Colorado § 16-14-102 - Request for disposition of untried complaint or information.

§ 16-14-102. Request for disposition of untried complaint or information.

(1) Any person who is in the custody of the department of corrections pursuant to section 16-11-301 or parts 8 and 9 of article 1.3 of title 18, C.R.S., may request final disposition of any untried indictment, information, or criminal complaint pending against him in this state. The request shall be in writing addressed to the court in which the indictment, information, or criminal complaint is pending and to the prosecuting official charged with the duty of prosecuting it and shall set forth the place of confinement.

(2) It is the duty of the superintendent of the institution where the prisoner is confined to promptly inform each prisoner, in writing, of the source and nature of any untried indictment, information, or criminal complaint against him of which the superintendent has knowledge, and of the prisoner's right to make a request for final disposition thereof.

(3) Failure of the superintendent of the institution where the prisoner is confined to inform a prisoner, as required by subsection (2) of this section, within one year after a detainer from this state has been filed with the institution where the prisoner is confined shall entitle the prisoner to a dismissal with prejudice of the indictment, information, or criminal complaint.

Source: L. 69: p. 291, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 39-23-1. L. 76: (2) and (3) amended, p. 532, § 7, effective April 9. L. 77: (1) amended, p. 902, § 6, effective August 1.

ANNOTATION

Provisions similar to interstate agreement on detainers (IAD). Provisions in this article mandating that prison authorities "forthwith" furnish the certified statement and request, and directing that failure to comply with the specified time requirements for commencing trial will result in dismissal, are almost identical to the analogous provision in the IAD. People v. Bean, 44 Colo. App. 373, 619 P.2d 72 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 650 P.2d 565 (Colo. 1982).

The Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA) and the IAD embody like policies and, generally, the principles of one may be applied to the other. People v. Morgan, 712 P.2d 1004 (Colo. 1986); Sweaney v. District Court, 713 P.2d 914 (Colo. 1986).

Failure to hold trial within prescribed time period requires dismissal of charges. This article by its express terms is jurisdictional, hence dismissal is required regardless of whether defendant was prejudiced by the delay. People v. Naulls, 937 P.2d 778 (Colo. App. 1996).

The general speedy trial statute, § 18-1-405, and not this act, applies to the retrial of charges on convictions overturned on appeal. The UMDDA applies only to untried charges, and the charges against this defendant, while still pending, were not untried. People v. Campbell, 885 P.2d 327 (Colo. App. 1994).

Filing of detainer not required. The right of a person in the custody of the department of corrections to request final disposition of criminal charges and thereby to obtain a right to trial within 90 days on those charges is not dependent upon the filing of a detainer. People v. Campbell, 742 P.2d 302 (Colo. 1987); People v. Trancoso, 776 P.2d 374 (Colo. 1989).

Sufficiency of request. Addressing the request for disposition to the chief judge of the appropriate court constitutes substantial compliance within the requirement that the defendant give the court notice that he wishes to invoke the provisions of the act. People v. Campbell, 742 P.2d 302 (Colo. 1987).

A prisoner's written request for disposition under this act, when sent to the superintendent, is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of this section. A prisoner's rights under this act cannot be defeated by the superintendent's failure to comply with his statutory duties under § 16-14-103. People v. Trancoso, 776 P.2d 374 (Colo. 1989).

Court did not err in denying consideration of defendant's request for final disposition when defendant improperly mailed the request directly to the court and no evidence existed that the superintendent or prosecutor ever received the request. People v. Adolf, 2012 COA 60, 296 P.3d 251.

Court properly nullified a motion requested by defendant's wife. A criminal defendant is not entitled to hybrid representation -- self-representation and representation by counsel -- and a court is entitled to ignore pro se filings submitted by a defendant represented by counsel. Moreover, defendant's wife, a nonattorney, filed the request, which she was not authorized to do. People v. Fields, 2025 COA 84, 581 P.3d 789.

Prison authorities must have "actual knowledge" of charges against a prisoner before a duty arises to promptly inform the prisoner of such charges. People v. Lewis, 680 P.2d 226 (Colo. 1984).

Mere awareness that charges are pending against an inmate in another jurisdiction does not trigger the superintendent's duty to inform the defendant of his rights under this article. People v. Yellen, 704 P.2d 306 (Colo. 1985).

A superintendent only has "knowledge" of an untried charge when a detainer has been filed. People v. Yellen, 704 P.2d 306 (Colo. 1985).

A person on parole is in custody of department of corrections for purposes of this section. People v. Gess, 250 P.3d 734 (Colo. App. 2010).

Revocation of parole not required for custody. A person placed on parole remains in the legal custody of the department of corrections and, therefore, revocation of parole is not required to invoke the protection of the uniform act. People v. Campbell, 742 P.2d 302 (Colo. 1987).

