (Colo. 1982).

There is no requirement in this section that defendant demonstrate prejudice as a result of prison officials' violation of the requirement to act "forthwith" on his behalf. People v. Bean, 44 Colo. App. 373, 619 P.2d 72 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 650 P.2d 565 (Colo. 1982).

Burden of establishing that request was "forthwith" transmitted to the court rests on the state. People v. Bean, 650 P.2d 565 (Colo. 1982).

Notice of detainer. The prosecution has the burden of proving that a defendant is not prejudiced, as measured against the purposes of the uniform act, by the failure on the part of the superintendent of the institution in which the prisoner is confined to inform the defendant promptly of the existence of a detainer and of the defendant's rights, as required by § 16-14-102 (2). People v. Higinbotham, 712 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1986).

Neither classification reviews or transportation orders constitute a "detainer" sufficient to trigger a superintendent's duty to promptly notify a prisoner of source and nature of untried indictment, information, or criminal complaint against such prisoner. People v. Morgan, 712 P.2d 1004 (Colo. 1986).

A superintendent's obligation to inform a prisoner pursuant to § 16-14-102 (2) does not arise until a detainer has in fact been filed; "knowledge" of untried charges for the purposes of § 16-14-102 (2) does not occur until a detainer has been filed. People v. Bolin, 712 P.2d 1002 (Colo. 1986).

Where defendant suffered no prejudice from superintendent's delay in sending copy of request to trial court and prosecutor, dismissal of charges is not warranted. Martin v. People, 738 P.2d 789 (Colo. 1987).

Superintendent's duties are invoked by prisoner's request. The superintendent's duties under this section are invoked whenever a prisoner's request under § 16-14-102 (1) is delivered to the superintendent, notwithstanding the absence of a detainer lodged against the prisoner. People v. Trancoso, 776 P.2d 374 (Colo. 1989).

Prisoner who mails a UMDDA motion directly to the court has delivered it incorrectly. People v. Gess, 250 P.3d 734 (Colo. App. 2010).

Defendant's request for a UMDDA trial was insufficient because it was one sentence in a four-page document filed pro se by defendant who was represented by counsel, the document was misleadingly labeled, and it was improperly delivered. People v. Roberts, 2013 COA 50, 321 P.3d 581.

Court did not err in denying consideration of defendant's request for final disposition when defendant improperly mailed the request directly to the court and no evidence existed that the superintendent or prosecutor ever received the request. People v. Adolf, 2012 COA 60, 296 P.3d 251.