Where defendant was in jail for a parole violation, defendant, for purposes of this section, was considered to be in the custody of the department of corrections while in county jail. People v. Slusher, 43 P.3d 647 (Colo. App. 2001).

An outstanding arrest warrant for a prisoner is not an indictment, information, or criminal complaint and, therefore, does not trigger application of notice and speedy trial provisions of the uniform act. People v. Gonzales, 679 P.2d 1085 (Colo. 1984).

The existence of an untried indictment, information, or criminal complaint is necessary before a criminal may invoke the UMDDA procedural protection. A petition for a speedy disposition that predates the filing of an indictment, information, or complaint is a nullity with no legal effect on subsequently filed felony charges. People v. Calhoon, 897 P.2d 855 (Colo. App. 1994).

The UMDDA applies to all of a prisoner's untried charges, not just charges that occurred before incarceration. People v. Gess, 250 P.3d 734 (Colo. App. 2010).

A writing that makes a claim under the UMDDA must not be misleadingly labeled as a motion for habeas corpus relief and must be sent to both the court and prosecution. People v. Gess, 250 P.3d 734 (Colo. App. 2010).

Defendant's request for a UMDDA trial was insufficient because it was one sentence in a four-page document filed pro se by defendant who was represented by counsel, the document was misleadingly labeled, and it was improperly delivered. People v. Roberts, 2013 COA 50, 321 P.3d 581.

Prisoner cured defects in original UMDDA claim by filing a written motion with the court and asking the court to dismiss the charges at a subsequent hearing at which the prosecution was present. People v. Gess, 250 P.3d 734 (Colo. App. 2010).

Notice of detainer. The prosecution has the burden of proving that a defendant is not prejudiced, as measured against the purposes of the uniform act, by the failure on the part of the superintendent of the institution in which the prisoner is confined to inform the defendant promptly of the existence of the detainer and of the defendant's rights, as required by subsection (2). People v. Higinbotham, 712 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1986).

The appropriate measure for determining the imposition of a sanction for violations of subsection (2) properly begins with an examination of purposes furthered by the UMDDA. People v. Higinbotham, 712 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1986).

A violation of the prompt notification requirement in subsection (2) does not mandate an automatic dismissal of the charges against a defendant. People v. Higinbotham, 712 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1986).

There is no reason in the language or purpose of the statute to require that a prisoner request final disposition of a charge as a condition precedent to filing a motion to dismiss the charge because of an alleged violation of the prompt notification requirement of subsection (2). People v. Higinbotham, 712 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1986).

A superintendent's obligation to inform a prisoner pursuant to subsection (2) does not arise until a detainer has in fact been filed; "knowledge" of untried charges for the purposes of subsection (2) does not occur until a detainer has been filed. People v. Bolin, 712 P.2d 1002 (Colo. 1986).

If a detainer is never filed, then a superintendent's duty required by § 16-14-102 (2) does not arise. People v. Morgan, 712 P.2d 1004 (Colo. 1986).

Violation of the provisions of subsection (3) does not automatically deprive the court of jurisdiction. It does entitle the prisoner to dismissal of the charges, regardless of whether he or she suffered any prejudice from the delay in notification. But defendant could not overcome the time bar imposed by § 16-5-402 on the basis that his motion alleged a jurisdictional defect. People v. Slusher, 43 P.3d 647 (Colo. App. 2001).

Statute as basis for jurisdiction. See Buffalo v. Tanksley, 189 Colo. 45, 536 P.2d 827 (1975).

The procedural requirements of the UMDDA and the IAD do not apply to a detainer placing a hold on a prisoner based on an unresolved sentencing determination in another jurisdiction where the defendant has already been convicted on the charges. Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355 (Colo. 1993).

Time constraints of this section were not applicable to prosecution's motion to revoke deferred judgment and sentence where defendant's guilty plea had previously been accepted by the court. The phrase "untried indictment, information, or complaint" as used in this section does not apply to those situations in which a defendant has entered a guilty plea and the sentence is deferred. People v. Hastings, 903 P.2d 23 (Colo. App. 1994).

The provisions of this article govern intrastate detainers, which involve prisoners in the custody of the department of corrections in Colorado who have Colorado charges pending against them and the provisions of § 24-60-501, govern interstate detainers, filed by a compact state that has charges pending against a person imprisoned in another compact state. Johnson v. People, 939 P.2d 817 (Colo. 1997).

Applied in People v. Buggs, 186 Colo. 13, 525 P.2d 421 (1974); People v. Lopez, 41 Colo. App. 206, 587 P.2d 792 (1978); People v. Gonzales, 42 Colo. App. 517, 601 P.2d 644 (1979); People v. Swazo, 199 Colo. 486, 610 P.2d 1072 (1980); People v. Mascarenas, 666 P.2d 101 (Colo. 1983); People v. Sa'ra, 117 P.3d 51 (Colo. App. 2004).